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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
People can behave in two differing and sometimes conflicting ways. In line with a 
layperson’s understanding of behavior, people are on one side capable of behaving in a 
deliberate and reflective (i.e., non-automatic) manner. Under certain circumstances, 
however, people behave impulsively and in contrast to their intentions (i.e., 
automatically1).  
For instance, people are in general capable of self-regulating and controlling their 
drinking behavior. The consumption of alcohol can, for instance, be inhibited by negative 
expectancies of alcohol use (i.e., that drinking will produce negative outcomes). Then 
again, people sometimes behave in contrast to their intentions not to drink excessively 
(e.g., when binge drinking; Wiers, Houben, Smulders, Conrod, & Jones, 2006). Such a 
conflict between automatic and non-automatic behavior can best be observed in the 
behavior of addicts, who continue to excessively consume alcohol despite being aware 
of the negative consequences. However, alcohol addiction is only one example for the 
conflict of non-automatic and automatic behavior. It has also been shown, for instance, 
that people often act habitually against their dieting behavior (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999) 
or demonstrate discriminative behavior against a member of another ethnical group 
despite a self-reported endorsement of egalitarian beliefs (e.g., Greenwald, Oakes, & 
Hoffman, 2003; Payne, 2001).  
                                                 
1 Note, that the concept of automaticity will be elaborated on in detail below. For now, the layperson’s 
idea of automaticity suffices. 
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These observations have triggered a surge of interest in mental processes that 
mediate behavior. At the moment, dual-process models constitute the predominant way 
of thinking not only about how behavior is guided, but also regarding reasoning (Sloman, 
1996), attitude change (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
stereotyping (e.g., Devine, 1989) and a multitude of other facets of human cognition (for 
a review, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000). As implied by their name, all dual-process models 
are unified in the general assumption of two modes of information processing. 
In this introduction, I will elaborate on these two modes of processing, the systems 
they operate in, and the mechanisms by which they guide behavior. Further, I will present 
methods to experimentally assess automatic behavior, and the rationale by which they 
make inferences about the underlying processes. A general understanding of these 
methods is crucial for the understanding of the experimental research presented in this 
dissertation. Essentially, the starting point of my dissertational research is the idea that 
all behavior might be guided by only one type of mental processing, as proposed by De 
Houwer and colleagues (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009). Accordingly, a short overview of such a single-process model will be given. The 
introductory chapter concludes with an overview of the empirical chapters of my 
dissertation. 
DUAL PROCESS MODELS 
For some time now, cognitive psychologists have tried to explain the conflict between 
automatic and non-automatic behavior by proposing mechanisms by which behavior is 
causally mediated by mental processes and representations. As indicated above, dual-
process models of cognition propose two modes of information processing that operate 
in distinct ways within two separate systems of representations. Depending on the 
specific nomenclature the names for these two processes and systems differ (cf. Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000, p. 111, Table 1). I will refer to the processes, based on their defining 
structural difference, as associative and propositional processes. The systems in which 
they operate are named, accordingly, the associative and propositional system. In 
general, these two systems differ in the way in which information is represented, stored, 
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and processed. These differences determine the way in which resulting behavior is 
perceived. Specifically, whether a behavior is seen as automatic or non-automatic is a 
direct consequence of the processes that initiated the specific behavior. In general, a 
process can be called automatic in the sense that it can for instance operate 
unintentionally, uncontrollable, goal independent, purely stimulus driven, unconsciously, 
efficient, or fast (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006). However, these different features of 
automaticity do not always co-occur, and different processes can possess different 
features of automaticity (e.g., De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). 
Automaticity is not a distinct state but rather an umbrella term for multiple features 
processes can possess.2 Importantly, all dual-process models postulate consistently that 
the associative system operates under conditions of automaticity, while the rule-based 
processing within the propositional system requires cognitive capacity and motivation 
(e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Accordingly, behavior that is guided by the associative 
system is perceived as occurring under conditions of automaticity, whereas behavior that 
is based on propositional processing is seen as being non-automatic. Note, that this 
notion, i.e., that the two processing modes are divided along the concept of automaticity, 
is crucial within the context of my research. 
In the subsequent paragraphs the associative and propositional systems, their modes 
of processing, and the mechanisms by which they guide behavior will be discussed 
separately. My remarks will be closely tied to the reflective-impulsive model of Strack 
and Deutsch (2004), as behavior was integrated into their model of cognition in a most 
comprehensive manner. 
The associative system 
The associative system is thought of as a simple associative network. This idea 
originated from semantic network models of memory (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975) according to which long term memory is represented as a network of 
                                                 
2 Note, that this definition of automaticity applies to behavior to the same extent. Behavior can be 
automatic in the sense that it us unintentional, uncontrollable, independent of goals, stimulus driven, 
unconscious, efficient, or fast. 
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associations between mental concepts (or aspects of concepts)3. It is assumed that the 
associations between concepts are gradually formed and changed as a result of 
experience, based on temporal-spatial continuity and frequency of stimulus parings in 
the environment (e.g., Shanks, 2007). Consequentially, associations between concepts 
differ in their strength. Concepts are activated when their physical counterparts are 
perceived in the environment, or thought of (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). This activation 
then automatically spreads to other elements in proportion to the strength of the 
associative link and the strength of the initial activation of the concept. Elements within 
the associative system can be concepts, but also cognitive, affective or motor reactions 
(e.g., attention allocation, motivational tendencies, response programs; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). Consequentially, a behavior can be automatically initiated within the 
associative system by the activation of a concept that is associated with that behavior. 
Consider, for instance, the abovementioned example of habitual drinking behavior. A 
person, for whom the presence of a beer and its consumption co-occurred repeatedly in 
the past, has developed a strong association between the concept of beer and the 
behavioral scheme of drinking. Consequentially, the presence of a beer can automatically 
activate the associated behavior of drinking it (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Indeed, research 
in the addiction literature indicates that for heavy drinkers the consumption of alcohol is 
linked to positivity or arousal (e.g., De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004; Wiers, 
Van De Luitgaarden, Van Den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 2005; Wiers, Van Woerden, 
Smulders, & De Jong, 2002) or alcohol-related concepts (e.g., Friday night, feeling good; 
Stacy, Ames, & Grenard, 2006). The activation of such concepts can be seen as cues, that, 
once activated, automatically trigger action tendencies like the approach of alcohol 
(Palfai & Ostafin, 2003). 
The propositional system 
While automatic behavior is postulated to be guided by a system of mental 
associations, non-automatic behavior is assumed to be dependent on a system that 
                                                 
3 For the sake of simplicity, this explanation will be restricted to localist models. Note, that distributed 
memory models (e.g., Masson, 1995), although structurally more complex, do not differ from localist 
models in the basic assumption that the activation of concepts is thought of in terms of the associative 
process of spreading activation. 
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consists of propositional representations (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004). While the associative system can be thought of as a long-term memory 
system, the propositional system is assumed to possess the properties of a temporal 
storage, in that it generates declarative knowledge in the form of propositions. 
Structurally, propositions differ from associations in two crucial points. First, propositions 
consist of one or more elements that are related to one another by qualified links. These 
relations can be simple logical relations that define category membership (e.g., A is B or 
A is not B; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) but can also be more complex relations (e.g., A implies 
B or A causes B; Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). Relations convey 
specific meaning that exceeds meaning implied by purely associative connections 
between concepts. Take, for instance, the proposition “I am good”. It is represented by a 
descriptive relation between the concepts self (i.e., “I”) and positivity (i.e., “good”). The 
similar proposition “I want to be good”, in contrast, relates the same two concepts, but 
in terms of desirability. An associative link between the two concepts, in contrast, does 
not convey such specific meaning. The second structural difference between associations 
and propositions concerns their veracity. Propositions are statements about the world. 
Consequentially, they are (believed to be) either accurate or false (De Houwer, 2009, 
2014). They, in short, possess a (subjective) truth value. Associations, in contrast, do not 
contain any information about their veracity (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Take the two 
propositions from the example above. The specified relations in the propositions “I am 
good” and “I want to be good” imply a factuality of each statement that can be either 
(subjectively) true or false. In the propositional system, behavioral decisions are based 
on propositional processes. Specifically, reasoning processes lead to behavioral decisions 
that take into account aspects like the feasibility and the desirability of behaviors (Ajzen, 
1991). Take, for instance, a person that developed an automatic tendency to drink 
alcohol when associated concepts are activated within the associative system. 
Propositional processing allows for a reflection and reasoning of these associations. 
Whether or not such propositional processes are capable of controlling the behavior 
depends on the availability of cognitive capacities necessary for the propositional system 
to function properly (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The resulting awareness of the 
associations that lead to alcohol consumption could, for instance, lead to an avoidance 
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of situations in which the person is confronted with stimuli that automatically elicit 
drinking behavior.  
The measurement of propositional and associative processes 
Cognitive processes cannot be observed directly. Rather, they can only be inferred 
through the observation of changes in behavior (e.g., De Houwer & Moors, 2012). 
Measurement procedures that assess propositional processing allow the respondent to 
behave in a deliberate and controlled manner. Paradigmatic measures are structured 
interviews and self-report questionnaires that contain rating scales (e.g., Likert scales, 
semantic differential scales). The respondent’s responses (i.e., answers) on such 
measures reflect propositional processes of reasoning, as cognitive capacities necessary 
for the propositional system to function properly are available to the respondent.  
The assessment of associative processes in contrast takes place with measurement 
procedures that assess behavior under conditions of automaticity. Inferences about 
activated knowledge is made from response patterns in well-controlled computer tasks, 
often referred to as implicit measures (De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer et al., 2009). The 
term implicit measure is used both in relation to the assessment and the underlying effect 
(De Houwer, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003). When the term is used to refer to the 
measurement procedure, implicit is used as an equivalent for the term indirect, as the 
outcome of the measurement procedure is assumed to be an indirect reflection of the 
to-be-measured construct. When the term implicit measure is in contrast used to refer 
to the measurement outcome (i.e., the effect) of the measurement procedure, it reflects 
the fact that the to-be-measured construct is assessed under conditions of automaticity 
(e.g., De Houwer & Moors, 2012; De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). 
A multitude of measurement procedures that assess automatic processes has been 
developed in recent history. The most prominent tasks are the Affect Misattribution 
Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), the Go/No-go Association 
Test (gNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the semantic and evaluative priming task (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), and the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). All of these measurement 
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procedures are based on the assumption that automatic behavior is guided by the 
activation of associatively connected mental representations in memory (for a review, 
see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). In the context of this dissertation, the 
IAT and the priming task are most important. Both tasks will therefore be discussed more 
deeply in the following paragraphs. 
The IAT is a double categorization task that assesses the extent to which individuals 
associate certain concepts with each other. Imagine an IAT constructed to access the 
associative strength of alcohol and valence (i.e., automatic attitudes towards alcohol; 
e.g., Wiers et al., 2002). In such an IAT, the associative strength between two target 
concepts (i.e., alcoholic drinks vs. soft-drinks) and two attribute concepts (i.e., positive 
vs. negative valence) is assessed by presenting stimuli of these concepts one by one on a 
computer screen. On one series of trials, participants are asked to press one key 
whenever they see a stimulus that refers to an alcoholic drink (e.g., beer, wine) or a 
positive stimulus, and a second key whenever they see a stimulus that refers to a soft-
drink (e.g., cola, juice) or a negative stimulus. In a second series of trials, the rule by which 
participants respond is reversed. Stimuli referring to alcoholic drinks and negative stimuli 
are assigned to the first key whereas stimuli referring to soft-drinks and positive stimuli 
are assigned to the second key. The difference in performance (i.e., speed and accuracy) 
between the one categorization condition (i.e., alcoholic drink / positive vs. soft-drink / 
negative) and the other categorization condition (i.e., alcoholic drink / negative vs. soft-
drink / positive) is argued to reflect the strength of associations between concepts in 
memory (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). Consequentially, in the example above, faster 
responses in the first categorization condition relative to the second categorization 
condition indicate stronger associations between the concepts alcoholic drink and 
positivity (and soft-drink and negativity) as compared to alcoholic drink and negativity 
(and soft-drink and positivity). Such a difference in performance can be seen as reflective 
of a positive attitude towards alcohol, as strong associations in memory between a 
concept and valence are regarded to be representative of psychological attributes (i.e., 
attitudes, stereotypes; e.g., Greenwald et al., 2002). However, there is also evidence that 
differences in performance can reflect other attributes of the stimuli (e.g., salience, 
perceptual similarity) or the participant (e.g., cognitive skills; for an overview, see De 
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Houwer et al., 2009). In any case, regardless of how an observed difference in 
performance between the two conditions of the IAT is interpreted (e.g., being reflective 
of attitudes), the difference is argued to be based on the associative strength of the target 
concepts (e.g., alcoholic drinks) and the attribute concepts (e.g., positivity). 
The priming task constitutes the second most popular implicit measure. It also allows 
for inferences of the associative strength between concepts. In typical priming tasks 
participants are presented, on each of a series of trials, with a prime stimulus followed 
by a target stimulus. Crucially, the relationship between the prime and the target is 
manipulated. On some trials both stimuli are somehow related (i.e., congruent trials), 
whereas both stimuli are unrelated on other trials (i.e., incongruent trials). The priming 
effect denotes the typical finding of superior performance (i.e., in speed and/or accuracy) 
in responding to target stimuli (e.g., pressing a button) on congruent trials as compared 
to incongruent trials. When participants in an evaluative priming task are asked to 
indicate whether targets denote positive or negative words, their response performance 
is influenced by the evaluative connotation of the prime stimuli (i.e., observable in the 
priming effect). Therefore, to assess the associative strength between alcohol and 
positivity or negativity with an evaluative priming task, prime stimuli would be either 
related or unrelated to the concept of alcohol (e.g., words or picture of well-known beer 
brands), while target stimuli would be positive or negative stimuli. Imagine a person 
performs better on trials consisting of alcohol related primes and positive targets relative 
to trials with alcohol related primes and negative targets. Such an observation allows for 
the inference that, for this person, the concept of alcohol is more closely related to the 
concept of positivity than to the concept of negativity. In terms of associative processing, 
the relation between the concept and its valence is thought of as an association between 
a concept and its valence (i.e., object-evaluation association; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In the words of Fazio (2001), the “presentation of an attitude 
object as a prime should activate any associated evaluation and, hence, facilitate a 
related judgment” (p. 116). Research has shown that this holds true for other object 
features apart from valence. What feature of the prime stimuli is processed depends on 
the aspect or feature participants attend their attention to (e.g., Spruyt, Houwer, & 
Hermans, 2009). Participants in an evaluative priming task are asked to categorize targets 
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on the basis of their evaluative connotation. Accordingly, the evaluative connotation of 
the primes is processed. If, however, participants are asked to categorize targets on the 
basis of a semantic feature (e.g., animacity), this feature is processed. Crucially, 
regardless of what specific prime feature is processed, within dual-process models these 
instances of processing are thought of in terms of associations between the prime and 
the specific, task-relevant feature of the prime, which is automatically activated. 
Conclusion 
Dual-process models of cognition currently constitute the predominant way of 
explaining automatic and non-automatic behavior. They propose two modes of 
information processing to be responsible for the two types of behavior, respectively. 
Automatic behavior is assumed to be guided by associative processing, which is thought 
of in terms of an automatic activation of associations between concepts that are 
structured based on similarity and contiguity, and established and strengthened over 
many experiences. Accordingly, measurement procedures that observe behavior under 
conditions of automaticity are used for their assessment. Non-automatic behavior is in 
contrast assumed to be guided by propositional processes. Such processes allow for a 
deliberate reasoning about activated information. Crucially, the complexity of 
information in the propositional system differs from that stored in the associative system. 
Specifically, propositions allow for specified relations between concepts and the 
assignment of a (subjective) truth value. Propositions are, consequentially, statements 
about the world, as compared to simple associations between concepts. Their 
construction is assumed to be time-consuming and to depend upon cognitive resources 
(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Their assessment therefore relies of measurement 
procedures that allow for non-automatic, deliberate responding (e.g., interviews, 
questionnaires). 
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: THE PROPOSITIONAL SINGLE-PROCESS APPROACH 
Purely propositional accounts of cognition (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell et al., 
2009) constitute a recent alternative to the predominant dual-process models. These 
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single-process models dismiss the dichotomy of processing modes along the concept of 
automaticity in favor of the assumption that all behavior, both automatic and non-
automatic, is guided by the propositional system. Accordingly, propositional processes 
are assumed to operate under automaticity conditions as well as non-automaticity 
conditions. The associative system is disregarded in favor of a single propositional 
system, in which knowledge is organized in the form of propositions. Both automatic and 
controlled processes contribute to the formation and activation of knowledge stored in 
this system. 
As indicated above, dual-process models recognize the role of propositional 
processes in the explanation of non-automatic behavior. Accordingly, for a purely 
propositional model to gain credibility, it has to provide an explanation of automatic 
behavioral effects. The first part of the research presented in this dissertation focused on 
exactly that. Chapter 2 consists of an empirical investigation of the question whether 
propositional processes can influence behavior under automaticity conditions. 
Furthermore, a mechanism that can account for propositional processing under 
automaticity conditions is proposed. 
The research in the second part of this dissertation in contrast focused on an 
implication of propositional single-process models. If automatic behavior is indeed 
guided by propositional processes, the scope of implicit measures should increase 
drastically. As indicated above, implicit measures can be used to infer how concepts are 
related to another. Assuming only one informational system that is structured by 
propositions, implicit measures might be sensitive to aspects that are specific to 
propositions. As argued above, propositions structurally differ from associations, in that 
they possess qualified links that specify the relation between concepts, and possess a 
truth value. Accordingly, it makes sense to examine the possibility of implicit measures 
to be capable of assessing (a) how concepts are related in memory and (b) whether or 
not the resulting proposition is believed to be true or false. Such an implicit measure 
should consequentially allow to assesses a person’s beliefs (i.e., propositions that are 
believed to be true), rather than simple associations between objects and their features 
(e.g., alcohol – bad). In the second part of this dissertation, which comprises of Chapters 
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3 to 5, research on the development and empirical validation of such an implicit measure 
of beliefs is presented.  
Conclusion 
Dual-process models propose stimulus processing under conditions of automaticity 
to be guided by associative processes. Propositional single-process models in contrast 
postulate that automatic behavior is guided by propositions. The empirical research 
presented in this dissertation addressed this discrepancy. Specifically, in one line of 
research it was examined whether propositional processes can influence behavior under 
automaticity conditions. A second line of research addressed an implication of the single-
process propositional models, namely the increased capacities of implicit measures in 
assessing psychologically relevant constructs. Both research lines are outlined in more 
detail in the next section. 
OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
Research line 1: The demonstration of automatic propositional processing 
The focus in Chapter 2 is directed at the question whether the processing of an object 
and its relation in size to another object can occur under conditions of automaticity. As 
information about the relation of concepts is unique in propositional knowledge, the 
process of constructing knowledge that contains such information can be considered an 
instance of propositional processing (i.e., propositional categorization; Strack & Deutsch, 
2004). Crucially, dual-process models postulate that such a propositional categorization 
cannot operate under conditions of automaticity, as automatic processes are equated 
with associative processes. A series of four sequential priming studies on the automatic 
processing of relational information about size (i.e., “smaller than”, “larger than”) was 
conducted. In each study, participants were presented on each trial with two line 
drawings that were similar in size but depicted objects of different size (e.g., a bike and a 
house). Participants were asked to judge the size of the second object (i.e., the target) 
relative to the size of a particular reference object. Participants, for instance, were asked 
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to decide whether a house is smaller or larger than a football. The size of the reference 
object varied between blocks of trials or from trial to trial, being either a football or a car. 
If it changed from trial to trial, it was presented at the offset of each trial. The line drawing 
that preceded the target stimulus (i.e., the prime) depicted an object that was also 
smaller or larger than the reference object. Trials in such a setup can be grouped into two 
trial conditions. On size-congruent trials, the size of the prime and the target stimuli 
relative to the reference object were the same (e.g., both stimuli were smaller than the 
reference object). On size-incongruent trials, in contrast, the relation in size of prime and 
target stimuli relative to the reference object was different (e.g., the prime was smaller 
and the target was larger than the reference object). Task performance was expected to 
be dependent upon the size congruency of prime and target. Specifically, faster and more 
accurate responses to targets were expected on size-congruent trials as compared to on 
size-incongruent trials. To account for the task-specific processing of the prime that is 
necessary for such priming effects, the mechanism of task misapplication was proposed. 
Participants were expected to unconsciously misapply the target-task (i.e., the judgment 
of the size of the targets relative to the reference object of the trial) to the primes. 
Consequentially, the processing of the primes was expected to lead to the generation of 
propositional information about the size of the prime relative to the size of the reference 
object of the trial (e.g., “the football is smaller than the car”). Crucially, primes differed 
in their size relative to the size of the two reference objects (e.g., the prime object bike 
is smaller than the car but larger than the football). Accordingly, whether a certain prime-
target pair belonged to the group of size-congruent or size-incongruent trials was 
dependent on the size of the reference object of the trial. The two objects bike and house 
are, for instance, size-congruent relative to the football (i.e., both are larger) but size-
incongruent relative to the car (i.e., the bike is smaller, but the house larger than a car). 
In general, primes were expected to facilitate “larger than” responses when they were 
bigger than the reference object on that trial (i.e., the football) and “smaller than” 
responses when they were smaller than the reference object on that trial (i.e., the car). 
Thus, priming effects that were dependent on the size of the reference object were 
expected to occur. 
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As expected, such relational priming effects were observed in all four experiments. 
The finding of these behavioral effects implies, as argued above, that propositional 
knowledge about the size of the task-irrelevant prime stimuli in relation to the reference 
object was automatically generated on each trial. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the 
observation of relational priming effects can be seen as empirical evidence of the 
occurrence of propositional processes under conditions of automaticity. Such findings 
are difficult to reconcile with dual-process models. They, instead, fit nicely to the idea 
that propositional processes can occur under conditions of automaticity, as proposed by 
propositional single-process accounts of cognition. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
that propositional processes can be executed under conditions of automaticity 
constituted the basis of the second research line of my dissertation.  
Research line 2: The indirect assessment of beliefs 
If automatic behavior can be guided by propositional processes, the scope of implicit 
measures should increase drastically in that implicit measures could be sensitive the truth 
value that is assigned to propositions. The findings presented in Chapter 2 support this 
assumption. Accordingly, the second part of this dissertation, containing Chapters 3 to 5, 
is devoted to the development and empirical validation of an implicit measure that is 
sensible to the truth value of propositional knowledge. Such a measure could be seen as 
an implicit measure of beliefs (i.e., propositions that are believed to be true). Throughout 
the three chapters that are dedicated to this endeavor, the concept of body 
dissatisfaction is of central importance. This construct was chosen for both practical and 
theoretical reasons. For once, the construct of body dissatisfaction constitutes a highly 
relevant psychological construct for young female adults, who make up the majority of 
available participants. Moreover however, body dissatisfaction can be defined as the 
negative attitude towards one’s own body resulting from a (perceived) discrepancy 
between one’s actual physical appearance (i.e., the actual body image) and internalized 
ideals about one’s physical appearance (i.e., the ideal body image; e.g., Cash & 
Szymanski, 1995). Therefore, the construct of body dissatisfaction comprises more than 
a simple association between the self and body size. Both the belief about the ideal and 
actual body image involve a relation between the concepts self and body size but, 
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crucially, differ with regard to how the concepts are related. More specifically, beliefs 
about actual body image are characterized by a descriptive relation (e.g., I am thin). In 
contrast, beliefs about ideal body image relate the self to body size in terms of desirability 
(e.g., I want to be thin). Consequentially, body dissatisfaction can be seen as a function 
of two similar but distinct propositional beliefs. The separate assessment of these two 
beliefs can be considered as a test of whether propositions used in implicit measure of 
beliefs are indeed processed completely, that is, including the relational information. 
First, however, in Chapter 3 the central hypothesis that body dissatisfaction is 
dependent on implicit beliefs concerning the actual and ideal body image is investigated. 
Implicit beliefs about the actual and ideal body image were assessed with two versions 
of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). The 
IRAP is a computerized reaction time task in which participants are presented with 
combinations of stimuli that are either in line or in contrast to a specific belief. Crucially, 
in one block of trials, participants are asked to respond as if they personally endorse that 
belief (e.g., a thin ideal body image). They are asked to select the response ‘true’ 
whenever a stimulus combination is presented that is in line with that specific belief (e.g., 
‘I want to be + thin’), and to select the response ‘false’ whenever a stimulus combination 
is presented that is in contrast to that specific belief (e.g., ‘I don’t want to be + thin’). In 
a second block of trials, participants are asked to respond as if they do not endorse the 
belief in question. Accordingly, they are expected to select the response ‘true’ whenever 
a stimulus combination is presented is in contrast with the belief, and to select the 
response ‘false’ whenever a stimulus combination is presented that is in line with the 
belief. The IRAP is based on the assumption that it is more difficult to respond in a manner 
that is inconsistent with one’s personal beliefs than it is to respond in a manner that is 
consistent with one’s personal beliefs. IRAP scores can thus be used as an indicator of the 
degree to which a person endorses or rejects a certain belief. The beliefs concerning 
actual and ideal body image were assessed with two versions of the IRAP. The scores of 
the two IRAPs should reflect whether a participant is satisfied or dissatisfied with her 
body. Specifically, the implicit belief to be thin, assessed with an IRAP focusing on the 
actual body image, was expected to be more pronounced in participants low in body 
dissatisfaction as compared to participants high in body dissatisfaction. In contrast, the 
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implicit desire to be thin, assessed with an IRAP focusing on the ideal body image, was 
expected to be less pronounced in participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared 
to participants high in body dissatisfaction. As will become clear, these general 
hypotheses were confirmed by the data. Furthermore, results indicated that both IRAP 
measures were related to body dissatisfaction and other variables (e.g., objective body 
size measures, explicit measures of actual and ideal body image) to a different extent. 
The findings indicated that for the assessment of body dissatisfaction it is key to examine 
not only whether the two concepts self and body size are related in memory but rather 
how they are related.  
In Chapter 4 the Relational Responding Task (RRT) is introduced as an alternative to 
the IRAP in capturing beliefs at the implicit level. Like in the IRAP, participants in an RRT 
are asked to respond in line with specific beliefs in different blocks of trials. In its initial 
test, the RRT was used to capture the extent to which Flemish participants held implicit 
racist beliefs about immigrants. Specifically, participants were asked to respond to 
statements that were either in line with the belief that Flemish people are more 
intelligent that immigrants (e.g., “Flemish people are smarter than immigrants”, 
“Immigrants are dumber than Flemish people”) or in line with the belief that immigrants 
are more intelligent than Flemish people (e.g. “Flemish people are dumber than 
immigrants”, “Immigrants are smarter than Flemish people”). In one block of trials, 
participants were asked to respond to these statements as if they believed that Flemish 
people are more intelligent than immigrants (i.e., to respond “true” to statements such 
as “Flemish people are smarter than immigrants” and to respond “not true” to 
statements such as “Flemish people are dumber than immigrants”). In a second block of 
trials, participants were asked to respond as if they believed that immigrants are more 
intelligent than Flemish people (i.e., to respond “not true” to statements like “Flemish 
people are smarter than immigrants” and to respond “true” to statements like “Flemish 
people are dumber than immigrants”). The RRT is based on the same assumption as the 
IRAP, i.e., that it is more difficult for participants to respond in a manner that is 
inconsistent with their personal beliefs than it is to respond in a manner that is consistent 
with their personal beliefs. This assumption is based on the idea that the processing of a 
statement leads to an automatic activation of its truth value. Consequentially, the scores 
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of this RRT can be used as an indicator of the degree to which a person personally 
endorses or rejects the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants. 
The RRT scores were expected to correlate with an explicit measure of the extent to 
which participants believed that Flemish people are more or less intelligent than 
immigrants. This hypothesis was confirmed. The RRT scores indeed indicated the strength 
of racist beliefs of the participants. 
In Chapter 5 the investigation of body dissatisfaction was revisited. This time, beliefs 
concerning actual and ideal body image were assessed with two RRTs. The dissociation 
between actual and ideal body image beliefs can be considered crucial in the validation 
process of the RRT, as it allows for testing the potential of the RRT to capture differences 
between beliefs that vary only in their relational component. Statements used in the RRT 
that addressed beliefs about the actual body image referred to how the own body is 
perceived (e.g., ‘I possess a slim body’, ‘I weight too much’). Statements of the RRT that 
addressed beliefs about the ideal body image focused on an ideal state (e.g., ‘I wish I 
possessed a slimmer body’, ‘I strive to weigh more’). Crucially, the statements used in the 
two RRTs differed from another in that the relevant concepts of self and body size were 
connected in a descriptive relation or a relation of desirability, respectively. Similar to the 
findings regarding implicit beliefs of actual and ideal body image with two IRAPs (in 
Chapter 3), participants were hypothesized to differ in their RRTs as a function of their 
level of explicitly measured body dissatisfaction. Specifically, the belief to be thin was 
expected to be more pronounced in participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared 
to participants high in body dissatisfaction. The desire to be thin, in contrast, was 
expected to be less pronounced in participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared 
to participants high in body dissatisfaction. As will be shown, these hypotheses were 
confirmed by the data. Results indicated that both RRT measures were related to body 
dissatisfaction and other variables (e.g., objective body size measures, explicit measures 
of actual and ideal body image) to a different extent. Furthermore, the prediction of body 
dissatisfaction was shown to benefit from RRT scores over and above explicit measures 
of body size. 
Summarized, the focus in the second research line of this dissertation lies on the 
development and validation of an implicit measure that, based on the assumptions of 
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propositional processing models, is assumed to allow for an assessment of beliefs rather 
than simple associations. In Chapter 3 it is investigated whether the construct of body 
dissatisfaction is appropriate for this endeavor. In Chapters 4 and 5 it is then focused on 
the development and the validation of the propositional implicit measure. The last two 
chapters both focus on substantiating the claim that the RRT can be used as a tool to 
capture beliefs at the implicit level.  
CONCLUDING NOTE 
To avoid confusion, the reader should note that each of the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation is based on an autonomous research paper that either has been submitted 
for publication or has been published. As each of the manuscripts should be able to stand 
on its own, the text of some of the chapters may partially overlap. 
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ON THE AUTOMATICITY OF  
RELATIONAL STIMULUS PROCESSING 1 
ABSTRACT 
While it is widely accepted that the semantic analysis of a stimulus can take place in 
an automatic fashion, it is typically assumed that non-automatic processes are required 
to process the relation of one stimulus relative to other stimuli. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence to support the idea that such relational stimulus processing can also take 
place under automaticity conditions. We examined this hypothesis further in four 
sequential priming experiments in which participants were asked to categorize target 
objects as larger or smaller than a reference object (i.e., a football or a car). Crucially, 
some primes were objects that were larger than the small reference object but smaller 
than the large reference object (e.g., a bike). Results showed that the impact of these 
primes upon target responding was dependent on the size of the reference object. 
When the size of the reference object was small, these primes facilitated responses 
towards large targets relative to small targets. Vice versa, when the size of the 
reference object was large, the same set of primes facilitated responses towards small 
targets relative to large targets. This result was obtained when the size of the reference 
object was manipulated block-wise (Experiments 1 & 3), trial-wise (Experiments 2 & 4), 
and even when the primes were presented near subjective recognition thresholds 
(Experiment 4). Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence for the hypothesis 
that complex relational stimulus processing can take place under automaticity 
conditions. A possible underlying mechanism is proposed. 
                                                 
1 Based on Heider, N., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2015). On the automaticity of relational stimulus 
processing. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is little doubt that the semantic analysis of a stimulus can take place in an 
automatic fashion (e.g., Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & Boothby, 2012; Nosek, 
Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). It is well-established, for example, that one can process the 
evaluative tone of a stimulus in a fraction of a second (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, 
& Kardes, 1986), even in the absence of plenteous cognitive resources (e.g., Hermans, 
Crombez, & Eelen, 2000; but see Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007), an explicit 
evaluative processing mindset (e.g., Spruyt, Hermans, Houwer, & Eelen, 2002), or the 
conscious identification of this stimulus (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998). Although 
these findings do not imply that the evaluation of a stimulus is unconditional (i.e., 
automatic in all possible ways; see Moors & De Houwer, 2006), it is safe to conclude 
that it has several of the features that fall under the umbrella of the concept 
automaticity. Likewise, there is ample evidence showing that automatic stimulus 
processing plays a key role in domains such as face perception and social judgment 
(e.g., Bargh et al., 2012), consumer behavior (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, & 
Wigboldus, 2005), and health-related behavior (e.g., Wiers, Van Woerden, Smulders, & 
De Jong, 2002). 
All these observations connect well with the idea that the ability to automatically 
process incoming stimulus information facilitates our interaction with the environment 
in important ways. In many situations, however, adaptive behavior requires a 
comparative integration of various sources of information rather than an assessment of 
a single stimulus. As an example, consider the simple act of buying a box of Belgian 
chocolates. Imagine that you just selected one box of chocolates out of many 
alternatives and that you are comparing this box with all the other alternatives in terms 
of their price, quantity, quality, or taste. Research in social economics shows that such 
choices are highly dependent on the alternatives given in a specific context. For 
example, when presented with three similar chocolate boxes with increasing size and 
price (i.e., chocolate box A, B, and C, respectively), most consumers will prefer 
chocolate box B over chocolate box C (Simonson, 1989). If, however, chocolate box A is 
replaced by a chocolate box D that is larger and more expensive than chocolate box C, 
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consumers are more likely to select chocolate box C than chocolate box B. More 
generally, in daily life, we are bombarded with situations in which it is important to take 
into account the relations between stimuli. The question therefore arises to what 
extent such relational information can be processed in an automatic fashion (i.e., fast, 
unintentional, uncontrolled, efficient, or unconscious, see Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
To shed light on this issue, we conducted a series experiments to examine whether 
the online comparison of two stimuli can take place under automaticity conditions. This 
research was partly inspired by and designed to extend earlier work of Dehaene et al. 
(1998) who convincingly showed that masked numerical primes can trigger cognitive 
process without gaining access to consciousness. Using an adaptation of the sequential 
priming paradigm, they presented numerals that were either smaller or larger than five 
as (masked) primes and (clearly visible) targets. Crucially, participants were asked to 
decide as quickly as possible whether the target numerals were larger or smaller than 
five. Results clearly showed that performance in this comparative judgment task was 
facilitated when the primes and the targets had the same relation to the reference 
number (e.g., 4 – 3, 6 – 9) than when their relation to the reference number was 
different (e.g., 4 – 9, 9 – 1). To explain this priming effect, the authors argued that 
participants misapplied the task instructions to the primes (Dehaene et al., 1998, p. 
598). Moreover, if it is assumed that the use of masked primes is sufficient to rule out 
the operation of non-automatic processes (see Dehaene et al., 1998; Kiefer, 2002; 
Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Ulrich, Hoenig, Grön, & Kiefer, 2013; but see Moors & De 
Houwer, 2006), the findings of Dehaene et al. (1998) seem to suggest that the 
processing of the (size) relation between two stimuli can occur in an automatic fashion, 
a phenomenon that we will refer to as (an instance of) automatic relational processing.2 
                                                 
2
 One could argue that even the processing of a single stimulus is often relational, for instance, when 
determining the semantic category of that stimulus (i.e., relating the stimulus to a semantic category). In 
this regard, (subliminal) priming effects have repeatedly been observed on the basis of category 
membership (see Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008, for a discussion). We do not consider stimulus processing in 
these cases to be truly relational, as the observed priming effects are attributed to the processing of 
certain properties of one stimulus alone (i.e., the task-relevant category membership of the prime 
stimulus). In contrast, the definition of relational processing in this paper is restricted to the online 
comparison of the task-relevant features of two distinct stimuli. 
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It must be emphasized, however, that there are also reasons to doubt the scope and 
theoretical interpretation of the observations reported by Dehaene et al. (1998). First, 
the stimulus set used by Dehaene et al. (1998) was very small (i.e., four numerals 
smaller than 5 and four numerals larger than 5). Second, only a single reference 
stimulus was used throughout the experiment (i.e., the numeral 5). Third, the numerals 
that were used as primes were also used as targets. For these reasons, one might argue 
that the numerals became linked to either the response smaller than or larger than as 
participants worked through the experimental procedure. Accordingly, the priming 
effects obtained by Dehaene et al. (1998) may have been due to a direct activation of 
these stimulus-response links rather than an online processing of the size relation 
between the primes and the reference number five (see Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid, Grassl, 
& König, 2010; Damian, 2001). 
Some of the limitations of the work of Dehaene et al. (1998) were addressed in 
subsequent studies (Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; 
Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008; Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005; but see Footnote 2). 
Most importantly, Van Opstal, Gevers, Osman, and Verguts (2010, Experiment 2) 
conducted a subliminal priming study in which participants were presented with prime 
and target compounds, each consisting of two stimuli. Participants were asked to 
decide whether the two target stimuli (i.e., two single digits) were the same. Results 
showed that the speed of these similarity judgments was dependent upon the nature of 
the preceding prime compound. More specifically, target responding was faster when 
the relationship between the elements of a target compound was identical to the 
relationship between the elements of a prime compound. For instance, the correct 
categorization of two identical target digits (e.g., 3 – 3) was faster when these target 
digits were preceded by a prime compound containing two equivalent letters (e.g., A – 
a) than when the prime compound consisted of two primes with different identities 
(e.g., A – d). As argued by Van Opstal et al. (2010), these observations are quite difficult 
to account for in terms of the activation of stimulus-response links or mere perceptual 
similarity. Instead, in line with Dehaene et al. (1998), they argued that participants 
unintentionally misapplied the target task to the prime compounds. Moreover, given 
that the prime compounds were masked and presented for a very brief period of time 
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(i.e., 33 ms), the findings of Van Opstal et al. (2010) again demonstrate that relational 
stimulus processing can take place in the absence of stimulus awareness. 
Nevertheless, one could still question whether relational processing was truly 
involved in the effects reported by Van Opstal et al. (2010). In their crucial second 
experiment (which was designed to minimize the impact of perceptual similarity), the 
prime compounds always consisted of an uppercase and a lowercase letter. 
Importantly, the equivalence relation between upper and lower case versions of the 
same letter (e.g., A = a) must be over-learned in literate subjects. It could thus be 
argued that their effects were driven by a retrieval of prior knowledge about the 
equivalence of the uppercase and lowercase letters rather than by an active, online 
comparison of the two elements of the prime compound. 
This concern, however, is less likely to hold for the evidence reported by Musch and 
Klauer (2003). In their Experiments 5 – 8, participants were asked to judge the similarity 
of briefly presented prime words (i.e., 57 ms) and clearly visible target words in terms 
of a non-evaluative stimulus dimension (e.g., font color). Results showed that these 
similarity decisions were affected by the evaluative match of the primes and the 
targets. Whereas match responses were facilitated by an evaluative match and 
inhibited by an evaluative mismatch, mismatch responses were facilitated by an 
evaluative mismatch and inhibited by an evaluative match. This data pattern clearly 
shows that participants processed the evaluative relationship between the primes and 
the targets even though this was not required (or even counterproductive) for the task 
at hand. Accordingly, if it is assumed that participants engaged in the evaluative 
comparison process despite the absence of the intention to so, the observations by 
Musch and Klauer (2003) add further weight to the idea that relational processing can 
occur automatically (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Finally, the same reasoning applies for the studies reported by Moors and 
colleagues (Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; Moors, De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005). In their evaluative priming studies, participants were 
presented with intrinsically neutral prime stimuli that signaled whether performance in 
a preceding goal-inducing task had been successful. Results showed that primes 
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indicating success facilitated positive target responses whereas primes indicating failure 
facilitated negative target responses. Crucially, in order to extract the motivational 
valence of the primes, participants were required to compare the primes with the 
desired end-state of the goal-inducing task, even though this was not required for the 
task of evaluating the targets and even though primes were presented only briefly (i.e., 
200 ms). Therefore, the findings of Moors and colleagues can also been seen as a 
demonstration of automatic relational processing, at least in the sense of the 
automaticity features ‘fast’, ‘unintentional’, and ‘efficient’. 
In sum, the literature strongly suggests that relational stimulus processing can 
proceed under various automaticity conditions. However, with the exception of the 
priming effects in size-judgment tasks discussed earlier (Dehaene et al., 1998; Naccache 
& Dehaene, 2001; Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008; but see Footnote 2), evidence for automatic 
relational stimulus processing is limited to the mere detection of the presence or 
absence of an equivalence relation. This is an important limitation because equivalence 
is just one of many ways in which stimuli can be related (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2002). In addition, the few studies that did concern comparative relational 
information (e.g., “smaller than” or “larger than” in the studies by Dehaene et al., 1998) 
were inconclusive with regard to the relational nature of the observed effects (Kunde et 
al., 2003; Quinn & Kinoshita, 2008). Hence, the important question of whether 
automatic relational processing might occur for complex relational information still 
needs to be answered. 
To shed light on this issue, we conducted four sequential priming studies in which 
line drawings of objects of various sizes were presented as primes and targets. 
Participants were asked to judge the size of the target objects relative to either a small 
reference object (i.e., a football) or a large reference object (i.e., a car). In line with 
earlier work (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; see also Ansorge, Kunde, & Kiefer, 2014; Kiefer 
& Martens, 2010), we assumed that participants would misapply the target task to the 
prime set. Given that the target task required a comparison between the targets and 
the reference objects, a misapplication of the target task to the prime set would thus 
result in an (automatic) comparison between the primes and the reference objects. In 
that sense, our studies go beyond earlier work showing that non-relational automatic 
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stimulus processing (i.e., the analysis of a stimulus irrespective of its relation to other 
stimuli) is constrained by top-down regulation (e.g., Ansorge & Heumann, 2003; 
Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; Ansorge et al., 2010; Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 
2009; Ansorge et al., 2014; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). 
Crucially, the prime set included medium-sized objects (e.g., a bike) that were larger 
than the small reference object and smaller than the large reference object (see Figure 
1). We thus expected medium-sized prime objects (e.g., a bike) to be judged as 
relatively large when the reference object was small (i.e., the football) but as relatively 
small when the reference object was large (i.e., the car). In addition, we expected that 
the misapplication of the target task to the prime set would result in an activation of 
task-relevant responses (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2010; Wentura & Frings, 2008). Medium-
sized prime objects were thus expected to facilitate target responding when they had 
the same size relation with the reference object (i.e., both ‘larger than’ or ‘smaller 
than’) as compared to when they had a different size relation with the reference object 
(i.e., ‘larger than’ the reference object whereas the target was ‘smaller than’ the 
reference object, or vice versa). For example, after the presentation of a football as a 
reference object and a bike as a (medium-sized) prime, we expected task performance 
to be better when the target was an airplane as compared to when the target was a 
spoon. Conversely, after the presentation of a car as a reference object, we expected 
the presentation of the exact same prime stimulus (i.e., the bike) to lead to better 
performance when the target was a spoon as compared to when the target was an 
airplane. We will refer to this effect as the relational priming effect (RPE). 
It may be noted that the emergence of this RPE requires two sequential processes 
(Spruyt, Gast, & Moors, 2011). In a first step, participants have to engage in an 
(automatic) analysis of the relational information conveyed by the primes. It is this 
process that is at the heart of our research. In a second step, the outcome of this 
comparison process must be translated in an observable priming effect by means of 
some mechanism. There is an abundant number of studies focusing on these 
mechanisms, many of which are very likely to play a critical role in the emergence of the 
RPE in our experiments. As explained above, for example, we clearly capitalize on the 
well-known mechanism of direct response activation (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2010; Kiefer, 
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Sim, & Wentura, 2015). It must be emphasized, however, that the experiments 
reported here were designed exclusively to shed light on the first process (i.e., 
automatic relational stimulus processing). The nature of the second process (e.g., 
response activation, semantic activation, etc.) is tangential to this research question 
and will therefore not be elaborated upon any further.  
The aim of Experiment 1 was to establish the RPE, a cognitive marker of relational 
stimulus processing, under typical automaticity conditions. More specifically, the 
primes were presented for 200 ms and the time interval between the start of the 
presentation of the primes and the start of the presentation of the targets (i.e., the 
Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA) was short (i.e., 250 ms). In addition, the stimuli that 
were used as primes were never presented as targets for an individual participant and 
participants were asked to respond to the targets only. Accordingly, should the RPE 
emerge under these conditions, it can be concluded that it is driven by fast-acting, 
unintentional processes (Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Moors, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 
2010). After this initial demonstration of the RPE, Experiment 2 was performed to rule 
out two alternative interpretations. Next, building further on the work of Dehaene et al. 
(1998) and Van Opstal et al. (2010), Experiment 3 was designed to test the hypothesis 
that RPE arises as the result of the misapplication of the target task to the prime stimuli. 
Finally, in Experiment 4, we examined whether automatic relational processing can 
occur even in the absence of the conscious identification of the instigating stimulus. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-eight students at Ghent University (55 women, 13 men; Mage = 
20.8 years) participated for course credit in this and an unrelated other experiment. All 
participants were Dutch speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants gave informed consent before participation. The experiment took 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
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Materials. All stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT screen (75Hz, 1280 × 1024 
pixels, white background color). A computer program written in Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, 
Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010) was used to control stimulus 
presentation and response registration. 
The reference objects used on the experimental trials were two black-and-white line 
drawings, one of a football (i.e. small reference object) and one a car (i.e. large 
reference object). The primes and the targets of the experimental trials were 36 black-
and-white line drawings of objects of various sizes, sampled from a stimulus set 
developed by Severens, Lommel, Ratinickx, and Hartsuiker (2005). All stimuli had a 
resolution of 300 × 300 pixels (roughly 7.9 cm × 7.9 cm), corresponding with a visual 
angle of (about) 9.03 degrees. The stimuli belonged to one of three subsets based on 
their size relative to the two reference objects (see Figure 1). Twelve objects were 
smaller than both a car and a football (i.e., small stimuli; e.g., cup). Twelve objects were 
larger than both a football and a car (i.e., large stimuli; e.g., house). Finally, the twelve 
critical, medium-sized stimuli were larger than the football but smaller than the car 
(e.g., bike). For each individual participant, a prime set and a target set were sampled at 
random without replacement with the restriction that each stimulus set consisted of six 
small, six medium-sized, and six large stimuli. Stimuli that were used as targets were 
thus never used as primes (and vice versa) for an individual participant.3 
For the practice trials, one reference object (i.e., a cow) and eight prime and target 
stimuli were used. Four stimuli depicted objects that were larger than a cow, whereas 
the other four stimuli depicted objects that were smaller than a cow. The stimuli used 
for the practice phase were also sampled from Severens et al. (2005). For each 
participant, both the subset of large and small objects were split at random into a prime 
set and a target set, each containing two small and two large stimuli each. 
 
                                                 
3 The luminance of pictures showing small objects was more pronounced than the luminance of pictures 
showing large objects, t(22) = 4.50, p < .001, or medium-sized objects, t(22) = 3.72, p < .005. Given that 
stimuli from different stimulus categories were presented equally often in response-compatible and 
response-incompatible conditions, none of our critical effects can be attributed to variations in 
luminance. 
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Figure 1. Experimental stimuli, grouped in their respective size categories, and the two 
reference objects (i.e., the ball and the car). Small objects (a) are smaller than the two 
reference objects. Large objects (c) are larger than the two reference objects. Medium-
sized objects (b) are smaller than the large reference object but larger than the small 
reference object 
 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a dimly-lit room. They were 
asked to categorize objects presented on the computer screen as larger than or smaller 
than a reference object. Participants were told that, on each trial, two objects would be 
presented in fast succession and were asked to categorize the second object. It was 
emphasized that the real-life sizes of the depicted objects should be the basis for their 
judgments. It was also mentioned that the reference stimulus would not change within 
blocks and that the meaning of the response keys would remain the same throughout 
the entire experiment (i.e., left key for targets smaller than the reference object, right 
key press for targets larger than the reference object). After an incorrect response, the 
sentence “Verkeerde reactie!” (Dutch for “Incorrect response!”) was presented for 
1000 ms.  
The practice phase comprised 16 trials. The experimental phase involved eight 
blocks of 60 trials each, leading to a total of 480 trials. The reference stimulus was the 
same throughout the first four blocks and was then changed for the last four blocks. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of two order conditions: They either first 
categorized target objects relative to a football and then to a car, or vice versa.  
Trials can be divided into three general trial types: On 40 % of trials (i.e., 24 trials per 
block), both the primes and targets depicted large or small objects (hereafter referred 
to as standard trials). On 40 % of trials (i.e., 24 trials per block), the primes depicted 
medium-sized objects whereas the targets consisted of large and small objects 
(hereafter referred to as critical trials). On the remaining 20 % of trials (i.e., twelve trials 
per block), the primes depicted objects that were either small or large, whereas the 
targets consisted of medium-sized targets (hereafter referred to as filler trials). This 
third trial type was included because large and small targets were associated with the 
same response irrespective of the size of the reference object. By including trials with 
medium-sized targets, we ensured that participants were required to compare the 
targets relative to the relevant reference object. Within in each blocks, however, the 
same response was required towards all the medium-sized targets (i.e., always “larger 
than” or “smaller than”). Accordingly, to avoid an overall response bias within blocks, 
we adjusted the number of small and large targets within the standard trials. When 
participants categorized the target objects relative to a football (and medium-sized 
targets thus had to be judged as large on the twelve filler trials), small target objects 
were presented on 18 out of the 24 standard trials (per block). In contrast, when 
participants categorized the target objects relative to a car (and all medium-sized 
targets thus had to be judged as small on the twelve filler trials), large target objects 
were presented on 18 of the 24 standard trials (per block). Note, that this procedure 
had no effect on the congruency proportion within each block: On 50 % of the trials, the 
relation to the reference object of both the prime and the target was the same, 
whereas it was different on the other half of the trials. Trials were semi-randomly 
intermixed, controlling for the same percentage of standard, critical, and filler trials in 
each block. Presentations of the same target on consecutive trials were not allowed. 
Each trial started with a 500 ms presentation of a fixation cross. Next, after an 
interstimulus interval of 500 ms, a prime picture was presented for 200 ms. Finally, 50 
ms after the offset of the prime, a target picture was presented until a response was 
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registered. The SOA was thus 250 ms. The next trial started after an interval that varied 
between 500 ms and 1500 ms.  
Results 
Data trimming. Practice trials and filler trials were excluded from the analyses. We 
also excluded all the data of two participants whose overall mean response latencies 
(758 ms and 767 ms) exceeded our cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the 
grand mean (M = 511 ms, SD = 76 ms; threshold = 702 ms). Similarly, the data of two 
other participants were excluded because their error rates (14.8 % and 25.5 %) 
exceeded the cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand mean (M = 3.1 
%, SD = 3.8 %; threshold = 12.5 %).4 At the trial level, we excluded all trials on which an 
incorrect response was registered (2.6 %).5 Finally, the influence of outlier values was 
reduced by excluding all trials with response latencies that deviated more than 2.5 
standard deviations from a participant’s mean latency in a particular priming condition 
(3.0 %; Ratcliff, 1993). 
Design. Two separate analyses were performed, one for the critical trials and one 
for the standard trials. The critical trials were subjected to a 2 (reference object: 
football vs. car) × 2 (target size: large vs. small) repeated measures ANOVA to check 
whether the influence of the medium-sized primes on the speed of responding was 
dependent upon the size of the reference object. Note, that the size of the reference 
object was used as a factor instead of the primes as the reference object was 
informative about the relative size of primes whereas the primes themselves were not. 
The RPE corresponds to the interaction between the size of the reference objects and 
the targets on critical trials. The standard trials were subjected to a 2 (reference object: 
football vs. car) × 2 (prime size: large vs. small) × 2 (target size: large vs. small) repeated 
measures ANOVA. It may be noted, however, that we expected automatic relational 
                                                 
4 None of the critical effects in this experiment nor in the subsequently reported experiments were 
dependent on the exclusion or inclusion of participants. 
5 An analysis of the error data revealed effects that mirrored the effects found in the reaction time data. 
It must be noted, however, that the overall error rates were too small to allow for parametric testing (i.e., 
less than 2.7 %), especially when taking into account the complexity of the resign design. We therefore 
decided not to reported the error data in full detail. 
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stimulus processing to occur for standard and medium-sized primes alike. On standard 
trials, it is therefore impossible to disentangle the effects of automatic relational 
stimulus processing from the effects produced by the size relation between the primes 
and the targets in terms of their absolute sizes. Caution is thus in order when 
interpreting the magnitude of the priming effects observed on the standard trials. 
Priming on critical trials. As expected, we obtained a significant interaction between 
the size of the reference objects and the targets, F(1, 63) = 99.99, p < .001, ηρ2 = .61. 
Large targets were categorized faster when the reference object was small than when 
the reference object was large (482 ms vs. 507 ms). Conversely, small targets were 
responded to faster when the reference object was large than when the reference 
object was small (477 ms vs. 498 ms). Overall, these results corresponded to a mean 
RPE of 23 ms. In addition, the main effect of target size was significant, F(1, 63) = 4.83, p 
= .032, ηρ2 = .07. Small targets were categorized faster than large targets (487 ms vs. 
495 ms). 
Priming on standard trials. As expected, the interaction between the size of the 
primes and the targets reached significance, F(1, 63) = 35.35, p < .001, ηρ2 = .36. Large 
targets were categorized faster when they were preceded by large primes than when 
they were preceded by small primes (487 ms vs. 503 ms). Conversely, responses 
towards small targets were faster after the presentation of small primes than after the 
presentation of large primes (488 ms vs. 502 ms). Overall, these results correspond with 
a priming effect of 15 ms. Three other effects were significant. First, the main effect of 
the size of the reference object was significant, F(1, 63) = 9.09, p = .004, ηρ2 = .13. 
Target categorizations were faster when the reference object was small compared to 
when the reference object was large (490 ms vs. 500 ms). Second, the size of the primes 
interacted significantly with the size of the reference object, F(1, 63) = 4.11, p = .047, 
ηρ2 = .06. When the reference object was large, the speed of responding was more or 
less the same after small and large primes (499 ms vs. 501 ms). Conversely, when the 
reference object was small, target responding was faster after large primes than after 
small primes (488 ms vs. 493 ms). Finally, the size of the targets interacted significantly 
with the size of the reference object, F(1, 63) = 43.90, p < .001, ηρ2 = .41. When the 
reference object was large, target responding was faster when the targets were small 
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than when the targets were large (492 ms vs. 508 ms). Conversely, when the reference 
object was small, target responding was faster when the targets were large than when 
the targets were small (482 ms vs. 498 ms).6 
Discussion 
In line with our expectations, the RPE reached significance. This effect strongly 
suggests that participants processed the size of the primes relative to size of the 
reference object. Moreover, the present findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that relational information processing can take place in an automatic fashion (De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). First, given that participants were 
quite fast to respond (i.e., mean response latencies below 500 ms) and the SOA was 
short (i.e., 250 ms), it can be concluded that the RPE was produced by fast-acting 
processes. Second, given that the primes were task-irrelevant, it seems unlikely that the 
occurrence of the RPE is dependent upon the conscious intention to process the 
relative size of the prime objects. Finally, the present findings provide further support 
for the idea that task misapplication is an important determinant of the sequential 
priming effect. According to this viewpoint, prime processing takes place due to an 
unintentional misapplication of the target task to the prime stimuli. Accordingly, if the 
task requires relational judgments about the target, one can expect the primes to be 
processed in a similar fashion. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, we also observed that target responding on the standard 
trials was dependent upon the relationship between the size of the reference objects 
and the size of the primes. More specifically, task performance was better when the 
                                                 
6 As explained in the method section, the reference object was changed after four blocks and the order in 
which the two reference objects were used was counterbalanced across participants. We therefore 
examined whether target responding was affected by this counterbalancing factor. On critical trials there 
was evidence for a main effect of order, F(1, 62) = 4.61, p = .036, ηρ2 = .07. Overall, participants were 
faster to respond when the small reference object was used first compared to when the large reference 
object was used first (477 ms vs. 504 ms). Reassuringly, the RPE was not moderated by the order factor, F 
< 1, nor were any other effects on critical trials, all Fs < 1, all ps > .81. We therefore excluded the order 
factor from the analyses of Experiment 1. It may be noted, however, that there was some evidence that 
the counterbalancing factor did impact the prime × target interaction observed on the standard trials, 
F(1, 62) = 3.52, p = .065, ηρ2 = .05. The priming effect was larger when the small reference object was 
used first compared to when the large reference object was used first (20 ms vs. 11 ms). None of the 
other effects observed on the standard trials were qualified by the counterbalancing factor, all Fs < 1.40, 
all ps > .241. 
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size dissimilarity between the primes and the reference objects was large as compared 
to when it was small. The relationship between the reference objects and the primes 
thus seems to affect target responding in the same manner as the relationship between 
the reference objects and the targets. On the one hand, this similarity between the 
effects produced by the primes and the effects produced by the targets adds further 
weight to the idea that participants misapplied the target task to the prime set. On the 
other hand, it is unclear to us how a prime stimulus, once compared to the reference 
object, can affect target responding irrespective of the nature of the targets or the 
nature of the required response. It must be noted, however, that the interaction 
between the size of the reference objects and the size of the primes observed in 
Experiment 1 replicated only in Experiment 3. Moreover, a joint analysis of all 4 
experiments revealed that the effect was not reliable across experiments, F(1, 223) = 
2.24, p = .14, and was also not moderated by the experiment factor, F(3, 223) = 1.76, p 
= .16. We are therefore reluctant to put too much weight on this finding. Taking into 
account that this effect concerns the (non-critical) standard trials only, we will therefore 
not elaborate on this effect any further. 
To summarize, our findings strongly suggest that relational information can be 
processed under automaticity conditions. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify two 
rivaling interpretations for our effects. First, it could be argued that the RPE observed 
on critical trials was an artifact resulting from the fact that the size of the reference 
object affected target responding in a direct, non-relational manner. Second it might be 
argued that our effects reflected memory retrieval processes rather than from 
automatic relational information processing. We now discuss these rivaling 
interpretations one by one. 
Inflation of the RPE. As explained above, we expected the evaluation of the size of 
the medium-sized primes to depend on the size of the reference object. More 
specifically, medium-sized primes were expected to be evaluated automatically as being 
smaller than the large reference object and larger than the small reference object. We 
therefore used the interaction between the size of the reference objects and the 
targets on critical trials as an index of automatic relational processing. One might 
object, however, that target responding was affected directly by the relationship 
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between the size of the references object and the targets, that is, irrespective of the 
primes. According to this viewpoint, target responding was simply faster for large 
targets when the reference object was small compared to when it was large, and vice 
versa for small targets. To account for such an effect, it could be argued that it is simply 
easier to determine the relative size of an object when the difference between that 
object and the reference object is large (i.e., the distance effect; Banks, 1977; Schneider 
& Logan, 2007).  
It is important to point out, however, that there are no reasons to suspect that the 
size of such an effect would be different on standard trials as compared to critical trials. 
Therefore, a comparison of the interaction of the size of the reference objects and the 
targets on both types of trials can shed light on the extent to which the RPE was truly 
due to relational processing. We thus performed an additional analysis in which all 
critical and standard trials were subjected to a 2 (trial type: standard vs. critical) × 2 
(reference object: football vs. car) × 2 (target size: large vs. small) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Reassuringly, the three-way interaction between trial type, reference object, 
and target size reached significance, F(1, 63) = 4.57, p = .036, ηρ2 = .07, showing that the 
interaction between the size of reference objects and the targets was significantly 
smaller on standard trials (i.e., 16 ms) as compared to critical trials (i.e., 23 ms, the 
RPE). Accordingly, it can be concluded that we obtained clear evidence for the 
occurrence of automatic relational stimulus processing, even though target responding 
was also influenced by the relationship between the target and the reference object. To 
corroborate this interpretation even further, we also decided to add an additional 
control condition to the design of Experiment 2 (see below). 
Automatic relational processing vs. automatic memory retrieval. As argued above, 
there are good reasons to argue that the RPE observed in the present study resulted 
from automatic relational stimulus processing. One could also argue, however, that 
automatic memory retrieval was the driving force behind our effects. Remember that 
the size of the reference object was manipulated on a block-wise basis. That is, 
participants first completed four blocks of trials with one reference object and then 
completed four additional blocks of trials with the second reference object. Under 
these circumstances, it seems difficult to rule out the possibility that participants 
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processed the primes in a non-automatic fashion on at least a number of trials and then 
retrieved the outcome of this prime-evaluation process on subsequent trials. Such an 
interpretation implies, however, that the magnitude of the RPE should have increased 
across blocks. Reassuringly, additional analyses confirmed that the interaction between 
reference object and target size did not differ between blocks, F < 1. Nevertheless, we 
decided to perform a second study in which this potential problem was addressed 
empirically rather than statistically. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1, aimed at ruling out two 
rivaling interpretations of our findings. First, to rule out the possibility that the RPE was 
driven by (automatic) memory retrieval rather than automatic relational stimulus 
processing, we manipulated the size of the reference object on a trial-by-trial basis. As a 
result, even if participants retrieved the outcome of the prime-evaluation process on 
preceding trials, automatic memory retrieval could no longer exert a systematic 
influence on the RPE. Second, we included a number of trials on which scrambled 
versions of the medium-sized objects were used as primes. As explained above, one 
might argue that target responding slows down as the absolute size of the targets and 
the reference objects becomes more similar. Because such a distance effect could 
inflate the RPE, it was key to demonstrate that the magnitude of the reference object × 
target interaction observed on trials with unscrambled medium-sized primes (i.e., the 
RPE + the distance effect) was substantially larger as compared to trials with scrambled 
medium-sized primes (i.e., the distance effect). 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-five students at Ghent University (42 women, 8 men; Mage = 21.45 
years) participated in this 30-minute experiment and received 5€ payment. All 
participants were Dutch speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants gave informed consent before participation. 
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Materials. All materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, with two 
exceptions. First, next to the original set of medium-sized images, we now included 
scrambled versions of these stimuli. Second, stimuli were presented on a 20-inch LCD 
screen (75Hz, 1680 × 1050 pixels) instead of 19-inch CRT screen. As a result, the physical 
size of the pictures was roughly 8.5 cm by 8.5 cm, corresponding with a visual angle of 
(about) 9.72 degrees. 
Procedure. The procedures used in the present experiment were identical to those 
used Experiment 1, with four exceptions. First, the size of the reference object was 
manipulated on a trial-wise basis. Each trial started with a 1000 ms presentation of one 
of the reference stimuli as a cue. Next, after an interstimulus interval of 500 ms, the 
prime picture was presented for 200 ms. Finally, 50 ms after the offset of the prime 
(SOA 250 ms), the target picture was presented at the same location until participants 
responded by pressing one of the two response keys. Participants were told that the 
reference stimuli would change from trial to trial. They were asked to compare the size 
of the targets relative to the preceding reference object. Second, the line drawings of a 
car and a football were now used as the reference stimuli both on the practice trials 
and the experimental trials. Consequentially, three of the eight practice stimuli were 
dropped, and eleven other stimuli were added, leading to six small stimuli, six large 
stimuli, and four medium-sized stimuli. Third, we included trials in the experimental 
phase on which the primes were scrambled versions of the medium-sized objects and 
the targets depicted large or small objects (hereafter referred to as neutral trials). 
Fourth, the number of trials was reduced to 360 trials (four blocks of 90 trials each). 
Each block consisted of 24 standard, 24 critical, 24 neutral, and 18 filler trials. Small and 
large targets were counterbalanced across trial types. Medium-sized targets were 
presented four times within each block of trials: twice on a trial with the small 
reference object and twice on a trial with a large reference object. Within each block of 
trials, the relatedness proportion was 50 %. Trials were semi-randomly intermixed, 
controlling for the above mentioned distribution of standard, critical, neutral and filler 
trials within blocks. 
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Results 
Data trimming. Due to a computer malfunction, the data set of one participant was 
not complete and was therefore excluded from the analyses. The criteria for excluding 
participants and trials were identical to those in Experiment 1. Specifically, we excluded 
the data of two participants whose overall mean response latencies (762 ms and 771 
ms) exceeded our cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand mean (M 
= 548 ms, SD = 84 ms; threshold = 757). The data of three other participants were 
excluded because their error rates (7.6 %, 8.7 % and 8.7 %) exceeded the cutoff 
criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand mean (M = 2 %, SD = 2 %; threshold 
= 7 %). At the trial level, we again excluded all trials on which an incorrect response was 
registered (1.7 %). Finally, to reduce the influence of outlier values, we excluded all 
trials on which a response latency was observed that deviated more than 2.5 standard 
deviations from a participant’s mean latency in a particular priming condition (2.9 %; 
Ratcliff, 1993). 
Design. To verify whether the interaction between the size of the reference objects 
and the targets was significantly larger on critical trials as compared to neutral trials, 
critical and neutral trials were subjected to a 2 (trial type: critical vs. neutral) × 2 
(reference object: football vs. car) × 2 (target size: large vs. small) repeated measures 
ANOVA. The standard trials were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
Priming on critical and neutral trials. A strong interaction between the size of the 
reference objects and the size of the targets was found, F(1, 48) = 27.75, p < .001, ηρ2 = 
37. Large targets were responded to faster when the reference object was small than 
when the reference object was large (519 ms vs. 530 ms). Conversely, small targets 
were responded to faster when the reference object was large than when the reference 
object was small (512 ms vs. 527 ms). Overall, these results corresponded to an 
interaction effect of 13 ms. Crucially, this 2-way interaction was further qualified by a 
three-way interaction between trial type, reference object, and target, F(1, 48) = 6.14, p 
= .017, ηρ2 = .11. We therefore performed separate analyses for the neutral trials and 
the critical trials. 
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On the subset of critical trials, the interaction between the size of the reference 
objects and the size of the targets was highly reliable F(1, 48) = 32.14, p < .001, ηρ2 = 
.40. Large targets were categorized faster when the reference object was small than 
when the reference object was large (519 ms vs. 533 ms). Conversely, small targets 
were responded to faster when the reference object was large than when the reference 
object was small (508 ms vs. 531 ms). Overall, these results corresponded to a mean 
RPE of 19 ms. 
On the subset of neutral trials, the interaction between target and reference object 
just missed conventional significance levels, F(1, 48) = 3.68, p < .061, ηρ2 = .07. Large 
targets were categorized faster when the reference object was small than when the 
reference object was large (519 ms vs. 527 ms). Conversely, small targets were 
responded to faster when the reference object was large than when the reference 
object was small (517 ms vs. 522 ms). Overall, the effect of the size relation between 
the reference objects and the targets amounted to 7 ms. 
Priming on standard trials. As expected, the interaction between prime size and 
target size reached significance, F(1, 48) = 10.97, p = .002, ηρ2 = .19. Large targets were 
categorized faster when they were preceded by large primes than when they were 
preceded by small primes (521 ms vs. 534 ms). Conversely, responses towards small 
targets were faster after the presentation of small primes than after the presentation of 
large primes (519 ms vs. 533 ms). Overall, these results corresponded to a priming 
effect of 13 ms. The reference object × target interaction on standard trials was not 
significant, F < 1, nor descriptively different from zero. Moreover, the reference object × 
target interaction on standard trials was significantly smaller than the RPE (0 ms vs. 19 
ms), F(1, 48) = 18.68, p < .001, ηρ2 = .28.  
Discussion 
The results are clear-cut. Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, a reliable RPE 
emerged. Crucially, the degree to which the size relation between the reference objects 
and the targets exerted an influence on target responding was significantly larger on 
the critical trials (i.e., 19 ms) as compared to the neutral trials (i.e., 7 ms). Given that the 
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critical trials and the neutral trials were identical in terms of the reference objects and 
the target stimuli that were used, this data pattern could be due only to the fact that 
the relational processing of the primes exerted an influence on target responding on 
the critical trials. We can therefore safely conclude that the RPE is not just a byproduct 
of the fact that it is easier to judge the relative size of an object as the difference in size 
between the reference object and the target object becomes larger.7 
The results of Experiment 2 are also important for a second reason. As pointed out 
earlier, memory retrieval may have contributed to the emergence of the RPE in 
Experiment 1. According to this viewpoint, participants processed the relative size of 
the primes in a non-automatic fashion on at least a number of trials and then retrieved 
the outcome of this deliberate prime-evaluation process on subsequent trials. In the 
present experiment, however, such an account is less likely because the size of the 
reference objects was now manipulated on a trial-wise basis instead of a block-wise 
basis. Even if knowledge about the size relation between the medium-sized primes and 
the reference objects was stored in episodic memory, the trial-wise variation of the 
reference objects renders it rather unlikely that the (automatic) retrieval of this 
information could influence target responding in a systematic way. Nevertheless, one 
might argue that a constant change of the reference object does not completely 
exclude the possibility that memory retrieval processes contributed to the emergence 
of the RPE. Therefore, additional analyses were performed. If participants established S-
R bindings first and then activated them on subsequent trials, one would predict the 
RPE to increase as a function of the number of prime repetitions. Reassuringly, these 
analyses revealed no supporting evidence for this prediction, F < 1.  
Finally, one might note that the distance effect observed on the standard trials (i.e., 
the interaction between the size of the reference objects and the size of the targets) 
was absent in the present experiment whereas the same interaction did reach 
                                                 
7 Experiment 2 was a replication of an earlier study, the results of which mimic those reported here. 
Specifically, we obtained a significant RPE of 16 ms, F(1, 56) = 12.69, p = .001, ηρ2 = .18, whereas the 
reference object × target interaction on the standard trials was non-significant, F(1, 56) = 1.73, p = .194, 
ηρ2 = .03. Crucially, we did not include neutral trials in this study. Therefore, the RPE was compared to the 
reference object × target interaction on standard trials to check for a possible inflation of the RPE. The 
three-way interaction between the size of the reference objects, the size of the targets, and the trial type 
failed to reach significance, F(1, 56) = 1.70, p = .197, ηρ2 = .03. 
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significance in Experiment 1. Additional analyses confirmed that this difference in the 
magnitude of the distance effect was statistically reliable, F(1, 111) = 13.93, p < .01. In 
all likelihood, this data pattern resulted from the fact that the reference objects were 
manipulated block-wise in Experiment 1 but varied randomly from trial to trial in 
Experiment 2. Irrespectively, the fact that the distance effect was absent in the present 
experiment whereas the RPE was not only adds to the idea that the RPE is not just a 
byproduct of the distance effect.8 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided convincing evidence for the hypothesis that relational 
stimulus information about the relative size of an object can be processed in an 
automatic fashion. Experiment 3 was primarily designed to test the hypothesis that the 
RPE arises as the result of a goal-dependent but unintentional misapplication of the 
target task to the prime set (Dehaene et al., 1998; Van Opstal et al., 2010). In theory, 
the likelihood of task-misapplication should decrease under conditions that promote a 
clear separation of the primes and the targets. Accordingly, we manipulated whether 
the (critical) medium-sized primes were presented in the same or a in a different color 
as the target stimuli and expected the RPE to be less pronounced in the color-
incongruent condition relative to the color-congruent condition.  
Experiment 3 was also important for an additional reason. Whereas the color of the 
medium-sized primes was manipulated on a within-subject basis, the color of the 
targets was manipulated on a between-subjects basis. We deliberately opted for this 
strategy to ensure that the critical priming trials were all identical for a given 
participant, except for the presence or absence of a color match/mismatch of the 
primes. Accordingly, should the magnitude of the RPE vary as a function of stimulus 
similarity, one can safely conclude that the RPE is not just a byproduct of the distance 
effect described earlier. 
                                                 
8 It may also be noted that, in Experiment 1, the standard trials revealed a reliable main effect of the size 
of the reference objects whereas the same effect was unreliable in Experiment 2. Additional analyses 
provided no evidence for the hypothesis that the magnitude of this effect was reliably different in both 
experiments, F(1, 111) = 2.02, p = .16. 
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Method 
Participants. Seventy-one students at Ghent University (54 women, 17 men; Mage = 
21.06 years) participated in this 30-minute experiment and received 5€ payment. All 
participants were Dutch speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants gave informed consent before participation. 
Materials. The stimulus materials used in the present experiment were identical to 
those used in Experiment 1. However, all primes and targets were now presented in 
orange or blue. Similar to Experiment 2, the experiment was conducted using a 20-inch 
LCD screen (75Hz, 1680 × 1050 pixels). Accordingly, the physical size of the 
experimental stimuli was roughly 8.5 cm by 8.5 cm, corresponding with a visual angle of 
(about) 9.72 degrees. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1, with two 
exceptions. First, the color of the medium-sized primes was manipulated trial-by-trial 
on a within-subjects basis (i.e., either orange or blue). Second, the color of all the other 
stimuli was manipulated on a between-subjects basis (i.e., either orange or blue). 
Crucially, on 50 % the critical trials, the primes and the targets were presented in the 
same color. On the remaining trials, the primes and the targets were presented in a 
different color. Given that critical trials represented on 40 % of all trials (see Experiment 
1), the color of the prime and the target differed on 20 % of all trials. 
Results 
Data trimming. The criteria for excluding participants and trials were identical to 
those in Experiment 1. Specifically, we excluded the data of one participant whose 
overall mean response latencies (964 ms) exceeded our cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard 
deviations above the grand mean (M = 517 ms, SD = 88 ms; threshold = 738 ms). We 
also excluded the data of one participant whose error rate (12.2 %) exceeded the cutoff 
criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand mean (M = 3.1 %, SD = 3.3 %; 
threshold = 11.2 %). Finally, we excluded the data of a third participant who was an 
extreme outlier both in terms of mean response latency (784 ms) as well as overall 
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error rate (18 %). At the trial level, we again excluded all trials on which an incorrect 
response was registered (2.7 %). Finally, to reduce the influence of outlier values, we 
excluded all trials on which a response latency was observed that deviated more than 
2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean latency in a particular priming 
condition (3.0 %; Ratcliff, 1993). 
Design. Critical and standard trials were analyzed as in Experiment 1, with the 
exception that for the analysis of critical trials the factor color congruency was added to 
the design to check for the influence of color congruency of prime and target on the 
RPE.9 
Priming on critical trials. We found a main effect of target size, F(1, 66) = 11.27, p 
=.001, ηρ2 = .15, which was further qualified by size of the reference object, F(1, 66) = 
85.21, p < .001, ηρ2 = .56. Large targets were categorized faster when the reference 
object was small than when the reference object was large (480 ms vs. 516 ms). 
Conversely, small targets were responded to faster when the reference object was large 
than when the reference object was small (477 ms vs. 497 ms). Overall, these results 
corresponded to a mean RPE of 28 ms. Crucially, color congruency qualified the 
interaction between the size of the reference objects and the targets, F(1, 66) = 19.66, p 
< .001, ηρ2 = .23. In contrast to our expectations, however, the mean RPE was larger 
when the color of the primes and the targets did not match than when the primes and 
the targets were presented in the same color (32 ms vs. 24 ms). This three-way 
interaction was further qualified by the order of the reference objects, F(1, 66) = 8.91, p 
= .004, ηρ2 = .12. When participants first categorized targets relative to the small 
reference object, the difference between the mean RPE observed on color incongruent 
                                                 
9 As in Experiment 1, the reference object was changed after four blocks. The order in which the two 
reference objects were used as well as the color in which the majority of the stimuli were presented were 
counterbalanced across participants. None of the critical effects were moderated by the color of the 
stimuli on neither the critical nor the standard trials, all Fs < 1.43, all ps > .236. The color factor was thus 
excluded from further analyses. However, the order in which the reference objects were used did affect 
critical effects. The influence of the order of the reference object on the RPE just missed conventional 
significance levels, F(1, 66) = 3.96, p < .051, ηρ2 = .06. When participants first categorized targets relative 
to the small reference object, the mean RPE was 33 ms. Conversely, when participants were first 
presented with the large reference object, the mean RPE was 23 ms. Moreover, the order factor qualified 
the critical three-way interaction between color congruency, size of the reference object, and size of the 
targets on critical trials, F(1, 66) = 8.91, p = .004, ηρ2 = .12. The order factor was thus kept for the analysis 
of the critical trials. 
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trials and color congruent trials was larger (41 ms vs. 26 ms) than when participants 
were first presented with the large reference object (24 ms vs. 23 ms). 
Priming on standard trials. As expected, the interaction between the size of the 
primes and the targets reached significance, F(1, 67) = 46.70, p < .001, ηρ2 = .41. Large 
targets were categorized faster when they were preceded by large primes than when 
they were preceded by small primes (488 ms vs. 501 ms). Conversely, responses 
towards small targets were faster after the presentation of small primes than after the 
presentation of large primes (483 ms vs. 502 ms). Overall, these results corresponded 
to a priming effect of 16 ms. Three other effects were significant. First, the main effect 
of the size of the reference object was significant, F(1, 67) = 6.44, p = .014, ηρ2 = .09. 
Target categorizations were faster when the reference object was small compared to 
when the reference object was large (489 ms vs. 499 ms). Second, the size of the prime 
interacted significantly with the reference object, F(1, 67) = 12.84, p = .001, ηρ2 = .16. 
When the reference object was large, target responding was faster after a small prime 
than after a large prime (494 ms vs. 503 ms). Conversely, when the reference object 
was small, target responding was faster after a large prime than after a small prime 
(488 ms vs. 490 ms). Finally, the size of the targets interacted significantly with the size 
of the reference object, F(1, 67) = 60.89, p < .001, ηρ2 = .48. When the reference object 
was large, target responding was faster when the targets were small than when they 
were large (488 ms vs. 509 ms). Conversely, when the reference object was small, 
target responding was faster when the targets were large than when the targets were 
small (480 ms vs. 497 ms). These results corresponded to an effect of 19 ms. However, 
the interaction was significantly smaller than the RPE of 28 ms, F(1, 67) = 8.86, p = .004, 
ηρ2 = .12. 
Discussion 
As in our previous experiments, the critical trials revealed a significant interaction 
between the size of the reference objects and the targets. Moreover, the magnitude of 
this RPE was larger on color-incongruent trials as compared to color-congruent trials. 
This finding is crucial as it adds further weight to the idea that the RPE is driven by the 
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automatic relational processing of the primes. With the exception of the color of the 
primes, color-congruent trials and color-incongruent trials were identical for a given 
participant. Therefore, the observation that the RPE was larger on color-incongruent 
trials as compared to color-incongruent trials can only be attributed to differences in 
the extent to which relational information about the primes was processed. 
It must be noted, however, that the nature of this interaction effect was 
unexpected. As explained above, we expected the likelihood of task misapplication (and 
hence the likelihood of obtaining a RPE) to be larger on color-congruent trials as 
compared to color-incongruent trials. The observed data pattern was exactly the 
opposite, but still it can be readily accounted for. Remember that all stimuli except the 
medium-sized primes were presented in the same color throughout the entire 
experiment for a given participant. In contrast, the color of the medium-sized primes 
varied randomly from trial to trial. As a result, the color used for the presentation of the 
color-incongruent primes was a rare event. It is well-known that infrequent events can 
attract attention because they are more salient than events that occur frequently (e.g., 
Barcelo, Escera, Corral, & Periáñez, 2006; Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2000; 
Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). It can thus be hypothesized that the color-incongruent 
primes were processed more deeply than the color-congruent primes because they 
were more salient and captured more attention. Additional research would be required, 
though, to firmly substantiate the hypothesis that involuntary task misapplication is 
dependent upon stimulus salience. 
Finally, it may be noted that the distance effect (i.e., the interaction between the 
size of the reference objects and the size of the targets observed on the standard trials) 
as well as the main effect produced by the reference objects on the standard trials 
reached significance. Remember that both effects were also observed in Experiment 1 
but were absent in Experiment 2. As argued earlier, this data pattern is likely to have 
resulted from the fact that the reference objects were manipulated block-wise in 
Experiments 1 and 3 but varied randomly from trial to trial in Experiment 2. 
Importantly, both effects are by definition unrelated to the RPE observed on the critical 
trails. Accordingly, we will not elaborate upon them any further. 
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EXPERIMENT 4 
As discussed above, the studies by Van Opstal et al. (2010) revealed that 
participants can detect the presence or absence of an equivalence relation between 
two stimuli even if the instigating stimuli are presented below subjective recognition 
thresholds. It remains an open question, however, whether the analysis of more 
complex relational information is contingent upon stimulus awareness. In Experiment 4, 
we therefore sought to replicate the RPE using prime stimuli that were presented below 
subjective recognition thresholds. In addition, the observation of a subliminal RPE 
would strengthen our position that relational prime processing is truly unintentional. 
To ensure that the primes were presented below subjective recognition thresholds, 
the prime duration used in Experiment 4 was reduced to just 23.5 ms. In addition, we 
used both a forward and a backward mask. Finally, to test whether our masking 
procedure was successful, we implemented a direct prime discrimination task. The 
regression method developed by Draine and Greenwald (1998) was then used to test 
for the significance of the RPE in the absence of prime awareness. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 50 students at Ghent University (40 women, 10 men; Mage = 
20.98 years) participated for course credit or were paid 8€ for their help in this and 
another experiment. Each experiment took approximately 30 minutes. Twenty-nine 
students executed this experiment first, 21 started with an unrelated other experiment. 
All participants were Dutch speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants gave informed consent before participation. 
Materials. All stimulus materials were the same as those used in Experiment 2, with 
the exception that scrambled versions of the medium-sized stimuli were not used. The 
experiment was conducted using a 19-inch CRT screen (85Hz, 1280 × 1024 pixels). 
Accordingly, as in Experiment 1, the physical size of the pictures was (approximately) 
7.9 cm by 7.9 cm, corresponding with a visual angle of (about) 9.03 degrees. 
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Procedure. The procedure used in the present experiment was identical to that used 
in Experiment 2, with the following three exceptions. First, to reduce the number of 
trials, the neutral trial condition was omitted from the design. The priming phase of 
experiment included 240 trials in total (i.e., four blocks of 24 critical trials, 24 standard 
trials, and twelve filler trials each). Second, the sequence of events on each trial was 
adjusted to ensure that the primes were presented subliminally. Each trial started with 
a 1000-ms presentation of a reference stimuli. Next, after an interstimulus interval of 
300 ms, a forward mask (i.e., a random distribution of black, grey, and white pixels with 
a resolution of 300 × 300 pixels) was presented for 300 ms. A prime picture was then 
presented for 23.5 ms, immediately followed by a 35-ms presentation of a backward 
mask (identical to the forward mask). Finally, at the offset of the backward mask (i.e., 
SOA = 58.5 ms), the target picture was presented at the same location as the primes 
until participants responded by pressing one of the response keys. As a third procedural 
change relative to Experiment 2, participants completed a direct prime-recognition task 
after completion of the priming task. This prime-recognition task was identical to the 
main priming task, with the exception that participants were now asked to categorize 
the size of the primes relative to the size of the reference object. They were asked to 
respond as accurately as possible and were informed that it was no longer necessary to 
respond as fast as possible. Participants were asked to guess if they were unable to 
identify a prime stimulus. No error feedback was given. 
Results 
Data trimming. The criteria for excluding participants and trials were identical to 
those in Experiment 1. Specifically, we excluded the data of three participants whose 
overall mean response latencies (968 ms, 1034 ms, 1187 ms) exceeded our cutoff 
criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand mean (M = 603 ms, SD = 141 ms; 
threshold = 955 ms). We also excluded the data of one other participant whose error 
rate (5.7 %) exceeded the cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand 
mean (M = 1.1 %, SD = 1.2 %; threshold = 4.2 %). At the trial level, we again excluded all 
trials on which an incorrect response was registered (1.0 %). Finally, to reduce the 
influence of outlier values, we excluded all trials on which a response latency was 
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observed that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean 
latency in a particular priming condition (2.8 %; Ratcliff, 1993). 
Design. The response latency data were subjected to the same set of analyses that 
were performed for Experiment 2, with one exception. Because the neutral prime 
condition was removed from the study design, the magnitude of the RPE was assessed 
relative to magnitude of the interaction between the size of the reference objects and 
the size of the targets observed on standard trials (as in Experiments 1 and 3).  
Priming on critical trials. The interaction between the size of the reference objects 
and the size of the targets again reached significance, F(1, 45) = 6.71, p = .013, ηρ2 = .13. 
Large targets were categorized faster when the reference object was small than when 
the reference object was large (556 ms vs. 567 ms). Conversely, small targets were 
responded to faster when the reference object was large than when the reference 
object was small (541 ms vs. 561 ms). Overall, these results corresponded with a mean 
RPE of 10 ms. In addition, a significant main effect of target size was found, F(1, 45) = 
5.15, p = .028, ηρ2 = .10. Small targets were categorized faster than large targets (549 
ms vs. 564 ms). 
Priming on standard trials. No significant effects were found, all Fs < 3.58, all ps > 
.065. Most importantly, both the interaction between prime size and target size and the 
interaction between the size of the reference objects and the size of the targets failed 
to reach significance, F < 1 and F(1, 45) = 1.03, p = .316, ηρ2 = .02, respectively. It might 
be noted, though, that both effects were numerically in the expected direction (i.e., 3 
ms and 5 ms, respectively). Importantly, the strength of the interaction between the 
size of the reference objects and the size of the targets was roughly the same on critical 
priming trials (i.e., the RPE, 10 ms) and standard priming trials (i.e., 5 ms), F(1, 45) = 
1.11, p = .297, ηρ2 = .02. 
Regression analysis. Linear regression analyses were performed to establish the 
subliminal character of the RPE (Draine & Greenwald, 1998). To that end, we first 
calculated individual d’ scores on the basis of the prime discrimination task. The 
proportion of correct prime categorizations was used as the hit rate whereas the 
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proportion of incorrect prime categorizations was used as the false alarm rate  (Green & 
Swets, 1966). On average, prime perceptibility was significantly different from zero, M = 
0.34, t(44) = 8.58, p < .001, d = 1.81. The individual RPE scores were then regressed on 
the individual d’ scores. The intercept in such a regression analysis indicates whether 
the RPE occurred in the absence of prime awareness. The slope, on the other hand, 
captures the relation between prime visibility and the RPE. One participant was 
identified as an influential case(i.e., Cook’s distance p > .20; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, 
& Li, 2005) and was therefore excluded from the regression analyses. It may be noted 
that the results reported below would improve dramatically if this case were not 
excluded. It is thus safe to say that we opted for a conservative approach. 
Figure 2 depicts the linear regression line and a scatterplot of the individual data 
points. Both the intercept (i.e., 7.17 ms) and the slope (i.e., 11.19 ms) were non-
significant, ts < 1.37, ps > .15. Virtually identical findings emerged when using the 
improved regression approach that was proposed by Klauer, Draine, and Greenwald 
(1998) to accommodate measurement error in the prime visibility regression predictor 
(see also Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998).  
Discussion 
While the overall RPE did reach significance, the present experiment failed to 
produce convincing evidence for the hypothesis that automatic relational processing 
can take place even if participants are completely unaware of the instigating stimulus. 
First, the mean d’ score was statistically different than zero, suggesting that our 
masking procedure may have been ineffective for at least a subset of participants. 
Second, a regression analysis in which the individual RPE scores were regressed on the 
individual d’ scores revealed non-significant results only. Third, the strength of the 
interaction between the size of the reference objects and the size of the targets was 
more or less the same on critical priming trials (i.e., the RPE) and standard priming 
trials. In sum, the results of Experiment 4 are insufficient to substantiate the hypothesis 
that automatic relational stimulus processing can take place in the absence of stimulus 
awareness. It is possible that the specific experimental setup (i.e., two reference 
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objects, a large and unpredictable prime stimulus set, short SOA) prevented the 
occurrence priming effects (e.g., Damian, 2001; Kunde et al., 2003). On the other hand, 
it may be noted, that (a) the all effects were numerically in the anticipated direction 
and (b) the sample size of the present experiment was quite limited. It might thus be 
worthwhile to replicate the present experiment while ensuring adequate statistical 
power. 
 
 
Figure 2. Regression of the relational priming effect on individual d′ measures of prime 
perceptibility: Scatterplot and best fitting regression function 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
To examine whether complex relational information can be processed under 
automaticity conditions, we conducted four sequential priming studies in which 
participants were asked to judge the physical size of a series of target objects relative to 
either a small reference object (i.e., a football) or a large reference object (i.e., a car). 
Crucially, the prime set included objects that were larger than the small reference 
object and smaller than the large reference object (e.g., a bike). Results showed that 
the impact of these medium-sized objects on target categorization was contingent upon 
the size of the reference object. That is, we observed that the medium-sized primes 
facilitated responses towards large targets and inhibited responses towards small 
targets when the size of the reference object was small. Conversely, when the size of 
the reference object was large, the same set of medium-sized primes facilitated 
responses towards small targets and inhibited responses towards large targets. This RPE 
was obtained when the size of the reference object was manipulated block-wise 
(Experiments 1 and 3) and trial-wise (Experiments 2 and 4). We also found some 
evidence that the RPE depends on the salience of the prime stimuli (Experiment 3). 
Finally, results were inconclusive as to whether the RPE might replicate in the absence 
of prime awareness (Experiment 4). The implications of these findings are twofold. First, 
our findings corroborate the hypothesis that complex relational information can be 
processed under automaticity conditions. Second, our findings shed new light on the 
mechanisms that are at play in the sequential priming paradigm. We will discuss these 
implications one by one. 
Complex relational stimulus processing under automaticity conditions? 
The mere fact that an RPE was found in each of our experiments is sufficient to 
conclude that participants were able to process complex relational prime information. 
The question to be addressed here concerns the extent to which the conditions 
implemented in our studies allow for the conclusion that this type of prime processing 
can take place under automaticity conditions. Reassuringly, a careful analysis of our 
experimental procedures in terms of the automaticity features put forward by Moors 
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and De Houwer (2006) strongly supports the conclusion that the RPE is indeed 
produced by automatic processes. First, it seems highly unlikely that the RPE is 
dependent upon the (conscious) intention to process the size relation between the 
primes and the reference objects. Not only were participants asked to respond on the 
basis of the targets only, the prime information was also uninformative for the task at 
hand. Moreover, in Experiment 3, it was observed that the RPE is more pronounced for 
salient than for non-salient primes. It seems highly unlikely that participants would limit 
their intentional attempts to extract task-relevant prime information to just one subset 
of experimental stimuli. The findings of Experiment 3 therefore add further weight to 
the idea that automatic relational stimulus processing can occur unintentionally. 
Second, both the SOA and the presentation time of the primes were quite short in each 
of our experiments. In addition, participants were always very fast to respond (i.e., 495 
ms, 524 ms, 496 ms, and 559 ms in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively). It can thus 
be concluded that the RPE observed in each of our experiments was driven by fast-
acting processes. Third, the response task implemented in the present series of 
experiments was much more demanding than the response tasks typically used in 
sequential priming research. It could thus be argued that the RPE emerged under 
conditions of reduced cognitive capacity, implying that the processes driving the RPE 
must be efficient. On the other hand, the results of Experiment 4 regarding the need for 
awareness of the prime stimuli were inconclusive. Although an RPE was observed in 
Experiment 4, we were unable to rule out the possibility that the magnitude of the RPE 
was inflated by the distance effect. Moreover, while the prime duration was reduced to 
just 23.5 ms, a regression analysis failed to produce convincing evidence for the idea 
that the RPE can replicate even if participants are completely unaware of the primes. 
Further research would thus be needed to firmly substantiate the hypothesis that the 
RPE is not dependent upon the conscious identification of the primes. Taken together, 
however, our findings provide strong corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that 
complex relational stimulus processing can take place under at least three automaticity 
conditions (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  
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The mechanism underlying the involuntary processing of task-irrelevant stimuli 
In line with Dehaene et al. (1998) and Van Opstal et al. (2010), we assume that 
automatic relational stimulus processing in the sequential priming paradigm results 
from a goal-dependent but unintentional application of the target task to the prime 
stimuli. Earlier research already provided supporting evidence for the hypothesis that 
the automatic analysis of task-irrelevant stimuli is confined to stimulus features that are 
task-relevant. Kiefer and Martens (2010), for example, demonstrated that the semantic 
analysis of briefly presented prime words is prevented if a non-semantic task set is 
activated prior to the presentation of the primes (for related findings, see Ansorge & 
Heumann, 2003; Ansorge et al., 2002, 2010, 2009, 2014; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; 
Kiefer & Martens, 2010). The present research extends these findings by showing that 
task-misapplication (or “task-set execution” in the terminology used by Ansorge et al., 
2014) can result not only in a top-down selection of specific features of a single 
stimulus, but also in a comparative integration of various sources of information. 
Importantly, the explanatory power of a task misapplication account is by no means 
restricted to priming studies aimed at capturing automatic relational processing (e.g., 
Van Opstal et al., 2010). It can readily account for any type of priming effect whenever 
there is dimensional overlap between the prime set and the target set (Kornblum, 
Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). For instance, if the task requires participants to process 
the evaluative connotation of the targets, participants are likely to process the 
evaluative tone of the primes as well. Accordingly, one can expect the evaluative match 
between the primes and the targets to affect target responding in such a task, as was 
observed in an overwhelming amount of studies (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Herring et 
al., 2013; Klauer & Musch, 2003). Likewise, when a non-evaluative semantic judgment 
of the target stimuli is required, one can expect participants to process the primes in 
terms of that specific semantic stimulus dimension, thereby producing a non-evaluative 
semantic priming effect (e.g., Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000). 
In principle, however, the mechanism of task misapplication fails to account for 
priming effects that arise in the absence of overlap between the prime set and the 
response set. As an example, consider a pronunciation task in which participants are 
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presented with positive and negative words as primes and targets and are asked to 
pronounce the targets. While task-misapplication in the pronunciation task may 
(perhaps) result in a tendency to pronounce the prime words, automatic evaluative 
stimulus processing is not expected to occur in this task because it is not required for 
the task at hand. Nevertheless, a number of researchers did report that they replicated 
the evaluative priming effect in the pronunciation task (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & 
Hymes, 1996; Hermans, Houwer, & Eelen, 1994 Experiment 2; but see Klauer & Musch, 
2001; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004).  
One way to reconcile these observations with the task-misapplication account is to 
assume that task-misapplication is not limited to proximal task goals (e.g., pronouncing 
words) but can also extend to more distal task goals (e.g., evaluating stimuli) that are 
relevant in a particular context (e.g., an evaluative priming experiment). In line with this 
reasoning, Spruyt and colleagues demonstrated that the evaluative priming effect 
replicates in the pronunciation task only if the experimental conditions encourage 
participants to engage in evaluative stimulus processing (Everaert, Spruyt, & De 
Houwer, 2011; Spruyt, 2014; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; Spruyt, Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt & Tibboel, 
2015). As an example, consider the findings of Spruyt et al. (2009). In their Experiment 
3, participants were asked to pronounce target words on just 25 % of the trials. On the 
remaining trials, one group of participants was asked to categorize the targets in terms 
of their valence (i.e., the evaluative condition) whereas a second group was asked to 
indicate whether the target words referred to persons or objects (i.e., the non-
evaluative condition). Crucially, the prime set and the target set used for the 
pronunciation trials consisted of positive and negative words that referred to persons 
and objects. It was thus possible to study the evaluative priming effect and the (non-
evaluative) semantic priming effect at the same time. Results showed that the 
evaluative priming effect on the pronunciation trials was reliable in the evaluative 
condition but not in the non-evaluative condition. Conversely, the non-evaluative 
priming effect on the pronunciation trials was reliable in the non-evaluative condition 
but not in the evaluative condition. Clearly, these findings can be readily accounted for 
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if one assumes that participants misapplied the (dominant) categorization task to the 
primes presented on the critical pronunciation trials.  
Interestingly, this reasoning can also account for the sequential priming data 
reported by Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Raaijmakers (1998). They examined whether 
target responding in the pronunciation task and the lexical decision task can be affected 
by the degree of perceptual relatedness between the primes and the targets. To that 
end, participants were presented with primes and targets that referred to objects with 
a similar shape (e.g., pizza – coin) or a dissimilar shape (e.g., pen – coin). As expected, 
response latencies were found to be faster on congruent trials as compared to 
incongruent trials, but only if participants completed a shape-categorization task prior 
to the experimental priming task. It could thus be argued that the perceptual priming 
effects reported by Pecher et al. (1998) resulted from the fact that participants 
misapplied the shape-categorization task to the primes presented during the sequential 
priming procedure, thereby producing a perceptual priming effect. 
In sum, the idea that task-misapplication can occur for proximal as well as distal task 
sets broadens the scope of our findings dramatically. Still, it must be reiterated that the 
emergence of a sequential priming effects requires two, sequential processes (Spruyt et 
al., 2011). While our work clearly shows that task-misapplication drives the 
interpretation of stimuli that are presented under automaticity conditions (see also 
Ansorge et al., 2014), we make no general claims about the mechanisms that may or 
may not be responsible for translating the outcome of the task-misapplication process 
into an observable sequential priming effect.  
 Conclusion 
While it is typically argued that non-automatic processes are required to process the 
relation of one stimulus relative to other stimuli, we presented strong evidence for the 
hypothesis that complex relational stimulus processing can take place under 
automaticity conditions. In addition, our findings strongly suggest that automatic 
relational stimulus processing is driven by an unintentional misapplication of (proximal 
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and/or distal) task sets, a viewpoint that can explain in a parsimonious way various, 
often conflicting results that have been reported in the literature.  
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ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODY 
DISSATISFACTION AND IMPLICIT BELIEFS 
ABOUT ACTUAL AND IDEAL BODY IMAGE 
1 
ABSTRACT 
We examined whether implicit measures of actual and ideal body image can be used 
to predict body dissatisfaction in young female adults. Participants completed two 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedures (IRAPs) to examine implicit beliefs 
concerning their actual (e.g., I am thin) and ideal body image (e.g., I want to be thin). 
Body dissatisfaction was examined via self-report questionnaires and rating scales. As 
expected, the implicit belief to be thin (i.e., actual body image) was lower in 
participants who exhibited a high degree of body dissatisfaction than in participants 
who exhibited a low degree of body dissatisfaction. In contrast, the implicit desire to be 
thin (i.e., ideal body image) was stronger in participants who exhibited a high level of 
body dissatisfaction than in participants who were less dissatisfied with their body. 
Adding further weight to the idea that both IRAP measures captured different 
underlying constructs, we also observed that they correlated differently with body mass 
index, explicit body dissatisfaction, and explicit measures of actual and ideal body 
image. More generally, these findings underscore the advantage of using implicit 
measures that incorporate relational information relative to implicit measures that 
allow for an assessment of associative relations only. 
                                                 
1
 Based on Heider, N., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2015). On the Relationship between Body 
Dissatisfaction and Implicit Beliefs about Actual and Ideal Body Image. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Body dissatisfaction can be defined as the negative attitude towards one’s own 
body resulting from a (perceived) discrepancy between one’s actual physical 
appearance (i.e., the actual body image) and internalized ideals about one’s physical 
appearance (i.e., the ideal body image; e.g., Cash & Szymanski, 1995; Higgins, 1989; 
Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991; Williamson, Gleaves, Watkins, 
& Schlundt, 1993). Because body dissatisfaction plays a central role in the causation and 
maintenance of eating disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Fairburn & 
Harrison, 2003; Stice, 2001), behavioral scientists have long sought ways to measure 
the degree of dissatisfaction with one’s physical appearance. Most often, they rely on 
the use of direct self-report measures (i.e., questionnaires), but it is well-known that 
such measures can be susceptible to social desirability and impression management 
(Cronbach, 1990; Holtgraves, 2004). In addition, self-report measures are, by definition, 
unsuited to capture attitudes that are introspectively unidentified (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). Accordingly, behavioral scientists have begun developing diagnostic instruments 
that allow for an assessment of body dissatisfaction in an indirect way, that is, without 
having to ask for a direct self-assessment. Instead, inter-individual differences are 
inferred from a respondent’s response pattern in well-controlled computer tasks, often 
referred to as implicit measures (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 
2009). 
Hitherto, several attempts have been undertaken to develop implicit measures of 
body-related attitudes (e.g., Ahern, Bennett, & Hetherington, 2008; Bessenoff & 
Sherman, 2000; Bluemke & Friese, 2012; Degner & Wentura, 2009; Juarascio et al., 
2011; Parling, Cernvall, Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Ghaderi, 2012; Roddy, Stewart, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2010, 2011; Watts, Cranney, & Gleitzman, 2008). Consider, for 
example, the findings of Bluemke and Friese (2012). In their adaptation of the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), stimuli referring to 
thinness and overweight and stimuli related to either the self or related to a well-known 
other person (i.e., a friend or a relative) were presented one by one on a computer 
screen. In a first critical block of trials, participants were asked to press one key as 
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quickly as possible upon the presentation of a word referring to thinness (e.g., ‘skinny’) 
or a word related to the self (e.g., the participant’s first name). The second key was to 
be pressed upon the presentation of a word referring to overweight (e.g., ‘fat’) or a 
word related to another person (e.g., the first name of a friend). In a second critical 
block, response assignments were reversed so that words referring to thinness and 
another person were assigned to the first key whereas words referring to overweight 
and the self were assigned to the second key. Based on the assumption that it is easier 
to respond when concepts assigned to the same key are associated in memory, a 
person’s implicit body image was then inferred from the difference in performance 
between the two critical blocks. More specifically, participants with a thin body image 
were expected to perform best when words relating to the self and thinness were 
assigned to the same key whereas participants with an overweight body image were 
expected to perform best when words relating to the self and overweight were 
assigned to the same key. In sum, the IAT measure developed by Bluemke and Friese 
(2012) was designed to capture inter-individual differences in the strength of 
associations between the concepts self and body size (i.e., thinness/overweight). 
Body dissatisfaction, however, by definition comprises more than a simple 
association between the self and body size because it is driven by the (perceived) 
discrepancy between one’s ideal and actual body image. Crucially, both ideal and actual 
body image involve a relation between the concepts self and body size but differ with 
regard to how those concepts are related. More specifically, beliefs about actual body 
image are characterized by a descriptive relation (e.g., I am thin). In contrast, beliefs 
about ideal body image relate the self to body size in terms of desirability (e.g., I want 
to be thin). Clearly, these two beliefs are fundamentally different, yet the IAT measure 
of Bluemke and Friese (2012) is unable to differentiate between them as the IAT was 
designed to capture the associative, unqualified strength between two concepts.  
As pointed out by Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, and Vahey (2012; also see De Houwer, 
2014), this is a property not only of the IAT but also of several other implicit measures 
such as the (standard) evaluative priming task (EPT; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 
1995) and the affect misattribution paradigm (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 
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2005).2 However, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP), developed by 
Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006), was designed specifically to capture inter-individual 
differences in the extent to which respondents relate concepts in a specific manner 
(Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). It could thus be hypothesized that the IRAP has the 
potential to outperform classic implicit measures such as the EPT and the IAT whenever 
relational information is critical. 
As an example, consider the studies of Remue and colleagues who examined ideal 
and actual self-esteem in a sample of dysphoric students and a non-dysphoric control 
group (Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & De Raedt, 2013; Remue, 
Hughes, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2014). To capture ideal self-esteem, participants were 
presented, on each of a series of trials, with either the stimulus ‘I want to be’ or ‘I do 
not want to be’ together with either a positive or negative adjective. Each combination 
of both stimuli was thus either congruent or incongruent with having positive ideal self-
esteem (e.g., ‘I want to be + good’ and ‘I want to be + bad’, respectively). Crucially, in 
one block of trials, participants were asked to respond as if they had the desire to 
possess positive self-esteem. They were thus required to select the response ‘true’ 
whenever a stimulus combination was presented that referred to having positive ideal 
self-esteem (e.g., ‘I do not want to be + bad’). Conversely, whenever a stimulus 
combination was presented that referred to having negative ideal self-esteem (e.g., ‘I 
want to be + bad’), they were required to select the response ‘false’. In a second block 
of trials, participants were asked to respond as if they had the desire to possess 
negative self-esteem. Accordingly, they were expected to select the response ‘true’ 
whenever a stimulus combination was presented that referred to having negative ideal 
self-esteem (e.g., ‘I want to be + bad’). Whenever a stimulus combination was 
presented that referred to having positive ideal self-esteem (e.g., ‘I want to be + good’), 
they were expected to select the response ‘false’. The IRAP is based on the assumption 
that it is more difficult to respond in a manner that is inconsistent with one’s personal 
beliefs than it is to respond in a manner that is consistent with one’s personal beliefs. A 
person’s level of ideal self-esteem was thus inferred from the difference in performance 
                                                 
2
 It might be noted that the sequential priming paradigm can be adapted so as to allow for the 
measurement of (automatic) relational processing. For an example, see Heider, Spruyt, and De Houwer 
(2015). 
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between the two critical blocks. More specifically, participants with positive ideal self-
esteem were expected to perform best when responding to statements that were in 
line with desiring to have positive self-esteem whereas participants with negative ideal 
self-esteem were expected to perform best when responding to statements in line with 
desiring to have negative self-esteem. It was anticipated that the desire to be good 
would be more pronounced in dysphoric students than in non-dysphoric controls, as 
was indeed observed by Remue et al. (2013, but see Remue et al., 2014). 
Crucially, Remue and colleagues also administered a second IRAP that was designed 
to capture actual self-esteem. This second IRAP was identical to the first one, except for 
the fact that participants were now (a) presented with stimulus combinations that 
referred to actual self-esteem (e.g., ‘I am + good’) and (b) were required to respond as if 
they did or did not possess positive self-esteem. Despite the structural similarity 
between the two IRAPs, the results obtained with the second IRAP revealed no (Remue 
et al., 2014) or even a reversed difference (i.e., more positive actual self-esteem in non-
dysphoric than in dysphoric students; Remue et al., 2013) between dysphoric and non-
dysphoric students. These findings are in line with the notion that ideal and actual self-
esteem are two different constructs and should therefore be measured independently 
from each other. More generally, because the essential difference between ideal and 
actual self-esteem concerns the quality of the relation between the self and 
positive/negative affect, these findings underscore the need for implicit measures that 
are sensitive to relational information. 
Accordingly, the aim of the present research was to develop an implicit measure of 
body dissatisfaction that takes into account the way in which the concepts self and 
body-size are related. Participants were asked to perform two IRAPs in quick 
succession, one to capture the extent to which participants endorsed or rejected beliefs 
reflecting their actual body (e.g., ‘I am thin’, ‘I am not overweight’) and one to capture 
the extent to which participants endorsed or rejected beliefs reflecting their ideal body 
(e.g., ‘I want to be thin’, ‘I don’t want to be overweight’). We expected that the 
discrepancy between the two IRAP scores would depend upon the degree of self-
reported body dissatisfaction. Specifically, we expected that the belief to be thin would 
be more pronounced in participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared to 
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participants high in body dissatisfaction. In contrast, we expected that the desire to be 
thin would be less pronounced in participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared 
to participants high in body dissatisfaction. 
METHOD 
Participants 
About one month prior to the actual experiment, 307 students at Ghent University 
completed the body dissatisfaction subscale of the Eating Disorders Inventory (EDI; 
Garner, Olmstead, & Polivy, 1983) during an online screening study that involved 
several questionnaires. Next, using an online participant recruitment system, we invited 
all female students who had scored within the first and forth quartile of the total EDI 
distribution (N = 112). In total, 52 female students (M = 19.6 years, SD = 4.8) 
participated in the actual experiment in exchange for course credit. Four participants 
were excluded because they failed to complete at least one of the two IRAP measures. 
Based on the scores of two body dissatisfaction self-reports obtained during the actual 
test session, the final sample (N = 48) was divided into a low body dissatisfaction group 
(n = 24, M = -0.90, SD = 0.27, min = -1.17, max = -0.03) and a high body dissatisfaction 
group (n = 24, M = 0.90, SD = 0.43, min = 0.04, max = 1.75), t(46) = 17.13, p < .001, d = 
4.95).3 All participants were Dutch speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
Measures 
Self-report measures. Body dissatisfaction was assessed by means of the body 
dissatisfaction subscale of the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI, 9 items; Garner et al., 
1983) as well as the body dissatisfaction subscale of the Body Attitude Test (BAT, 7 
items; Probst, Vandereycken, Coppenolle, & Vanderlinden, 1995). Scores of the two 
measures were highly correlated, r = .91. Scores of explicit body dissatisfaction were 
                                                 
3
 A renewed administration of explicit measures of body dissatisfaction during the test session was 
necessary as invitations were sent out anonymously via an online participant recruiting system.  
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computed for each participant by averaging their standardized scores of both body 
dissatisfaction self-report measures. Based on this general score of body dissatisfaction, 
participants were assigned into either the low or high body dissatisfaction group. Actual 
and ideal body image were measured using the female version of the Contour Drawing 
Rating Scale (CDRS; Thompson & Gray, 1995). The CDRS consists of nine schematic 
(female) figures of varying sizes ranging from underweight (1) to overweight (9). 
Participants completed the CDRS twice, once to indicate their actual body image and 
once to indicate their ideal body image. Higher CDRS scores indicated a more 
overweight actual and ideal body image, respectively. Finally, we computed two Body 
Mass Indices for each participant, once using their self-reported weight and height (i.e., 
self-reported BMI) and once using their factual weight (i.e., factual BMI). Discrepancies 
between self-reported BMI and factual BMI were unrelated to all other (indirect and 
direct) measures. Accordingly, only the factual BMI data were used. 
IRAPs. Participants completed two IRAPs, one to capture actual body image (i.e., 
actual-IRAP) and one to capture ideal body image (i.e., ideal-IRAP). To capture actual 
body image, participants were presented with combinations of the stimuli ‘I am’ or ‘I 
am not’ (in the IRAP literature referred to as sample stimuli) and one of twelve words 
referring to the concepts thinness and overweight (in the IRAP literature referred to as 
target stimuli). All target stimuli are presented in the Appendix. The combination of 
sample and target stimuli resulted in two trial types: Twelve combinations were in line 
with the belief ‘I am thin’ (e.g., ‘I am + slim’; ’I am not + chubby’), and 12 combinations 
were in line with the belief ‘I am overweight’ (e.g., ‘I am + chubby’; ‘I am not + slim’). 
Similarly, to capture ideal body image, the same set of 12 target stimuli was combined 
with the sample stimuli ‘I want to be’ or ‘I don’t want to be’. Trials were thus either in 
line with the belief ‘I want to be thin’ (e.g., ‘I want to be + slim’; ’I don’t want to be + 
chubby’) or in line with the belief ‘I want to be overweight’ (‘I want to be + chubby’; ‘I 
don’t want to be + slim’).  
Both IRAPs consisted of six blocks of trials in which each of 24 combinations of 
sample and target stimuli was presented exactly once in random order (144 trials in 
total). Participants were asked to respond as fast as possible by pressing one of two 
response keys. One of the keys indicated ‘true’ whereas the other indicated ‘false’. 
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Response assignments varied randomly from trial to trial. To capture actual body image, 
participants were asked to respond in line with the belief ‘I am thin’ in one type of block 
(i.e., congruent block). In the second type of block (i.e., incongruent block), they were 
asked to respond in line with the belief ‘I am overweight’. Likewise, to capture ideal 
body image, participants were asked to respond in line with the belief ‘I want to be thin’ 
in the congruent block. In the incongruent block, they were asked to respond in line 
with the belief ‘I want to be overweight’. Congruent and incongruent blocks were 
presented in an alternating order and all participants started with a congruent block of 
trials. 
Each IRAP was preceded by a practice phase. All participants completed a congruent 
practice block followed by an incongruent practice block in which each of the 24 
stimulus combinations were again presented in a random order. Participants were 
instructed verbally to focus on response accuracy first and then to increase their 
response speed. Unless participants achieved an accuracy of more than 80% and a 
median response latency of less than 2000 ms in both practice blocks, a second pair of 
practice blocks was presented. If necessary, this procedure was repeated after the 
second pair of practice trials. If participants failed to reach the threshold criteria during 
the third pair of practice trials, the IRAP was stopped. This was the case for four 
participants who did not complete at least one of the IRAPs.4  
Each trial was started with a 400-ms blank white screen. Afterwards, one of the 24 
stimulus combinations of a sample and a target stimulus was presented in two rows at 
the center of the upper half of the computer screen in black color, Arial font size 26. To 
signal the response assignments for each trial (i.e., the keys D and K), the words ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ were presented in a green color, Arial font size 36, at the bottom left and the 
bottom right corner of the computer screen. In case of an incorrect response, a red X 
was presented in Arial font size 48 below the stimulus combination. Participants were 
required to correct an erroneous response in order to proceed to the next trial. After 
each block, participants were presented with feedback about their accuracy (in 
                                                 
4
 Note, that the version of the IRAP software used in this study recorded the raw response latencies of 
the last pair of practice blocks only. Consequentially, there is no information about the number of 
participants that completed one, two, or three pairs of practice blocks, respectively, before proceeding 
with the test phase. 
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percentages) and speed of responding (in median response latencies), based on the last 
24 trials, in red color, Arial font size 12. Each block of trials was preceded by the 
presentation of a reminder about the overall response rule, Arial font size 14 (e.g., 
‘Please respond as if you are thin and are not overweight’). All stimuli were presented 
on a 19-inch VGA screen (75Hz, 1024 × 768 pixels) and implemented using the 2012 
version of the IRAP software downloaded from http://www.irapresearch.org. 
Procedure 
All participants gave informed consent before participation. Participants completed 
both IRAPs in a counterbalanced order. They then completed the EDI, BAT, and CDRSs 
for actual and ideal body image, in that order. Finally, the participants’ weight and 
height were assessed for the calculation of the BMI. All participants were tested 
individually. The experiment took approximately 45 minutes. 
RESULTS 
Data Preparation 
For each participant and each version of the IRAP, the raw response latencies of the 
six experimental blocks were aggregated in a single overall D-score using the algorithm 
described by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). We first excluded response latencies 
above 10,000 ms (0.10 %). Other criteria for data exclusion as specified in the scoring 
algorithm (e.g., responses faster than 300 ms on more than 10% of the trials) were not 
met. We then calculated standard deviations on the basis of all response latencies 
observed in subsequent pairs of congruent and incongruent blocks (i.e., Block 1 & 2, 3 & 
4, and 5 & 6). Next, mean response latencies were calculated for each of the six blocks. 
Difference scores were then calculated for each pair of blocks by subtracting the mean 
response latency observed in the congruent block from the mean response latency 
observed in the incongruent block. Finally each difference score was divided by its 
corresponding standard deviation, yielding three D-scores, one for each pair of blocks. 
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Finally, the three D-scores were averaged to obtain one overall D-score.5 D-scores were 
calculated so that positive values indicate a higher degree of a thin body image belief 
(actual or ideal). 
Effects at the Group Level 
To investigate whether implicit measures of actual and ideal body image were 
dependent upon the degree of body dissatisfaction, the overall D-scores were 
submitted to a 2 (IRAP: actual vs. ideal) x 2 (body dissatisfaction: high vs. low) mixed 
models ANOVA.6 As expected, we found a significant interaction between body 
dissatisfaction and IRAP, F(1, 46) = 6.71, p = .013, ηρ
2 = .13, indicating that the two 
groups responded differently to the two IRAPs. Participants low in body dissatisfaction 
scored higher on the actual-IRAP than participants high in body dissatisfaction, 0.13 (SD 
= 0.17) vs. 0.05 (SD = 0.16), respectively. In contrast, participants high in body 
dissatisfaction scored higher on the ideal-IRAP than participants low in body 
dissatisfaction, 0.13 (SD = 0.16) vs. 0.03 (SD = 0.17), respectively. This pattern of results 
is consistent with our hypotheses (a) that the implicit belief to be thin is more 
pronounced in individuals who are low in body dissatisfaction as compared to 
individuals who exhibit a high degree of body dissatisfaction, and (b) that the implicit 
desire to be thin is more pronounced in individuals who are high in body dissatisfaction 
as compared to individuals who exhibit a low degree of body dissatisfaction. Additional 
t-tests showed, however, that the D-scores of the actual-IRAP did not differ significantly 
between groups, t(46) = 1.57, p = .122, d = 0.45. In contrast, the D-scores of the ideal-
IRAP did differ significantly between the groups, t(46) = 2.12, p = .040, d = 0.61. 
                                                 
5
 It may be noted that this approach diverges from the analysis strategy adopted by Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, and Boles (2011). Instead of calculating a single, overall D-score, these authors 
suggested to calculate four different D-scores, one for each of type of trial (i.e., ‘I am + thin’, ‘I am not + 
thin’, ‘I am + overweight’, ‘I am not + overweight’, in case of the actual-IRAP). The rationale to depart 
from this approach is threefold. First, for both of the IRAPs that we used, all four trial types were 
assumed the probe the exact same belief. Second, by aggregating all observations into a single D-score, 
the impact of outlying observations is much better controlled for. Finally, a single D-score can be 
interpreted in an intuitive manner. 
6
 As explained above, the order in which the two IRAP tasks were completed was counterbalanced across 
participants. Reassuringly, our critical effect (i.e., the interaction between explicit body dissatisfaction 
and the type of IRAP) was not moderated by this counterbalancing factor, F(1, 44) = 1.38, p = .247, ηρ² = 
.03, nor were any other effects, all Fs < 1, all ps > .49. We therefore excluded the order factor from the 
analyses. 
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Differences between actual and ideal body image were significant for participants low 
in body dissatisfaction, t(46) = 2.02, p = .049, d = 0.58, and marginally significant for 
participants high in body dissatisfaction, t(46) = 1.65, p = .105, d = 0.48. The ANOVA did 
not reveal other significant effects, all Fs < 1, all ps > .712. 
Correlational Analyses 
For exploratory reasons, we also computed all pairwise correlations between the 
IRAP scores, the CDRS measures, the explicit measure of body dissatisfaction, and the 
BMI (see Table 1). Note, however, that most variables were not normally distributed 
because our sample consisted of participants who exhibited either a high or low degree 
of body dissatisfaction. Accordingly, Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients 
were computed rather than Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. In line 
with the results presented above, the ideal-IRAP correlated or tended to correlate 
positively with the actual-CDRS, the ideal-CDRS, the explicit measure of body 
dissatisfaction, and the BMI. Conversely, the actual-IRAP correlated negatively with 
each of these measures, albeit not significantly so. Adding further weight to the idea 
that both IRAP measures captured different underlying constructs, the degree to which 
the two IRAP measures correlated with each of the other variables was reliably 
different for the actual-CDRS, the ideal-CDRS, and the explicit measure of body 
dissatisfaction, ts < 2.01, ps < .05. For the BMI, the difference between the correlation 
with the ideal-IRAP and the actual-IRAP just missed significance, t(46) = 1.91, p = .06. 
 
 
Table 1. Correlations between measures. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Actual-IRAP - -0.08 -0.24+** -0.27+** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
2 Ideal-IRAP  - -0.39*** -0.27+** -0.30*** -0.28*** 
3 Actual-CDRS   
 
- -0.60*** -0.82*** -0.77*** 
4 Ideal-CDRS  
  
- -0.17*** -0.63*** 
5 EBD 
    
- -0.61*** 
6 BMI 
 
  
  
- 
Note. IRAP = Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure; CDRS = Contour Drawing Rating Scale; 
EBD = explicit body dissatisfaction, based on averaged scores of the body dissatisfaction 
subscales of the Eating Disorders Inventory (EDI) and the Body Attitude Test (BAT); BMI = Body 
Mass Index
 
+ 
p < .10, 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001 
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Reliability 
For the EDI and BAT subscales of body dissatisfaction, Chronbach’s alpha was 0.99 
and 0.93, respectively. Test-retest reliability of the actual body image CDRS was r = .78, 
as reported by Thompson & Gray (1995). Reliability coefficients of both IRAPs were 
estimated using a bootstrap procedure, wherein 100 random-splits were drawn from 
the data. The calculation steps for the random-split D-scores were identical to the 
calculation of the overall D-scores as presented above. For each random split, the 
correlation across participants between the two D-scores was calculated. Correlations 
were then averaged. This procedure resulted in spearman-brown corrected mean split-
half correlations of Rsb = 0.32 and Rsb = 0.42, for the actual and ideal body image IRAP, 
respectively. 
DISCUSSION 
The degree to which people are dissatisfied with their own body is a function of the 
(perceived) discrepancy between one’s actual and ideal body image (Cash & Szymanski, 
1995; Higgins, 1989). We hypothesized that participants high and low in body 
dissatisfaction would differ not only in their self-reported degree of body dissatisfaction 
but also in their implicit beliefs concerning their actual and ideal body image. More 
specifically, we expected the implicit belief to be thin to be more pronounced for 
participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared to participants high in body 
dissatisfaction. In contrast, we expected the implicit desire to be thin to be more 
pronounced in participants who exhibit a high degree of body dissatisfaction as 
compared to participants low in body dissatisfaction. Using the IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2006) as an implicit measure of beliefs, we found strong supporting evidence for 
both predictions. In addition, the pattern of correlations between each of the two IRAP 
measures and a number of other variables was quite different. In line with the idea that 
the desire to be thin must be higher in individuals who estimate their own physical 
appearance to be overweight, the ideal-IRAP correlated positively with the actual-CDRS. 
Likewise, significant positive correlations were observed with the BMI and explicitly 
measured body dissatisfaction. In contrast all correlations between the actual-IRAP 
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scores and each of these measures were negative, albeit not significantly so. Taken 
together, these findings strongly suggest that both IRAP measures, despite their 
structural similarity, captured different underlying constructs. 
These observations are important for two reasons. First, as pointed out above, an 
important rationale for using implicit measures is their alleged resistance to effects of 
social desirability and impression management. In addition, it has been argued that 
implicit measures may be used to capture traces of prior experience that are 
introspectively unidentified. It can thus be hypothesized that the added value of using 
implicit measures of actual and ideal body image to predict behavioral outcomes will be 
most pronounced when participants are somehow unwilling or unable to complete 
explicit measures of body dissatisfaction in a truthful manner. In this respect, it seems 
particularly interesting to use the IRAP measures developed here in the context of 
eating disorders (e.g., anorexia nervosa), for two reasons. First, patients suffering from 
eating disorder might be inclined to fake self-report measures of (ideal and actual) body 
image because of significant therapeutic consequences (e.g., compulsory admission). In 
addition, the discrepancy between actual body weight (BMI) and implicit beliefs about 
one’s actual body weight might be an important cognitive marker for future therapeutic 
outcomes. In sum, while the current study revealed no added value of the IRAP 
measures over and above explicit measures (e.g., the CDRS measure of actual body 
image) in predicting self-reported body dissatisfaction, there are good reasons to 
suspect that implicit measures of ideal and actual body image may be much more 
instrumental in applied research contexts. 
A second reason why our findings are important concerns the use of implicit 
measures in general. For two decades now, implicit measures have been widely used in 
various research domains, including health and clinical psychology (e.g., 
Descheemaeker, Spruyt, & Hermans, 2014; Spruyt et al., 2013; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; 
Teachman, Cody, & Clerkin, 2010; Wiers, Houben, Roefs, De Jong, Peter, & Etchison, 
2010; Wiers, Van Woerden, Smulders, & De Jong, 2002), forensic psychology (e.g., 
Snowden & Gray, 2010), and consumer psychology (e.g., Perkins & Forehand, 2010). 
Crucially, traditional implicit measures such as the IAT, EPT, and AMP were designed to 
capture the extent to which certain concepts are associated in memory (Hughes et al., 
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2012). Each of these measures, for example, can be readily used to capture the extent 
to which a certain class of stimuli (e.g., spiders) is associated with a positive or negative 
valence. In many cases, however, it is not only important to examine whether two 
concepts are related in memory but also the precise way in which they are related. As 
demonstrated by Remue et al. (2013, 2014), for example, it makes a tremendous 
difference to know whether someone has the implicit belief to be a person who actually 
is good or wants to be good. Likewise, the findings reported here demonstrate that it is 
important to distinguish between the implicit desire to be thin versus the implicit belief 
to be thin. Accordingly, it seems most interesting or even essential to invest in the 
development of implicit measures that are capable of tapping into relational 
information that is more complex than simple, unqualified associations (e.g., The 
Relational Responding Task, recently introduced by De Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roets, 
& Hughes, 2015, also see Chapter 4). 
To sum up, we used two IRAP measures: One to capture implicit beliefs concerning 
one’s actual body image and one to capture implicit beliefs concerning one’s ideal body 
image. Both IRAP measures were related to different outcome variables to a different 
extent, thereby underscoring the validity of both measures. More generally, our 
findings indicate that it is key to examine not only whether two concepts are related in 
memory but also how they are related. Future research concerning the applied value of 
implicit measures would thus benefit greatly from taking into account complex 
relational information. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2. Target stimuli of the IRAP measures and English translations 
Thinness Thickness Thinness (English) Thickness (English) 
dun vet thin fat 
mager dik lean thick 
fijngebouwd zwaarlijvig fine boned obese 
smal gezet narrow squat 
tenger volslank slender curvaceous 
slank mollig slim chubby 
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THE RELATIONAL RESPONDING TASK: 
TOWARD A NEW IMPLICIT MEASURE OF 
BELIEFS 1 
ABSTRACT 
We introduce the Relational Responding Task (RRT) as a tool for capturing beliefs at 
the implicit level. Flemish participants were asked to respond as if they believed that 
Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants (e.g., respond “true” to the 
statement “Flemish people are wiser than immigrants”) or to respond as if they 
believed that immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people (e.g., respond “true” 
to the statement “Flemish people are dumber than immigrants”). The difference in 
performance between these two tasks correlated with ratings of the extent to which 
participants explicitly endorsed the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than 
immigrants and with questionnaire measures of subtle and blatant racism. The current 
study provides a first step towards validating RRT effects as a viable measure of implicit 
beliefs.    
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Based on De Houwer, J., Heider, N., Spruyt, A., Roets, A., & Hughes, S. (2015). The Relational Responding 
Task: Toward a New Implicit Measure of Beliefs. Frontiers in Psychology 
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INTRODUCTION 
Implicit measures have become an important part of the psychologist’s toolbox (see 
Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014, and Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011, for recent 
reviews). Although opinions differ on what it means to say that a measure is implicit, we 
favor the view that implicit measures are measurement outcomes that capture the to-
be-measured construct (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, evaluation) under conditions of 
automaticity (e.g., even when participants have little time, are engaged in multiple 
tasks, are not aware of what is being measured, or do not have the intention to express 
the construct that is being measured; see De Houwer & Moors, 2012; De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). In most implicit measurement tasks, 
participants are asked to respond as quickly as possible to stimuli that appear on a 
computer screen. For instance, in an Implicit Association Test (IAT) designed to assess 
implicit self-esteem, positive words, negative words, stimuli related to the self (e.g., the 
first name of the participant), and stimuli related to other people (e.g., the first name of 
another participant) appear one by one on a computer screen. In a first critical block of 
trials, participants are asked to press one key as quickly as possible whenever they see a 
positive word or a self-related stimulus and a second key whenever they see a negative 
word or an other-related stimulus. In a second critical block, positive words and other-
related stimuli are assigned to the first key whereas negative words and self-related 
items are assigned to the second key. Implicit self-esteem is inferred from the 
difference in performance in the two critical blocks. For instance, participants who 
perform better in the first relative to the second block are assumed to have more 
positive self-esteem than participants who perform better in the second relative to the 
first block (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).  
A core property of most implicit measures is that they were designed to capture 
associations between concepts while ignoring the way in which those concepts are 
related (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012, for a detailed overview). For 
instance, the propositional beliefs “I am good” and “I want to be good” both involve a 
relation between “I” and “good” but differ with regard to the type of relation. Even 
though these beliefs are fundamentally different and might coincide with entirely 
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different behaviors, an IAT cannot differentiate between them. The Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP), on the other hand, does allow one to differentiate at the 
implicit level between beliefs that differ only with regard to the relational component 
(for an overview, see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2011).2 
Consider a version of the IRAP designed to capture the belief “I am good”. On each 
trial of this task, either “I am” or “I am not” appears at the top of a computer screen 
along with a positive or negative adjective in the middle of the screen (e.g., “good” or 
“bad”). In this way, the task is comprised of four different types of trials (I am + positive; 
I am + negative; I am not + positive; I am not +negative). As with the IAT, there are two 
different types of critical blocks. In one block of trials, participants are trained to select 
the response “correct” on trials that are in line with the belief “I am good” (i.e., I am + 
positive; I am not + negative) and to respond “false” on trials that contradict this belief 
(i.e., I am not + positive and I am + negative). In the second type of blocks, responses 
need to be in line with the belief “I am bad” (i.e., respond “correct” on I am not + 
positive and I am + negative trials and respond “false” on I am + positive and I am not + 
negative trials). The better someone performs on the first type of blocks relative to the 
second type of blocks, the stronger that person is assumed to hold the belief “I am 
good” (relative to “I am bad”).3 
Importantly, this version of the IRAP can easily be redesigned to capture the belief “I 
want to be good”. The only necessary change is to replace the stimuli “I am” and “I am 
not” with the stimuli “I want to be” and “I do not want to be”, respectively. Once this 
change is in place, participants can be trained to select the response “correct” on I want 
                                                 
2 Research on implicit measures has been conducted both within the cognitive and the functional 
tradition in psychology (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). The term “implicit belief” could 
also be used either at the mental or at the functional level of explanation. At the mental level, it refers to 
an automatically constructed or activated propositional representation, that is, an informational unit in 
memory that contains information about how concepts are related and that mediates the impact of the 
environment on behavior by means of automatically operating mental processes (see De Houwer, 2009, 
2014). At the functional level, implicit beliefs can be defined as specific patterns of (arbitrarily applicable) 
relational responding, that is, behavior that is under the control of the relation between events. Given 
the assumption that (arbitrarily applicable) relational responding is mediated by propositional 
representations (Hughes et al., 2011), measures such as IRAP scores can be conceptualized both as 
indices of relational responding (when adopting a functional perspective) and as indices of propositional 
representations (when adopting a mental perspective).     
3 It is also possible to calculate an IRAP score for each trial type separately, which can be used an index 
for four different beliefs). In the foregoing example, these trial types would be: “I am good”, “I am bad”, 
“I am not good”, and “I am not bad” (see Hughes et al., 2011).  
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to be + positive and I do not want to be + negative trials and to select the response 
“false” on I want to be + negative and I do not want to be + positive trials. During a 
second type of blocks, they are required to select “correct” on I want to be + negative 
and I do not want to be + positive trials and to select “false” for I want to be + positive 
and I do not want to be + negative trials. Comparing performance across these different 
types of blocks provides an index of the belief “I want to be good” (relative to “I want to 
be bad”). 
The significance of distinguishing between different beliefs at the implicit level was 
recently demonstrated in a study by Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, 
Vanderhasselt, and De Raedt (2013; see also Remue, Hughes, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 
2014). Their research was triggered by the observation that implicit self-esteem as 
indexed by IAT scores is as positive in dysphoric students and acutely depressed 
patients as it is in non-dysphoric students or non-depressed control participants (e.g., 
De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, & De Houwer, 2006). Remue and colleagues tested the idea 
that standard implicit measures of self-esteem might reflect different types of beliefs in 
different participants. For instance, in non-dysphoric students, positive self-esteem IAT 
scores might reflect the belief “I am good” (i.e., actual self-esteem) whereas the same 
score might reflect the belief “I want to be good” (i.e., ideal self-esteem) in dysphoric 
students. In line with this hypothesis, they observed that dysphoric students had lower 
scores on an IRAP designed to capture the belief “I am good” than on an IRAP designed 
to capture the belief “I want to be good” whereas non-dysphoric students showed the 
reversed pattern. 
The IRAP has been used successfully in a wide variety of contexts (see Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2011; and Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, for reviews). Still it would be 
good to have alternative measures of implicit beliefs, if only to assess and control for 
method specific variance. Moreover, the IRAP is often quite difficult for participants to 
complete. Across many studies, a substantial part of the (university student) sample 
fails to complete an IRAP (e.g., more than 20% of the students in the study of Remue et 
al., 2013 see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, Table 1, for an overview). The difficulty of 
the IRAP originates - at least in part - from the fact that the assignment of keyboard 
keys to the “correct” and “false” response option typically varies from trial to trial (e.g., 
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press d for “correct” and k for “false” on trial n but press d for “false” and k for 
“correct” on trial n+1). The assignment of responses to different keys is varied in order 
to avoid a potential confound between the function of the response (indicate “correct” 
or “false”) and its physical location (e.g., the ‘d’ or ‘k’ keys). This confound could alter 
the encoding of the responses by allowing participants to select a response on the basis 
of its spatial properties (e.g., “if I am + positive, then press key d”) rather than its 
meaning (e.g., “if I am + positive, then press correct”; but see Campbell, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2011, for data showing that keeping the assignment of 
responses fixed does not necessarily reduce IRAP effect sizes). Although it might be 
possible to avoid a high drop-out rate by increasing prior exposure to the task or 
changing properties of the procedure (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; and Vahey, 
Boles, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, for a discussion), the difficulty in completing an IRAP 
does constrain its utility, especially when using it via online applications (in which case 
extensive training is often not feasible) or with certain populations (e.g., clinical 
patients with limited attentional or intellectual capacities). 
In the present paper, we offer the Relational Responding Task (RRT) as a novel 
measurement procedure that, like the IRAP, is designed to capture specific beliefs at 
the implicit level. It retains an essential ingredient of the IRAP – namely – the 
requirement for participants to respond in-line with specific beliefs (e.g., “I am good” or 
“I want to be good”). Unlike most instantiations of the IRAP, the RRT involves the 
presentation of full statements in the middle of the computer screen (e.g., “I like 
myself”) and participants are explicitly instructed to act “as if” they agree with certain 
statements and disagree with others.4 For instance, in a first block, participants might 
be asked to respond as if they believe that they are good by selecting “true” when 
presented with statements that imply positive views of the self (e.g., “I like myself”) and 
by selecting “not true” when presented with statements that imply negative views of 
the self (e.g., “I dislike myself”). In a second block, they would respond as if they believe 
that they are bad by selecting “true” when presented with negative self-related 
statements and “false” when presented with positive-self related statements. The 
                                                 
4 In many instantiations of the IRAP, participants are trained to respond in certain ways via error feedback 
rather than given explicit instructions about the stimulus-response assignments. 
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difference in performance between these two types of blocks is assumed to provide a 
measure of the extent to which participants believe that they are good. 
In addition to differences in the type of stimuli used and the nature of the 
instructions, the IRAP and RRT also differ in their structural properties. In the RRT, the 
physical properties of the correct and false response remain constant throughout the 
task. On all trials, responding “true” is realized by pressing a first key whereas 
responding “not true” is done by pressing a second key. Recoding of the responses (e.g., 
in terms of physical location) is discouraged, however, by including inducer trials on 
which stimuli are presented that refer to the concepts “true” or “not true” (e.g., words 
such as “correct” and “wrong”). Participants are instructed to press one key for inducer 
stimuli that refer to “true” and to press a second key for inducer stimuli that refer to 
“false”. Similar inducer trials have been used successfully in other implicit measurement 
procedures as a means to discourage recoding of the responses (e.g., Extrinsic Affective 
Simon Task; De Houwer, 2003).  
Interestingly, the inclusion of inducer trials results in the RRT having a task structure 
that closely resembles the IAT. More specifically, in both the RRT and the IAT, four 
categories of stimuli are assigned to two responses in a way that varies across blocks. 
As a result, it is likely that the difficulty of performing an RRT will be similar to the 
difficulty of performing an IAT. Given that (a) attrition rates in IAT studies are typically 
low, that (b) IATs have already been successfully administrated via the world wide web 
on a large scale, and that (c) IATs have been used successfully with a variety of 
populations (e.g., Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007, for a review), we believe that the 
convenience of use of the RRT will be high, and in several respects, superior to that of 
the IRAP (at least as currently instantiated). 
Despite their structural similarity, it is important to realize that the IAT is 
fundamentally different from the RRT (and IRAP) in several ways. Most importantly, a 
typical IAT does not require participants to relate the different categories that are used 
in the IAT. In a self-esteem IAT, for example, participants can select the correct 
response merely by identifying the individual category that the presented stimulus is a 
member of (e.g., the word “me” is a member of the category of stimuli labeled “self”). 
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In the RRT (and the IRAP), on the other hand, participants can only select the correct 
response based on the way that different stimuli are related to one another. For 
instance, in an RRT designed to assess the belief “I am good”, a correct response does 
not simply depend on the presence of specific stimuli (e.g., “I”, “am”, or “good”) but on 
the relation between different stimuli (e.g., the statement “I am good”). Moreover, the 
instruction to “act as if” statements are true or false encourages participants to relate 
the presented statement with the categories “true” and “not true”. That is, participants 
need to respond to a statement as being either true or false based on the rule that is 
specified for each block of trials. In sum, the RRT requires participants to respond in a 
complex relational manner (hence the name relational responding task). It is precisely 
this feature of the RRT that endows it with the potential to capture individual beliefs 
that differ with regard to the relational component (e.g., “I am good” versus “I want to 
be good”). 
In the current paper, we set out to validate empirically the RRT effect as an implicit 
measure of beliefs. Rather than immediately testing the potential of the RRT to capture 
differences between beliefs that vary only in their relational component (e.g., by 
comparing an RRT designed to capture the belief “I am good” with an RRT that captures 
the belief “I want to be good”), we first conducted a study that focused on a single 
belief and examined whether an RRT measure of that belief correlates with criterion 
variables (see De Houwer et al., 2009, for more information on how to validate implicit 
measures). More specifically, we used an RRT that was designed to capture the extent 
to which Flemish participants hold the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent 
than immigrants. The inducer stimuli were synonyms of the concepts “true” or “false” 
that had to be categorized as either “true” by pressing one key or as “false” by pressing 
another key. Target trials involved the presentation of statements that were either in 
line with the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent that immigrants (e.g., 
“Flemish people are smarter than immigrants”, “Immigrants are dumber than Flemish 
people”) or in line with the belief that immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish 
people (e.g. “Flemish people are dumber than immigrants”, “Immigrants are smarter 
than Flemish people”).  
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In addition to practice blocks that contained either inducer trials or target trials only, 
the RRT also included two types of test blocks that contained both inducer and target 
trials. During the first type of test block, participants were asked to respond to the 
target statements as if they believed that Flemish people are more intelligent than 
immigrants (i.e., to respond “true” to statements such as “Flemish people are smarter 
than immigrants” and to respond “not true” to statements such as “Flemish people are 
dumber than immigrants”; pro-Flemish block). In the second type of test block, 
participants were asked to respond as if they believed that immigrants are more 
intelligent than Flemish people (i.e., to respond “not true” to statements like “Flemish 
people are smarter than immigrants” and to respond “true” to statements like “Flemish 
people are dumber than immigrants”; pro-immigrant block). The difference in 
performance across these two types of blocks is assumed to assess the belief that 
Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants. 
In order to validate the RRT scores, we also asked participants to express on a rating 
scale the extent to which they believe that Flemish people are more or less intelligent 
than immigrants. Because implicit and explicit measures of the same construct typically 
converge to some extent (Nosek, 2007), we expected that the RRT and rating measure 
would be correlated. Participants also completed questionnaires designed to capture 
subtle, modern, and blatant forms of racism. Blatant racism is considered to be a hot 
and direct form of racial prejudice, often referring to beliefs about the (genetic) 
inferiority of the racial out-group. It is typically associated with a strong opposition to 
any intimate contact with the out-group. Subtle racism, on the other hand, is a more 
cool and covert expression of racial prejudice, including the idea that out-groups are 
poorly adapted to the ingroup’s traditional values, an exaggeration of cultural 
differences between the in-group and the out-group, and the absence of positive 
emotions (rather than the presence of negative emotions) toward the out-group (see 
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Similarly, modern racism also refers to a more covert 
form of prejudice (as opposed to the blatant, old-fashioned forms) but is distinct in that 
it taps into beliefs that racial discrimination is no longer a problem (or even does not 
exist anymore) and that out-groups (i.e., Black people in the original work) have 
become too demanding and are pushing for unfair advantages (McConahay, 1986). If a 
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Flemish person believes that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants, this 
belief could be regarded as an instance of racial prejudice, especially blatant/old-
fashioned racism (e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; McConahay, 1986). We therefore 
expected that RRT scores would also correlate with scores on these racism 
questionnaires, in particular blatant racism. 
Finally, please note that we did not make predictions about the direction or 
magnitude of the overall RRT score. First, the overall RRT score in our study would 
probably be biased as the result of order effects. We fixed the order of the blocks (i.e., 
all participants started with the pro-Flemish block) because we were interested 
primarily in interindividual differences in RRT scores, that is, we wanted to correlate 
RRT scores with other measures. Counterbalancing block order is known to increase 
error variance (i.e., differences in scores between participants might reflect not only 
differences in the to-be-measured attribute but also differences in block order) and 
thus to lower correlations (see Perugini & Banse, 2007, for a discussion and the 
recommendation to fix block order). Because there are few studies about the effect of 
block order on the validity of implicit measures (e.g., studies examining whether 
correlations with validity criteria are stronger when starting with an attitude-
inconsistent versus an attitude-consistent block), we did not have strong reasons to 
select one of the two block orders but more or less randomly decided to always start 
with the pro-Flemish block. More importantly, fixing the order of blocks complicates the 
interpretation of overall scores because those scores could be influenced by the order 
in which the blocks are completed. For instance, practice with the stimulus-response 
mappings in the first critical block might slow down responding in the second critical 
block during which those mappings are reversed. On the other hand, performance in 
the second critical block might be facilitated because of practice effects (e.g., faster 
responding because items are more familiar and thus easier to process). When block 
order is fixed, it is impossible to determine to what extent the overall score reflects the 
reversal of stimulus-response mappings, practice effects, or the properties of the to-be-
measured attribute. Hence, it is best to refrain from interpreting the overall score when 
block order is fixed. A second reason for refraining from an interpretation of the overall 
RRT score is that, even without biases due to fixed block order, it is difficult to 
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determine the correct interpretation of the zero point on psychological measures 
(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006).  
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-nine students at Ghent University (Mage = 23 years, SDage = 4; five men) 
participated in exchange for €5. Ghent University is situated in Flanders, which is the 
northern region of Belgium. These participants were classified as being Flemish because 
they indicated that Dutch (which is the dominant language in Flanders) was their native 
language and that both their parents were Flemish. The data of six other participants 
who told the experimenter that they had at least one parent of non-Belgian nationality 
or said that Dutch was not their (only) native language, were excluded from the 
analysis. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided 
their informed consent before participating.  
Materials 
RRT. Ten words and twenty statements were used as stimuli. Five words were 
related to “true” (the Dutch words “goed”, “juist”, “correct”, “exact”, and “in orde”) 
and five words were related to “false” (the Dutch words “mis”, “onjuist”, “incorrect”, 
“verkeerd”, and “fout”). These words were presented during the inducer trials. Each of 
the twenty target statements (see Appendix) related Flemish people and immigrants to 
one another in terms of their intelligence level, using five synonyms for intelligent (e.g., 
smarter) and five synonyms to denote a lack of intelligence (e.g., dumber). Ten 
statements implied that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants (e.g., 
“Flemish people are smarter than immigrants”, “Immigrants are less clever than 
Flemish people”) while another ten statements implied that immigrants are more 
intelligent than Flemish people (e.g., “Immigrants are wiser than Flemish people”, 
“Flemish people are less wise than immigrants”). All statements were presented in bold 
Verdana font, size 28. Inducer stimuli were presented in orange, whereas target 
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statements were presented in blue throughout the task. The experiment was 
conducted using a 17 inch LCD screen (60 Hz, 1440 × 900 pixels). The RRT program was 
written in Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). 
Questionnaires. Participants completed a 12-item subtle racism scale and an 8-item 
blatant racism scale (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; adapted by Van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2005), along with a 10-item modern racism scale (McConahay, 1986; translated by 
Dhont, Cornelis, & Van Hiel, 2010). Virtually all questions referred to immigrants in 
general, with the exception of a few questions that referred to Turks and Moroccans, 
the two largest groups of immigrants in Belgium from outside of the European Union. 
Also, a few items stated that immigrants differ in their religious beliefs or culture from 
Belgians, implying that immigrants do not include foreigners from other western 
European countries. Examples are "Immigrants should be wise enough not to impose 
themselves at places where they know beforehand that they would be discriminated" 
(subtle racism scale), “Discrimination against immigrants no longer is problem in 
Belgium" (modern racism scale), and “Immigrants are a threat to the employment of 
Belgians" (blatant racism). Note that some questions referred to Belgian people as the 
in-group whereas the RRT referred to Flemish people as the in-group. If anything, this 
difference would reduce the magnitude of the correlations between the racisms 
measures and the RRT and thus work against our hypotheses. However, we did not 
expect a strong negative impact of this divergence because our participants are both 
Belgian and Flemish. Hence, both labels describe the in-group correctly as opposed to 
the out-group of immigrants. 
All questions were rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (‘completely 
disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’). In addition, participants were asked to provide their 
opinion on the relative intelligence of Flemish people and immigrants using a scale that 
ranged from -10 (immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people) to +10 (Flemish 
people are more intelligent than immigrants), with 0 indicating that the two groups do 
not differ in their intelligence. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. All participants first 
completed the RRT. They were instructed to categorize words and statements 
presented on the screen as either “true” or “not true” by pressing the left or right 
control-keys of the keyboard, respectively. In the first block (40 trials), each of the 10 
inducer words was presented 4 times as practice. Participants were asked to categorize 
the words as synonyms of “true” (press right control key) and “not true” (press left 
control key). In the second block of 40 trials, the 20 target statements were presented 
twice. Participants were asked to respond to the statements in line with the rule that 
Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants (and immigrants are therefore less 
intelligent than Flemish people). The third block consisted of two consecutive 
repetitions of 40 trials, in which the 10 inducer stimuli were presented twice and the 20 
target statements were presented once, leading to a total of 80 trials. Participants were 
asked to respond in accordance with the rules practiced in the two preceding blocks. 
Block 4 was identical to the second block except for a reversal of the rule for 
responding. That is, participants were asked to respond as if immigrants are more 
intelligent than Flemish (and Flemish are therefore less intelligent than immigrants). 
The fifth and final block was identical to the third, but participants were asked to 
respond to target statements in accordance with the response rule learned in block 
four.  
The order of the trials was random except for the restriction that the same 
statement or word could not be presented on two consecutive trials. Each trial started 
with the presentation of a word or statement in the middle of the screen. It remained 
there until a response was registered. Incorrect responses were followed by the 
presentation of a red cross which remained on screen until participants gave the 
appropriate response. The following trial started 750 ms after a correct response was 
emitted. Once they completed the RRT, participants rated the target belief after which 
they completed the three questionnaires (subtle, modern, and blatant racism scale, in 
that order). They then were debriefed and paid. 
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RESULTS 
RRT data 
Given that inducer trials were included merely to prevent response recoding, only 
data from the target trials of the mixed blocks were analyzed. Analyses that included 
also the data of the inducer trials led to the same conclusions. The data from two 
participants were excluded from the analyses because their percentage of errors was 
more than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean percentage of errors of the total 
group. Reaction times were defined as the time in milliseconds between the onset of 
presentation of the statement and the registration of the correct response. These 
reaction times were transformed into DRRT scores using the same improved D-algorithm 
(D1) that Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) developed for the IAT. The D1 score was 
chosen because we recorded reaction times until the correct response was emitted, 
thus removing the need for algorithms that add extra penalty time to reaction times on 
trials with an incorrect response. Analyses using the D4 (also known as D600) scoring 
algorithm, led to similar conclusions. DRRT effects were scored so that positive values 
indicated faster responses in the pro-Flemish block (i.e., act as if Flemish people are 
more intelligent than immigrants) relative the pro-immigrant block of the RRT (i.e., act 
as if immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people) while negative values 
indicated the opposite. The DRRT score ranged from -0.79 to 0.56, with a mean DRRT 
score of M = -0.01 (SD = 0.34). The mean DRRT score did not differ significantly from zero, 
t < 1. During the mixed blocks, participants on average took 1551 ms (SD = 373.93) to 
respond to the target statements and 672 ms (SD = 88.58) to respond to the inducer 
words. In these blocks, they made on average 11.1 % of errors (SD = 0.06) on trials with 
target statements and 5.3% of errors (SD = 0.04) on trials with inducer words. 
Correlation analyses  
Table 1 provides an overview of all pairwise correlations between the DRRT score, the 
explicit rating, and the three questionnaires. Most importantly, the DRRT score 
correlated significantly with the explicit judgments of the relative intelligence of Flemish 
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Table 1. Correlations between measures. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 DRRT - 0.43* 0.36* 0.20 0.34* 
2 Rating  - 0.40* 0.31* 0.70* 
3 Subtle Racism   - 0.74* 0.80* 
4 Modern Racism    - 0.67* 
5 Blatant Racism     - 
* p < .05 
 
and immigrants, r = 0.43, t(44) = 3.17, p = .003, with the scores on the subtle racism 
scale, r = 0.36, t(45) = 2.59, p = .013, and with the scores on the blatant racism scale, r = 
0.34, t(45) = 2.39, p = .020. The correlations between the DRRT score and those obtained 
from the modern racism scale did not reach conventional levels of significance, r = .20, 
t(45) = 1.39, p = .171.  
 Odd-even split half reliability of the RRT score, using Spearman-Brown correction, 
was Rsb = 0.64. For the questionnaire of subtle, modern, and blatant racism, 
Chronbach’s alpha was .85, .83, and .86, respectively. The mean value on those 
questionnaires was 4.26 (SD = .86), 3.55 (SD = .87), and 2.61 (SD = 1.05), respectively. 
Finally, the mean score on the explicit rating was 1.28 (SD = 1.05) which differed from 
zero, t(45) = 4.41, p < .001. 
DISCUSSION 
The current study sought to provide a first step toward the validation of the RRT 
effect as an implicit measure of beliefs. In line with the hypothesis that the RRT scores 
capture the (prejudiced) belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than 
immigrants, we observed a significant correlation between RRT scores and explicit 
ratings of how much participants endorsed this belief. RRT scores also correlated 
positively with questionnaires of subtle and blatant (but not modern) racism. This 
pattern of correlations supports the claim that the RRT effects captured the to-be-
measured belief and hence provides preliminary evidence for the idea that the RRT can 
provide a general tool for assessing beliefs. In addition, the RRT seems to be more user 
RELATIONAL RESPONDING TASK 
 
 
115 
friendly than the IRAP. First, the attrition rate in our study was low. All participants 
successfully completed the RRT. We did discard the data of two participants because 
their percentage of errors was more than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean 
percentage of errors of the total group. However, this still implies an attrition rate of 
less than 5% (i.e., 4.08%) whereas attrition rates of 20% or more are common in IRAP 
studies. Moreover, participants needed only about 10 minutes to complete the RRT 
whereas it often takes 20 minutes or more to complete the various stages of the IRAP. 
We not only put forward the claim that RRT scores capture beliefs but also that they 
provide an implicit measure of those beliefs. It has been argued that a measure qualifies 
as implicit if it functions as a valid measure even under conditions of automaticity (De 
Houwer & Moors, 2012; De Houwer et al., 2009). Based on the structural features of 
the RRT, one could argue that RRT scores provide an implicit measure in the sense that 
they capture beliefs even though participants are asked to respond quickly. Speed is of 
course a continuous variable, which implies that measures differ in the degree to which 
they are implicit along this criterion. In our study, for example, participants required an 
average of 1551 ms to respond to the target statements and 672 ms to respond to 
inducer words. Although 1551 ms might seem long relative to the reaction times 
observed in most other implicit measurement tasks, the target statements used in our 
study are much more complex than the single words or pictures that are usually 
presented in other implicit measurement tasks. Hence, it seems likely that participants 
did respond very quickly once they processed the meaning of the statements. 
Consistent with this conclusion, reaction times on inducer trials (during which 
participants reacted to individual words) were much shorter and comparable to those 
seen in other implicit measurement tasks. Regardless of how RRT scores relate to other 
implicit measures in this regard, it seems safe to argue that RRT scores are more implicit 
in terms of speed than scores obtained from traditional self-report procedures (e.g., 
ratings, questionnaires) that allow for ample time to reflect and respond to questions.  
Are RRT measures implicit in the sense of unintentional? Unlike explicit measures 
such as the rating measures used in our study, participants are not asked to express 
their beliefs during an RRT. Instead, they are simply asked to act as if they endorse a 
certain belief. On the one hand, when asked to act in ways that contradict their beliefs, 
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it is unlikely that participants will express those beliefs in an intentional manner 
because this would lead to incorrect responses. On the other hand, when asked to 
respond in line with beliefs that they do endorse, it is possible (but not necessarily the 
case) that participants do express their beliefs in an intentional manner rather than act 
as if they endorse those beliefs. Hence, at present, it is difficult to make strong claims 
about whether RRT measures are implicit in the sense of valid in the absence of the 
intention to express a belief. Future work could examine this issue further by 
determining the strategies that participants use while completing an RRT. Such work 
could also examine if the RRT meets other conditions of automaticity, such as 
controllability.  
What would it mean to say that RRT scores capture beliefs at the implicit level? One 
way to conceptualize this statement is in terms of the implicit endorsement of 
propositions. At first sight, the idea that propositions can be endorsed implicitly might 
seem self-contradictory in light of cognitive theories that postulate that all implicit 
processing relies on associative representations (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Unlike 
propositions, associations do not have a truth value: an association does not imply a 
statement about the world and is therefore neither true nor untrue. Hence, 
associations as such cannot be endorsed (i.e., be evaluated as true).5 Together, these 
two assumptions (all implicit processing relies on associations; associations cannot be 
endorsed) imply that endorsement can never be implicit.  
More recently, however, cognitive researchers have raised the possibility that 
implicit processing can involve propositional representations (De Houwer, 2014; 
Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011; Hughes et al., 2012). Indeed, a rapidly 
growing body of evidence supports the conclusion that propositions can be both 
formed and activated under the various conditions of automaticity (see De Houwer, 
2014, for a review). At the same time, Shidlovski, Schul, and Mayo (2014), recently 
advanced the concept of “implicit truth” which they define as the automatic 
endorsement of propositions. Across several studies, the authors showed that indices 
of implicit truth can be dissociated from the explicit endorsement of truth. From this 
                                                 
5 The proposition that an association exists can be endorsed but the association itself cannot.  
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perspective, scores on the RRT (and IRAP) do have a unique and potentially crucial role 
to fulfill in psychological research as measures of the implicit endorsement of 
propositions. 
One could argue, however, that the IRAP and RRT are not alone in their ability to 
capture beliefs at the implicit level. For instance, several variants of the IAT use 
categories that specify relational information. Consider the so-called personalized IAT 
(pIAT) in which participants classify (attribute) stimuli as instances of the categories “I 
like” or “I dislike” rather than the categories “good” or “bad” (Olson & Fazio, 2004; see 
Dewitte & De Houwer, 2008; and Yoshida, Peach, Zanna, & Spencer, 2012 for related 
propositionalized variants of the IAT). For instance, in a smoking pIAT (e.g., De Houwer, 
Custers, & De Clercq, 2006), participants see words that refer to things they like (e.g., 
flowers), words that refer to things they dislike (e.g., cockroaches), pictures related to 
smoking (e.g., a lighter), and pictures unrelated to smoking (e.g., a pencil). One could 
argue that, in this case, the categorization of words is no longer based on category 
membership as such (i.e., good, bad, or I) but rather on the basis of the relation 
between different concepts (“I” in combination with “like” or “dislike”).  
Nevertheless, while performance in the pIAT might be relationally more complex 
than performance on traditional IATs, the pIAT remains fundamentally different from 
the RRT (and IRAP). Like other IATs, the pIAT does not require participants to relate the 
different components of a to-be-measured belief. For instance, in a smoking pIAT, 
response selection is determined on the basis of individual elements of the beliefs “I 
like smoking” or “I dislike smoking” (i.e., the individual categories “I like”, “I dislike”, 
“smoking”, or “non-smoking”). In the RRT, on the other hand, response selection is 
instructed in terms of the full combination of these elements (i.e., “I like smoking” or “I 
dislike smoking”). Moreover, as we pointed out in the introduction, in the RRT but not 
in IATs, participants are instructed to respond on the basis of whether a statement is to 
be considered as true or false in a specific block of trials. 
The autobiographical IAT (aIAT; see Verschuere, Suchotzki, & Debey, 2014, for a 
review) is another variant of the IAT that might allow for the measurement of beliefs 
and seems to bear even greater similarity to the RRT at the structural level than other 
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IATs. In an aIAT, participants encounter generic statements that are true (e.g., “I am a 
human being”) or false (e.g., “I am a cow”) for all participants. They are required to 
classify these statements as either “true” or “false” by pressing one of two keys. 
Participants also see statements that describe a particular event (Event A) that the 
participant has witnessed (autobiographical items; e.g., statements related to a crime) 
or a second event (Event B) that the participant has not witnessed (control items). In 
one of the critical test blocks, participants press the same key for true items and items 
referring to Event A and a second key for false items and items referring to Event B. In 
the second critical test block, the stimulus-response assignments are reversed (press 
the first key for true items and Event B items; press the second key for false items and 
Event A items). As is the case for the pIAT, the aIAT is relationally more complex than 
traditional IATs. Most importantly, in the aIAT, participants respond to statements (i.e., 
combinations of items) rather than individual elements of a statement. Nevertheless, 
unlike the RRT, the aIAT does not require participants to relate all elements of the to-
be-measured belief (e.g., “Event A is true”) because responses can be selected on the 
basis of the individual elements of that belief (e.g., “Event A” or “true”). Therefore, like 
all other variants of the IAT, the aIAT does not require participant to respond on the 
basis of whether a statement is to be considered as true or false.  
The fact that the RRT is fundamentally different from both the pIAT and aIAT does 
not, however, allow for the conclusion that only the RRT can be used to capture beliefs 
at the implicit level. In fact, we believe that scores on the pIAT, aIAT, and even 
traditional IATs reflect beliefs (also see De Houwer, 2014). Although IATs do not require 
participants to relate all elements of a to-be-measured belief, participants might still 
relate those elements to one another, either explicitly or implicitly. Take the self-
esteem IAT that we mentioned in the introduction. Rather than responding to self-
related items merely on the basis of the fact that the item refers to oneself, participants 
could recode the task in such a way that they respond to self-related items as positive 
items (i.e., based on the fact that self-related items such as “I” have a positive valence 
for the participant). This would imply that self-related items are responded to in terms 
of how they relate to positive and negative valence, which could reflect beliefs about 
those items (e.g., “I like myself”). Importantly, the way in which items are responded to 
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can vary in implicit, unintentional ways. For instance, participants might sometimes 
erroneously classify self-related items on the basis of their valence even when they do 
not have the intention to do so. In fact, one of the most successful accounts of the IAT 
implies that IAT effects are due to such instances of task misapplication (i.e., Klauer & 
Mierke, 2005). Hence, IAT effects might well reflect the implicit (in the sense of fast and 
unintentional) endorsement of propositions.  
Because traditional IATs do not incorporate any information about the relation 
between the different categories, different participants might (implicitly or explicitly) 
relate the categories of the IAT in different ways. For instance, whereas non-dysphoric 
students might relate items that refer to the self and positive items in terms of liking 
(i.e., respond to items in terms of whether they refer to something you like), dysphoric 
students might relate those items in terms of aspirations (i.e., respond to items in terms 
of whether they are something you want). Although this idea leaves open the question 
of why dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants differ in this manner, it is in line with 
the fact that self-esteem IAT scores do not differ between those participants even 
though all other evidence leads to the conclusion that dysphoric participants do have 
lower self-esteem (De Raedt et al., 2006). It is also in line with the IRAP findings of 
Remue and colleagues (Remue et al., 2013, 2014) which suggest that dysphoric and 
non-dysphoric students do indeed differ in their implicit endorsement of the 
propositions “I am good” and “I want to be good”. From this perspective, pIATs and 
aIATs differ from traditional IATs in that the former are more likely to guide the way in 
which participants relate the different categories by specifying the precise way in which 
those stimuli should be related (e.g., “I like” or “I dislike”).  
In short, it seems reasonable to assume that scores on IATs (and other implicit 
measures; see De Houwer, 2014) reflect beliefs at the implicit level. Still, the RRT is 
likely to have advantages over other implicit measures when it comes to capturing 
beliefs. Most importantly, because the RRT requires participants to relate the elements 
of beliefs in a highly specific manner, the RRT offers more control over the way that 
participants relate stimuli and thus over the type of beliefs that scores on the RRT 
capture. Of course, whether the RRT (or IRAP) outperforms the IAT as an implicit 
measure of beliefs is an empirical issue. 
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Finally, a reviewer alerted us to the fact that the RRT bears some resemblance to 
one particular variant of the IRAP in which participants are cued to lie or respond 
truthfully (Levin, Hayes, & Waltz, 2010). When the word LIE is presented on the screen, 
participants select response “similar/yes” if they consider the two concepts on the 
screen to be dissimilar (e.g., “addict” and “good”) and to select the response 
“dissimilar/no” if they consider the concepts to be similar (e.g., “addict” and “bad”). On 
trials with the word TRUTH, “similar/yes” has to be selected for similar pairs and 
“dissimilar/no” for dissimilar pairs. Unlike to what is the case in the RRT, in this variant 
of the IRAP, the experimenter does not determine which responses are correct or 
incorrect. Instead, it is the participant who first has to decide what is true for him or 
her, after which he or she can select the response in line with the cue on that trial 
(TRUTH or LIE). Hence, this version of the IRAP seems to tap into how well people can 
intentionally lie about their beliefs (relative to telling the truth). In the RRT, on the other 
hand, participants are instructed by the experimenter to respond in a particular manner 
that might be either consistent or inconsistent with the beliefs of the participant. The 
task does not require participants to decide what their beliefs are. Which responses 
qualify as correct depends entirely on the experimenter. As such, RRT effects do not 
capture the ability to lie in an intentional manner (i.e., to retrieve and then conceal the 
truth) but the ability to act in ways that are consistent or inconsistent with a belief one 
might have. Although it needs to be settled empirically which of the two tasks is more 
valid and useful, this variant of the IRAP does differ from the RRT in non-trivial ways. 
Moreover, as is the case in most instantiations of the IRAP, attrition rates in this variant 
were very high (25%), probably because of the trial-by-trial changes in the location of 
the response options and the nature of response cue. Because we observed much a 
lower attrition rate in our RRT study, it does seem to be the case that the RRT is more 
user friendly than the variant of the IRAP that was introduced by Levin et al. (2010).  
To conclude, the present paper introduces the RRT as a tool for obtaining an implicit 
measure of beliefs. We reported a first study in which the RRT was used to measure the 
extent to which Flemish participants hold the belief that Flemish people are more 
intelligent than immigrants. As expected, scores on the RRT correlated with ratings of 
how much participants explicitly endorse this belief. Also correlations with 
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questionnaires of racism were observed. Although these findings provide initial 
evidence for the claim that the RRT provides a way to capture beliefs, more research is 
clearly needed, especially research in which RRT scores are related with real-life 
behavior. Indeed, it might well be that RRT effects allow one to predict unique variance 
in behavior that cannot be predicted on the basis of explicit measures of beliefs. Such 
an added value is likely to arise in situations where implicitly endorsed propositions 
differ from explicitly endorsed propositions (see Shidlovski et al., 2014). Future work 
will also need to substantiate the claim that RRT scores qualify as an implicit measure of 
beliefs and to compare the RRT with other potential implicit measures of beliefs. 
Moreover, it would be good to directly compare RRT measures with other measures in 
terms of validity, utility, and employability. By providing the first step in the validation 
process, however, the present paper highlights the potential of the RRT and sets the 
stage for such work. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2. Target statements of the RRT and English translations. 
Target statements English translations 
Vlamingen zijn intelligenter dan allochtonen. Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn slimmer dan allochtonen. Flemish people are smarter than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn verstandiger dan allochtonen.  Flemish people are wiser than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn scherpzinniger dan allochtonen. Flemish people are sharper than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn minder dom dan allochtonen. Flemish people are less dumb than immigrants. 
  
Allochtonen zijn niet zo intelligent als Vlamingen. Immigrants are not as intelligent as Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn dommer dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are dumber than Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn minder verstandig dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are less wise than Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn minder scherpzinnig dan Vlamingen.  Immigrants are less sharp than Flemish people 
Allochtonen zijn achterlijker dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are more backward than Flemish people. 
  
Vlamingen zijn niet zo intelligent als allochtonen. Flemish people are not as intelligent as immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn dommer dan allochtonen. Flemish people are dumber than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn minder verstandig dan allochtonen. Flemish people are less wise than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn minder scherpzinnig dan allochtonen. Flemish people are less sharp than immigrants. 
Vlamingen zijn achterlijker dan allochtonen. Flemish people are more backward than immigrants. 
  
Allochtonen zijn intelligenter dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn slimmer dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are smarter than Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn verstandiger dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are wiser than Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn scherpzinniger dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are sharper than Flemish people. 
Allochtonen zijn minder dom dan Vlamingen. Immigrants are less dumb than Flemish people. 
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BODY DISSATISFACTION REVISITED: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF BELIEFS CONCERNING 
BOTH ACTUAL AND IDEAL BODY IMAGE 1 
ABSTRACT 
The capability of the Relational Responding Task (RRT) as an implicit measure of 
beliefs was tested in the context of body dissatisfaction. Body dissatisfaction (i.e., 
negative attitudes towards one’s own body) is assumed to originate from a perceived 
discrepancy between the actual and ideal body image. We assessed implicit beliefs 
concerning actual and ideal body image using two RRTs. Body dissatisfaction was 
assessed by means of a (self-report) questionnaire. As hypothesized, participants who 
exhibited a high level of dissatisfaction with their body exhibited a higher implicit desire 
to be thin relative to participants who were less dissatisfied with their body. In contrast, 
the degree to which participants exhibited the implicit belief to be thin was lower in 
participants who exhibited a high degree of body dissatisfaction as compared to 
participants who exhibited a low degree of body dissatisfaction. In contrast to previous 
research, the findings indicated that implicit beliefs concerning both actual and ideal 
body image contributed to a person’s level of self-reported body dissatisfaction. 
Moreover, the RRT measures allowed for a better identification of body dissatisfied 
people than the objective index of body mass alone. The findings contribute to the 
empirical validation of the RRT as an implicit measure of beliefs, as the two applied RRTs 
differentiated between beliefs concerning actual and ideal body image by focusing on the 
relational component that distinguishes these beliefs (i.e., a person’s belief vs. desire to 
be thin or overweight). 
                                                 
1 Based on Heider, N., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2015). Body dissatisfaction revisited: The importance of 
beliefs concerning both actual and ideal body image. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Body dissatisfaction can be defined as the negative attitude towards the own body 
resulting from a (perceived) discrepancy between one’s appearance (i.e., the actual body 
image) and internalized physical ideals (i.e., the ideal body image; e.g., Cash & Szymanski, 
1995; Higgins, 1989; Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991; 
Williamson, Gleaves, Watkins, & Schlundt, 1993). Body dissatisfaction has been identified 
as one of the key factors for dieting behavior, negative affect, and the causation and 
maintenance of eating disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Fairburn & 
Harrison, 2003; Stice, 2001, 2002). Consequentially, since the 1970s, a variety of 
measures has been developed to assess body dissatisfaction and attitudes related to 
body image and perceptions (Allebeck, Hallberg, & Espmark, 1976; Bessenoff & Sherman, 
2000; Bluemke & Friese, 2012; Degner & Wentura, 2009; Freeman, Thomas, Solyom, & 
Hunter, 1984; Heider, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2015; Juarascio et al., 2011; Parling, Cernvall, 
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Ghaderi, 2012; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, 
2011; Schlundt & Johnson, 1990; Slade & Russell, 1973).  
Until recently, body dissatisfaction was almost exclusively assessed via self-report 
measures like questionnaires. However, research has shown that explicit measures in 
general can be biased by social desirability and impression management effects 
(Cronbach, 1990; Holtgraves, 2004). Moreover, explicit measures have shown to be 
unsuited to capture attitudes that are introspectively unidentified (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). Accordingly, researchers developed a new class of diagnostic instruments that 
allows for an assessment of cognitions in an indirect way, that is, without having to rely 
on direct self-assessments. Instead, inter-individual differences are inferred from the 
respondents’ response patterns in well-controlled computer tasks, often referred to as 
implicit measures (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). Expectably, 
implicit measures have also gained popularity in the field of body related attitudes (e.g., 
Ahern, Bennett, & Hetherington, 2008; Ahern & Hetherington, 2006; Bluemke & Friese, 
2012; Heider et al., 2015; Juarascio et al., 2011). Implicit measures can be divided into 
two groups. Associative implicit measures, like the (standard) evaluative priming task 
(EPT; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
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Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), and the affect misattribution paradigm (AMP; 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), are designed to assess the associative strength 
between concepts in memory (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). These measures 
can, for instance, be used to capture the extent to which a certain class of stimuli (e.g., 
spiders) is associated with a positive or negative valence. In many cases, however, it is 
not only important to examine whether two concepts are related in memory but also the 
precise way in which they are related. In such cases, the application of relational implicit 
measures, like the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2006) and the Relational Responding Task (RRT; De Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roets, & 
Hughes, 2015) seem more appropriate, as they are based on the idea that the processing 
of propositions is accompanied by an automatic endorsement or rejection (i.e., an 
automatic evaluation as true or false; e.g., De Houwer, 2014; De Houwer & Moors, 2012; 
De Houwer et al., 2009). Consequentially, they are capable of assessing how relevant 
concepts are related to another. For the assessment of body dissatisfaction such a 
sensitivity is beneficial, as body dissatisfaction is characterized as being driven by the 
perceived discrepancy between one’s ideal and actual body image. Crucially, beliefs 
about these two concepts can be verbalized involving the two concepts self and body 
size. However, the way in which these two concepts are related to each other differs 
between the beliefs concerning actual and ideal body, respectively. A belief about one’s 
actual body image involves a relation of descriptiveness to reflect the factuality between 
the two concepts (e.g., ‘I am thin’). Beliefs concerning the ideal body image, in contrast, 
are reflected by a relation of desirability between the self and a certain body size (e.g., ‘I 
want to be thin’). The importance of assessing and dissociating between these two types 
of beliefs was recently demonstrated by Heider et al. (2015, also see Chapter 3). They 
used one IRAP (hereafter referred to as actual-IRAP) to capture beliefs about the actual 
body image. A second IRAP (hereafter referred to as ideal-IRAP) was used to capture 
beliefs about the ideal body image. In the actual-IRAP, participants were presented, on 
each trial, with combinations of two stimuli that were either congruent or incongruent 
with possessing a thin body (e.g., ‘I am’ + ‘skinny’ and ‘I am’ + ‘chubby’, respectively). 
Crucially, participants were asked to respond as if they believed to be thin in one block 
of trials, and to respond as if they believed to be overweight in a second block of trials. 
That is, they were required to select the response ‘true’ whenever a stimulus 
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combination was presented that reflected the belief participants were asked to respond 
in accordance to within that block of trials, and to select the response ‘false’ whenever a 
stimulus combination was presented that reflected the opposite belief. The ideal-IRAP 
was identical to the actual-IRAP except for the fact that participants were (a) presented 
with stimulus combinations that reflected the desire to be thin or overweight (e.g., ‘I 
want to be + skinny’ and ‘I want to be + chubby’, respectively) and (b) required to respond 
as if they desired to  thin or overweight in different blocks of trials. 
As mentioned above, the IRAP is based on the idea that the processing of a stimulus 
combination that expresses a specific belief is accompanied by an automatic 
endorsement or rejection of that belief. Consequentially, participants are expected to 
more easily respond to stimuli in a manner that are in line with their personal beliefs than 
it is to respond in a manner that is inconsistent with their personal beliefs. Therefore, the 
difference in the performance between the two types of trials within an IRAP can be used 
to infer a participant’s belief. Faster responses in an actual-IRAP on trials that require 
responding in line with possessing a thin body as compared to on trials that require 
responding in line with possessing an overweight body for instance indicate the belief of 
possessing a thin body. Similar inferences about a person’s ideal body image (i.e., the 
desire to possess a thin body) can be made from the differences in response latencies in 
the two different blocks of trials of the ideal-IRAP. 
In accordance with the assumption that body dissatisfaction can be described as a 
function of a person’s actual and ideal body image, Heider et al. (2015) found that 
participants high and low in body dissatisfaction differed in their scores in the two IRAPs. 
Specifically, results indicated that the implicit belief to be thin was more pronounced in 
individuals who were satisfied with their body as compared to individuals that were 
dissatisfied with their body. The implicit desire to be thin was in contrast more 
pronounced in individuals who were dissatisfied with their body as compared to 
individuals who exhibit a low degree of body dissatisfaction. These findings clearly 
indicate the benefit of assessing beliefs underlying body dissatisfaction as compared to 
assessing only the strength of association between the concepts of self and body weight 
(e.g., ‘self – thin’, ‘self – overweight’). Consequentially, we consider these results an 
important step towards a more precise implicit measurement of body dissatisfaction. 
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However, there are two reasons that encouraged us to revisit the implicit measurement 
of beliefs concerning actual and ideal body image in the current article.  
The first reason can be found in the additional analyses indicating that the level of 
body dissatisfaction was dependent upon scores of the ideal-IRAP only. This finding was 
unexpected, as it was hypothesized that a person’s level of body dissatisfaction should 
also depend on actual body image beliefs. Specifically, based on the definition of body 
dissatisfaction, Heider et al. (2015) assumed that actual body image beliefs moderated 
the degree to which the desire to possess a thin body correlates with a person’s level of 
body dissatisfaction. We thus decided to revisit the implicit assessment of actual and 
ideal body image beliefs with the abovementioned RRT. The RRT is, like the IRAP, based 
on the idea that propositions are automatically endorsed or rejected when processed. 
The RRT is therefore sensitive to how concepts are related to another. In their seminal 
study, De Houwer et al. (2015, also see Chapter 4) demonstrated the capabilities of the 
RRT in assessing racist beliefs. Specifically, participants were asked to respond to 
propositions that expressed the belief that Flemish people were either more or less 
intelligent than immigrants (e.g., ‘Flemish people are smarter than immigrants’, ‘Flemish 
people are less intelligent than immigrants’, respectively). In one crucial block of trials, 
participants were asked to categorize these propositions as true or false in line with 
believing that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants. In a second crucial 
block of trials, participants were asked to reverse their responses and to categorize the 
same propositions in accordance with the belief that immigrants are more intelligent 
than Flemish people.2 The difference in performance between blocks of different 
response rules provided a score of the implicit belief that Flemish people are more 
intelligent than immigrants. Crucially, De Houwer et al. (2015) found that this score 
correlated with the participants’ self-reported endorsement of the belief that Flemish 
people are more intelligent that immigrants, as well as with multiple more general 
questionnaire measures of racism. 
                                                 
2 On additional trials (i.e., inducer trials) throughout the task, participants were asked to categorize 
synonyms of the response options ‘true’ and ‘not true’ in accordance with their meaning. The function of 
these trials was to discourage participants to recode the responses in term of their physical location. 
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The second motivation for the present research concerns the RRT itself, namely the 
claim that it is sensitive to relational information. As propositions concerning actual and 
ideal body image differ only in how the concepts self and body size are related, this 
research domain is an ideal test case for the RRT. If the RRT is indeed sensitive to 
relational information, we should be capable of dissociating between these two beliefs 
and how they are related to body dissatisfaction.  
For these two reasons, in the present study, we addressed beliefs concerning actual 
and ideal body image using two versions of the RRT (i.e., actual-RRT and ideal-RRT, 
respectively). The actual-RRT was used to assess beliefs about the actual body and 
included statements like ‘I possess a slim body’ and ‘I see myself as a fat person’. The 
ideal-RRT was used to assess beliefs about the desired body ideal and included 
statements like ‘I wish I was thinner’ and ‘I strive to weigh more’. We hypothesized that 
participants would differ in the scores of the two RRTs as a function of their level of 
explicitly measured body dissatisfaction. Specifically, based on our previous findings, we 
expected the scores of the ideal-RRT to be the main predictor of body dissatisfaction. 
However, in line with the general definition of body dissatisfaction, we furthermore 
expected the scores of the actual-RRT to moderate the relationship between ideal body 
image and body dissatisfaction. Specifically, we expected the thin ideal body image to 
correspond with high body dissatisfaction only when participants possessed an 
overweight actual body image. 
 METHOD 
Participants 
During an online screening study that involved several questionnaires, 468 students 
at Ghent University completed the body dissatisfaction subscale of the Eating Disorders 
Inventory (EDI; Garner et al., 1983) online. About one month later, we invited all female 
students who had scored within the first and forth quartile of the sample (N = 143), using 
an online participant recruitment system. In total, 68 female students (M = 18.72 years, 
SD = 2.12) participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit or payment of €7 
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(n = 6). Four participants were excluded because either their mean response latencies or 
error rates exceeded our cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand 
means of the respective criterion. Based on the EDI scores obtained during the actual test 
session, the final sample (N = 64) was divided by cluster analysis into a high body 
dissatisfaction group (n = 31, M = 19.1, SD = 4.6, min = 12, max = 32) and low body 
dissatisfied group (n = 33, M = 46.4, SD = 5.2, min = 36, max = 54). Groups differed 
significantly in terms of mean EDI score, t(62) = 22.35, p < .001. All participants were 
Dutch speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Measurement 
Relational Responding Task. Ten words were used as stimuli on the inducer trials of 
the actual-RRT and the ideal-RRT. Five words were related to ‘true’ and five words were 
related to ‘not true’ (for the list of the Dutch words and their English translations, see 
Table 2 in the Appendix). Two separate sets of 20 statements were used for the target 
trials of the two RRTs. Statements for the actual-RRT related thin or overweight in a way 
that concerned the perceived state of the participants’ body. Statements in the ideal-RRT 
concerned the desired state of the participants’ body. Crucially, each of the twenty target 
statements of each RRT contained words or phrases related to thinness or overweight in 
a self-relevant sentence. In the actual-RRT, five statements each implied the belief of 
being thin (e.g., ‘I possess a slim body’) or overweight (e.g., ‘I weigh too much’). Negations 
in these ten statements led to five statements that implied the belief of not being 
overweight (e.g., ‘I do not weigh too much’) or not being thin (e.g., ‘I do not possess a 
slim body’), respectively. In the ideal-RRT, five statements each implied that the desire to 
be thin (e.g., ‘I desire to weigh less’) or overweight (e.g., ‘I desire to be chubbier’). 
Negations in these ten statements led to five statements that imply the desire of not 
being overweight (e.g., ‘I don’t desire to be chubby’) or thin (e.g., ‘I don’t desire to weigh 
less’), respectively (for the complete list of the statements and their English translations, 
see Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix).  
Participants were instructed to categorize words and statements presented on screen 
as ‘true’ or ‘not true’ by pressing the right and left ctrl-key of the keyboard, respectively. 
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Each RRT consisted of five blocks. In Block 1 (40 trials) each of the ten inducer words was 
presented 4 times. Participants were asked to categorize the words as referring to ‘true’ 
and ‘not true’. In Block 2 (40 trials), the 20 target statements were presented twice. 
Participants were asked to respond in line with possessing a thin actual body image (in 
the actual-RRT) or a thin ideal body image (in the ideal-RRT). Block 3 (80 trials) consisted 
of a first and a second block of 40 trials each. In each half, the ten inducer words were 
presented twice and the 20 target statements were presented once. Participants were 
asked to respond in accordance with the rules practiced in the two preceding blocks. 
Block 4 (40 trials) was identical to Block 2 except for a reversal of the statement-response 
assignments. Participants were now asked to respond in line with possessing an 
overweight actual body image (in the actual-RRT) or desiring to possess an overweight 
ideal body image (in the ideal-RRT). Block 5 (80 trials) was identical to Block 3, but 
participants were asked to respond to target statements in accordance with the response 
rule learned in Block 4. The order of trials within all blocks was semi-randomized, 
preventing the same word or phrase to be presented on two consecutive trials.  
Each trial started with the presentation of an item (i.e., inducer word or target 
statement) in the middle of the screen, Tahoma, 28 point font size. Inducer stimuli were 
presented in white color in both RRTs, target statements were presented in orange 
(actual-RRT) or blue color (ideal-RRT). Different colors were used to increase awareness 
of the fact that target statements differed between tasks. Items remained on screen until 
the correct response was registered. Incorrect responses were indicated by the 
presentation of a red X (Arial, 72 point font size) below the item until participants gave 
the correct response. The next trial started 750 ms after registration of the correct 
response. The RRTs were presented on a 17 inch LCD screen (60 Hz, 1440 × 900 pixels) 
and were written in Affect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 
2010). 
Self-report measures. The 20 statements used on the target trials of each of the RRTs 
were rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. 
Ratings of each group of target statements were aggregated to calculate scores of the 
participants’ explicit actual and ideal body image beliefs, with a score of 1 indicating total 
agreement with being/wanting to be overweight, whereas a score of 5 indicated total 
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agreement with being/wanting to be thin. Body dissatisfaction was assessed by means of 
the body dissatisfaction subscale of the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI, 9 items; Garner 
et al., 1983). Actual and ideal body image were measured using the female version of the 
Contour Drawing Rating Scale (CDRS; Thompson & Gray, 1995). The CDRS consists of nine 
schematic (female) figures of varying sizes ranging from underweight (1) to overweight 
(9). Participants completed the CDRS twice, once to indicate their actual body image and 
once to indicate their ideal body image. Finally, we computed the Body Mass Index (BMI) 
for each participant using their self-reported weight and height. 
Procedure. All participants gave informed consent before participation. Participants 
completed both RRTs in a counterbalanced order. They then indicated their level of 
agreement with all statements used on the target trials of both RRT tasks. Afterwards 
participants completed the EDI and CDRSs for actual and ideal body image and reported 
their weight and height for the calculation of their BMI. After the experiment participants 
were debriefed. All participants were tested individually. The experiment took 
approximately 35 minutes. 
RESULTS 
Data preparation 
For the analysis of the RRT data, only the data of the target trials (i.e., trials containing 
target statements) of the mixed blocks were analyzed.3 The data of two participants were 
excluded from the analysis because their mean reaction times in both tasks (2428 ms and 
2629 ms, for the actual-RRT; 2862 ms and 2838 ms, for the ideal-RRT) exceeded our cutoff 
criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand means of the tasks (Actual-RRT: M = 
1292 ms, SD = 369 ms; threshold = 2215 ms; Ideal-RRT: M = 1521 ms, SD = 417 ms; 
threshold = 2563 ms; see Ratcliff, 1993). Also excluded from the analysis were the data 
of two other participants whose error rates (27.5 % and 35.0 %) in one of the two tasks 
exceeded the cutoff criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the grand mean of that 
                                                 
3 In contrast to the IAT, this second type of trials (i.e., inducer trials) was included only to prevent response 
recoding. Note, however, that analyses that included data of inducer trials led to similar results. 
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task (Actual-RRT: M = 11.2 %, SD = 5.3 %; threshold = 24.4 %; Ideal-RRT: M = 11.3 %, SD = 
6.7 %; threshold = 28 %; Ratcliff, 1993).4 The mean reaction time on target trials in the 
actual-RRT was 1284 ms (SD = 341 ms), with participants responding incorrectly on 10.9 
% (SD = 4.8 %) of the target trials. In the ideal-RRT, participants on average needed 1517 
ms (SD = 394 ms) to respond on target trials and responded incorrectly on 10.8 % (SD = 6 
%) of the target trials. 
For each participant and each version of the RRT, the raw response latencies were 
transformed into DRRT scores using the D-algorithm (D1) described by Greenwald, Nosek, 
and Banaji (2003).5 Positive DRRT scores of the actual-RRT indicated stronger beliefs of 
possessing a thin body, whereas negative DRRT scores indicated stronger beliefs of 
possessing an overweight body. Similarly, positive DRRT scores of the ideal-RRT indicated 
a stronger desire of possessing a thin body, whereas negative DRRT scores indicated a 
stronger desire of possessing an overweight body. The DRRT score of the actual-RRT 
ranged from -0.46 to 0.71, with a mean score of M = 0.08 (SD = 0.30), which differed from 
zero, t (63) = 2.07, p = .043, d = 0.37. The DRRT scores of the ideal-RRT ranged from -0.63 
to 0.63, with a mean score of M = -0.05 (SD = 0.33), which did not differ from zero, t(63) 
= -1.33, p = .189, d = -0.23.  
Effects at the group level 
RRT measures. To investigate whether the RRTs of actual and ideal body image were 
dependent upon the degree of body dissatisfaction, the overall DRRT scores were 
submitted to a 2 (RRT: actual vs. ideal) x 2 (body dissatisfaction: high vs. low) mixed 
models ANOVA.6 As expected, we found a significant interaction of body dissatisfaction 
and RRT, F(1, 62) = 8.80, p = .004, ηρ2 = .12, indicating that DRRT scores differed in both 
groups. Participants low in body dissatisfaction scored higher on the actual-RRT than 
participants high in body dissatisfaction, 0.18 vs. -0.02, t(62) = 2.72, p = .008, d = 0.68. 
                                                 
4  Analyses that included all participants did not yield to different results. 
5  Analyses using the D4 scoring algorithm led to similar results. 
6 The order in which the two RRT tasks were completed was counterbalanced across participants. 
Reassuringly, our critical effect (i.e., the interaction between explicit body dissatisfaction and the type of 
RRT) was not moderated by this counterbalancing factor, F(1, 60) = 1.65, p = .204, ηρ² = .03, nor were any 
other effects, all Fs < 3.18, all ps > .08. We therefore excluded the order factor from the analyses. 
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Conversely, participants high in body dissatisfaction scored higher on the ideal body 
image RRT than participants low in body dissatisfaction, 0.00 vs. -0.11, t(62) = 1.40, p = 
.166, d = 0.35. This pattern of results indicates that the belief to be thin was more 
pronounced for participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared to participants high 
in body dissatisfaction, and the desire to possess a thin body was more pronounced for 
highly body dissatisfied participants as compared to participants low in body 
dissatisfaction. In addition, we found a significant main effect of RRT, F(1, 62) = 6.90, p = 
.011, ηρ2 = .10, indicating higher DRRT scores on the actual-RRT as compared to the ideal-
RRT, 0.08 vs. -0.05. No other effects were significant, all Fs < 1, all ps > .475.  
Explicit ratings of the target statements of the RRT measures. The explicit ratings of 
the target statements used in both RRTs were used as dependent variables in a 2 (type 
of target statement: actual body image vs. ideal body image) x 2 (body dissatisfaction: 
high vs. low) mixed model ANOVA. Results mirrored those of the DRRT scores. We found a 
significant interaction of type of target statement and body dissatisfaction, F(1, 62) =  
135.09, p < .001, ηρ2 = .69, indicating that participants high and low in body 
dissatisfaction differed in their ratings of the two types of target statements. Specifically, 
participants low in body dissatisfaction rated statements more in line with being thin as 
compared to participants high in body dissatisfaction, 4.09 vs. 1.93, t(62) = 7.46, p < .001, 
d = 1.86. Participants high in body dissatisfaction rated statements more in line with 
wanting to be thin as compared to participants low in body dissatisfaction, 4.55 vs. 3.42 
t(62) = 12.97, p < .001, d = 3.24. Moreover, within groups, mean ratings of both types of 
statements differed significantly from the scales mean of 2.5, ts > 5.49, ps < .001. 
Additionally, we found a significant main effect of the type of statement, F(1, 62) = 47.83, 
p < .001, ηρ2 = .44, indicating higher overall ratings on statements about the ideal body 
image, 4.00 vs 2.97. Finally, we found a significant main effect of group, F(1, 62) = 49.30, 
p < .001, ηρ2 = .44, indicating that highly body dissatisfied subjects rated overall more 
extreme than subjects of the low body dissatisfied group, 3.24 vs. 3.75.  
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Table 1. Correlations between measures. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 EDI - -0.54*** -0.36*** -0.28*** -0.67*** -0.06*** -0.85*** -0.80*** 
2 BMI  - -0.34*** -0.00*** -0.82*** -0.48*** -0.76*** -0.62*** 
3 Actual-RRT   - -0.01*** -0.28*** -0.10*** -0.30*** -0.15*** 
4 Ideal-RRT    - -0.03*** -0.36*** -0.22+** -0.13*** 
5 Actual-CDRS     - -0.45*** -0.80*** -0.70*** 
6 Ideal-CDRS      - -0.07*** -0.04*** 
7 Actual-RRT (statements)       - -0.85*** 
8 Ideal-RRT (statements)        - 
Note. Actual = Actual body image; Ideal = Ideal body image; RRT = Relational Responding Task; CDRS = Contour Drawing 
Rating Scale; EDI = Body dissatisfaction measured with the Eating Disorders Inventory; BMI = Body Mass Index 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Correlational Analyses 
Table 1 provides an overview of all pairwise correlations between the DRRT scores of 
the two RRTs, the CDRS scores of actual and ideal body image, explicit body 
dissatisfaction as measured with the EDI, the target statement ratings of the two RRTs, 
and the BMI. As a result from sampling participants with a high or low level of body 
dissatisfaction, some variables were not normally distributed. Accordingly, Spearman’s 
rank order correlations were computed. Results showed that while the DRRT scores of the 
actual-RRT correlated significantly with the explicit measures of actual body image (i.e., 
actual-CDRS scores, actual-RRT statement ratings, BMI scores), they were unrelated to 
the explicit measures of ideal body image (i.e., ideal-CDRS scores, ideal-RRT statement 
ratings). The DRRT scores of the ideal-IRAP in contrast correlated significantly with Ideal-
CDRS scores, but were unrelated to explicit measures of actual body image (i.e., actual-
CDRS scores, actual-RRT statement ratings, BMI scores). Moreover, DRRT scores of actual- 
and ideal-RRT did not correlate with one another. 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analyses 
To further scrutinize the relationship between the DRRT scores of the two RRTs and 
self-reported body dissatisfaction, and to ascertain whether the DRRT scores contributed 
substantially to the predictability of body dissatisfaction over and above an explicit 
measure of body size, a hierarchical logistic regression was performed. We compared a 
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model in which the BMI scores were the only predictor of body dissatisfaction group 
membership (i.e., high and low body dissatisfaction as assessed with the EDI) with a 
model that included the BMI and the DRRT scores of the two RRTs. The BMI alone was 
predictive of group membership, χ2(1) = 16.27, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .31, OR = 1.528 
(71.9 % correct classifications). However, adding the DRRT scores of the two RRTs and their 
interaction into the model resulted in a significantly better model fit, χ2(3) = 10.35, p = 
.016. On the basis of the model including the BMI and the DRRT scores of the two RRTs 
and their interaction, χ2(4) = 27.17, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .46, 76.6 % of all participants 
were correctly classified. Specifically, both the BMI, χ2(1) = 9.41, p = .002, OR = 1.580, and 
the DRRT scores of the ideal-RRT, χ2(1) = 5.20, p = .023, OR = 23.160, contributed 
significantly to the prediction of group membership. The DRRT scores of the actual-RRT 
and the interaction term just missed conventional significance levels, χ2(1) = 3.52, p = 
.061, OR = .093, and χ2(1) = 3.71, p = .054, OR = 0.001, respectively.7 Specifically, the 
interaction indicates that the degree to which a thin ideal body image is predictable of 
belonging to the group of body dissatisfied participants is dependent on the participant’s 
beliefs about the actual body image. For participants that perceived themselves as 
overweight, body dissatisfaction is dependent on whether or not a participant desired to 
be thin. For participants that in contrast saw themselves as thin, the desire to be thin did 
not influence group membership (see Figure 1).  
Reliability 
For the EDI subscale of body dissatisfaction, Chronbach’s alpha was 0.98. Test-retest 
reliability of the actual body image CDRS was r = .78, as reported by Thompson & Gray 
(1995). Reliability coefficients of both RRTs were estimated using a bootstrap procedure, 
wherein 100 random-splits were drawn from the data. For each random split, the 
correlation across participants between the two RRT scores was calculated. Correlations 
were then averaged. This procedure resulted in spearman-brown corrected mean split-
half correlations of Rsb = 0.49 and Rsb = 0.57, for the actual- and ideal-RRT, respectively. 
                                                 
7 Noteworthy, this better model fit depended on the inclusion of the DRRT scores of the actual-RRT. A model 
containing only the BMI, the DRRT scores of the ideal-RRT and their interaction did not fit the data 
significantly better than a model containing the BMI alone, χ2(2) = 3.96, p = .138. 
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Figure 1. Probability of membership to group of high body dissatisfied participants as a 
function of ideal body image DRRT scores, separated for thin (i.e., 1 SD below average), 
average, and overweight (i.e., 1 SD above average) actual body image DRRT scores. 
DISCUSSION 
The degree to which people are dissatisfied with their own body is a function of the 
(perceived) discrepancy between one’s actual and ideal body image (Cash & Szymanski, 
1995; Higgins, 1989). We recently demonstrated that young female adults that are either 
high or low in body dissatisfaction differed not only in their self-reported degree of body 
dissatisfaction but also in their implicit beliefs concerning their actual and ideal body 
image, as measured with two IRAPs (Heider et al., 2015). In the present study, we 
revisited the implicit measurement of body dissatisfaction with the RRT (De Houwer et 
al., 2015) and replicated our earlier findings. 
We again showed that the implicit belief to be thin was more pronounced for 
participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared to participants high in body 
dissatisfaction. The implicit desire to be thin was, in contrast, more pronounced in 
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participants high in body dissatisfaction as compared to participants low in body 
dissatisfaction. We observed this pattern not only for the scores of the RRTs, but also in 
self-report ratings based on the statements used in the two RRTs. These findings first and 
foremost suggest that the RRT is capable of dissociating between closely related beliefs 
that differ only in their relational component (i.e., ‘I am thin’ vs. ‘I want to be thin’). 
Additional findings corroborated this inference. While the two RRTs did not correlate 
with each other, DRRT scores of the actual-RRT correlated with explicit measures of actual 
body image but not with explicit measures of ideal body image. DRRT scores of the ideal-
RRT on the other hand correlated with explicit measures of ideal body image but not with 
explicit measures of actual body image. Such a finding strongly supports the conclusion 
that both RRT measures, despite their structural similarity, captured different beliefs. 
In addition, the present results go beyond our earlier findings in several ways. First, 
whereas Heider et al. (2015) observed that the level of body dissatisfaction was 
dependent upon scores of the ideal-IRAP only, we found that the scores of both implicit 
measures contributed significantly to the prediction of body dissatisfaction. Second, 
results hinted that explicit body dissatisfaction was dependent upon the interaction 
between the two RRT scores. In line with the idea that body dissatisfaction is a function 
of the (perceived) discrepancy between one’s actual and ideal body image, we observed 
that the relationship between body dissatisfaction and the implicit desire to be thin was 
moderated by implicit beliefs about the own actual body image. 
Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that the RRT might allow for a more 
precise measurement of implicit beliefs concerning actual and ideal body image than the 
IRAP. The following factor might account for this observation. Note, that the stimuli used 
in an IRAP are combinations of sample stimuli (e.g., ‘I want to be’) and a range of target 
stimuli that are all quite similar to each other (e.g., ‘thin’, ‘lean’, etc.). The RRT in contrast 
allows for the use of a much wider range of experimental stimuli in the form of 
propositions (e.g., ‘I strive to weigh less’, ‘It is my wish to be slimmer’). This difference in 
the restrictiveness of the experimental items might have influenced the processing of the 
stimuli on two levels. First, it is imaginable that the use of propositions that differ in the 
structure of the sentences (RRT), as compared to the rigid combination of sample and 
target items (IRAP), might have required participants in the current study to process the 
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statements more closely on every trial. The stimuli combinations used in the IRAP might 
have allowed for a more superficial processing. The possibility of a rather shallow 
processing of the IRAP stimuli could have been furthermore supported given the higher 
number of overall trials in the IRAP. As a consequence, the likelihood of an automatic 
endorsement or rejection of the stimuli based on the participant’s subjective beliefs (i.e., 
the mechanism from which RRT effects are expected to originate from; see De Houwer 
et al., 2015) might have been higher for the RRT as compared to the IRAP. It is also 
imaginable that the diversity in the statements might have allowed for capturing more 
fine-grained beliefs with the RRT. Similar to a well-constructed questionnaire, the higher 
number of different propositions that differ slightly in their wording might have increased 
the precision of the measure in assessing the specific construct. While both explanations 
seem intuitively plausible, research is needed to back up these claims and to properly 
investigate the differences in the two relational implicit measures.  
As indicated above, the number of published studies in which the RRT was used as an 
implicit measure of beliefs is still meager. In their initial demonstration of the capabilities 
of the RRT as an implicit measure of beliefs, De Houwer et al. (2015) focused on a single 
belief and examined whether an RRT measure of that belief correlates with criterion 
variables. In the current study we continued the empirical validation of the RRT by testing 
its potential in capturing differences between beliefs that vary only in their relational 
component. As mentioned above, beliefs concerning the actual and ideal body image 
vary only in how the inherent concepts self and body size are related (i.e., ‘am’ vs ‘want 
to be’, and variations thereof). The finding that both RRT measures were related to 
different explicit variables to a different extent underscores the distinctiveness of both 
measures and their sensitivity to relational information. The present findings can thus be 
seen as a crucial step in the empirical validation process of the RRT.  
Furthermore, the current findings support the propositional models of implicit 
cognition  (e.g., De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) that 
constitute the theoretical basis of the RRT. Most models of implicit cognition postulate 
that the automatic processing of information is based solely on the activation of 
associations in long-term memory (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975). By definition, such 
models do not allow for the implicit endorsement of beliefs, as associative 
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representations do not possess a truth value. In contrast to this predominant view, De 
Houwer et al. (2015) argued that automatic endorsement of processed propositional 
knowledge is possible, if one does not exclude the involvement of  propositions from the 
realm of implicit cognition (De Houwer, 2014; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 
2011). The presented findings support this assumption, as they indicate that the 
endorsement or rejection of propositions, including their inherent relational component, 
can take place in an automatic fashion. At the theoretical level, our results thus give 
additional credibility to propositional models of implicit cognition. 
To conclude, with the present paper we continued the path of empirically validating 
the RRT as an implicit measure of beliefs, as well as investigating the relationship 
between body dissatisfaction and beliefs concerning actual and ideal body image. Two 
RRTs were used to capture and dissociate between the two closely related concepts 
actual and ideal body image. Results indicated that beliefs concerning both actual and 
idea body image were related to the level to which a person is satisfied with the own 
body. More generally, the findings substantiate the claim that the RRT can be used as a 
tool to capture beliefs at the implicit level.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2. Inducer words of the RRTs and English translations 
Inducer word English translations Inducer word English translations 
goed good Mis wrong 
juist right Onjuist incorrect 
correct correct incorrect incorrect 
exact exact verkeerd wrong 
in orde alright Fout error 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Target statements of the actual-RRT and English translations 
Target statements English translations 
Ik heb een tengere lichaamsbouw. I have a slender physique. 
Ik weeg weinig. I weigh little. 
Ik zie mezelf als een slank persoon. I consider myself a slim person. 
Ik heb een mager figuur. I have a lean figure. 
Ik ben fijngebouwd. 
 
I am delicately built. 
 
Ik heb geen zware lichaamsbouw. I do not have a plump physique. 
Ik weeg niet te veel. I do not weigh too much. 
Ik zie mezelf niet als een dik persoon. I do not consider myself a fat person. 
Ik heb geen mollig figuur. I do not have a stout figure. 
Ik ben niet struis. 
 
I am not robustly built. 
 
Ik heb geen tengere lichaamsbouw. I do not have a slender physique. 
Ik weeg niet te weinig. I do not weigh too little. 
Ik zie mezelf niet als een slank persoon. I do not consider myself a slim person. 
Ik heb geen mager figuur. I do not have a lean figure. 
Ik ben niet fijngebouwd. 
 
I am not delicately built. 
 
Ik heb een zware lichaamsbouw. I have a plump physique. 
Ik weeg te veel. I weigh too much. 
Ik zie mezelf als een dik persoon. I consider myself a fat person. 
Ik heb een mollig figuur. I have a stout figure. 
Ik ben struis. I am robustly built. 
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Table 4. Target statements of the ideal-RRT and English translations 
Target statements English translations 
Ik wil een meer tengere lichaamsbouw hebben. I want to have a more slender physique. 
Ik streef ernaar minder te wegen. I strive to weigh less. 
Het is mijn wens om slanker te zijn. It is my wish to be slimmer. 
Ik wil een mager figuur hebben. I want to have a leaner figure. 
Ik wil fijner gebouwd zijn. 
 
I want to be more delicately built. 
Ik wil een minder zware lichaamsbouw hebben. I want to have a less plump physique. 
Ik streef er niet naar meer te wegen. I don't strive to weigh more. 
Het is niet mijn wens om dikker te zijn. It is not my wish to be fatter. 
Ik wil geen mollig figuur hebben. I don't want to have stouter figure. 
Ik wil minder struis zijn. 
 
I want to be less robustly built. 
Ik wil een minder tengere lichaamsbouw hebben. I want to have a less slender physique. 
Ik streef er niet naar minder te wegen. I don't strive to weigh less. 
Het is mijn wens om minder slank te zijn. It is my wish to be less slim. 
Ik wil geen mager figuur hebben. I don't want to have a leaner figure. 
Ik wil minder fijn gebouwd zijn. 
 
I want to be less delicately built. 
Ik wil een zwaardere lichaamsbouw hebben. I want to have a plumper physique. 
Ik streef ernaar meer te wegen. I strive to weigh more. 
Het is mijn wens om dikker te zijn. It is my wish to be fatter. 
Ik wil een mollig figuur hebben. I want to have stouter figure. 
Ik wil struiser zijn. I want to be more robustly built. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
RECAPITULATION OF THE RESEARCH GOALS 
The research presented in this dissertation was inspired by the idea that propositions, 
rather than associations, guide automatic behavior, as proposed by single-process 
propositional accounts of cognition (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009). This view contrasts sharply with predominant dual-process models of 
cognition as these models postulate that automatic behavior must be guided by 
processes that are associative in nature. The focus of my dissertational research was 
twofold. First, it was investigated whether propositions can be constructed under 
conditions of automaticity. While such an observation would be fully compatible with a 
single-process propositional model, it would very be hard, if not impossible, to reconcile 
with classic dual-process models. Second, the usefulness and scope of implicit measures 
was reexamined in light of the observation that propositional processes can occur under 
conditions of automaticity. Specifically, it was tested whether the endorsement of 
propositions can occur under conditions of automaticity. In addition, it was examined 
whether this logic can be exploited as a means to indirectly assess beliefs (i.e., 
propositions that are believed to be true). The results presented in each chapter are 
outlined in detail in the following section.  
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SUMMERY AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Research line 1: The demonstration of automatic propositional processing 
In Chapter 1, I set out to investigate the abovementioned idea that propositional 
representations, i.e., informational units in memory that contain information about how 
concepts are related (De Houwer, 2009, 2014), can be constructed or derived under 
conditions of automaticity. Specifically, it was tested whether participants are capable of 
automatically processing the size relation between two objects (i.e., automatic relational 
stimulus processing). To answer this question, the sequential priming paradigm was used. 
The behavioral outcome of priming tasks (i.e., the priming effect) allows for inferences 
about the knowledge that is automatically constructed when processing the irrelevant 
prime stimuli. Accordingly, in my studies, the priming task was used to examine whether 
the processing of prime stimuli can lead to an automatic construction of propositional 
knowledge. Four sequential priming experiments were conducted. In each experiment, 
participants were asked to judge the physical size of a series of target objects relative to 
either a large reference object (i.e., a car) or a small reference object (i.e., a football). 
Crucially, the set of prime objects included objects that were smaller than the large 
reference object and larger than the small reference object (e.g., a bike). Results showed 
that the impact on target categorization of these medium-sized objects was contingent 
upon the size of the reference object. Specifically, it was observed that the medium-sized 
primes facilitated responses towards large targets and inhibited responses towards small 
targets when the size of the reference object was small. Conversely, when the size of the 
reference object was large, the same set of medium-sized primes facilitated responses 
towards small targets and inhibited responses towards large targets. This interaction, 
termed relational priming effect, was obtained when the size of the reference object was 
manipulated block-wise (Experiments 1 & 3), trial-wise (Experiments 2 & 4), and even 
when the primes were presented near subjective recognition thresholds (Experiment 4). 
The consistent finding of the relational priming effect implies that participants processed 
the size of the primes in relation to the size of the reference object of the trial. 
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To understand why such a finding is problematic for processing models that explain 
automatic stimulus processing solely in terms of associative processes (i.e., dual-process 
models), two questions have to be discussed separately. First, why is relational 
processing of primes considered to be a propositional process? Second, in what way can 
relational processing of primes be considered to occur automatically? 
With regard to the first question, consider how the processing of medium-sized prime 
stimuli is thought of in a dual-process model. When a specific prime, for instance the 
prime ‘bike’, is perceived, its mental representation is activated within an associative 
network. The activation then spreads automatically via associative links to related 
concepts (e.g., Fazio, 2001; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). If relational information is also 
represented within the associative system, one can hypothesize that the two relations of 
size ‘larger than’ and ‘smaller than’ are also associatively connected to the concept ‘bike’. 
However, the relational priming effect implies an activation of only one and not the other 
relation, depending on the reference object. Such a processing cannot be explained 
within a purely associative network. In dual-process models, such (relational) processing 
is therefore assumed to rely on propositional processing, termed propositional 
categorization (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Crucially, propositional categorizations require 
the use of propositional beliefs. For instance, the construction of the proposition “a bike 
is smaller than a car”, requires the retrieval of the two relevant concepts (e.g., the prime 
bike, the reference object car) and the relation (e.g., smaller than) that is consistent with 
the truth value of the to-be-constructed proposition from the associative system. The 
process required for the assembly of the proposition are therefore not purely associative. 
Moreover, this assembly process is assumed to be time-consuming and to depend upon 
cognitive resources (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and is therefore excluded from 
occurring under automaticity conditions. This leads to the second question. In what way 
does the processing of the prime stimuli in the size-judgment task operate automatically? 
To discuss this question, it is important to understand that a process does not simply 
operate automatically or not. Automaticity can be decomposed into multiple 
independent automaticity features, like speed, efficiency, uncontrollability, and 
unconsciousness (Moors, 2016; see Moors & De Houwer, 2006 for a more extensive list). 
Whether or not processing occurs given a specific automaticity feature is determined by 
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a multitude of factors like personal characteristics (e.g., personality, learning history, 
genetic makeup) and the specific experimental procedures used to examine it (e.g., the 
specific stimulus set, the measure that is used; for an in-depth discussion and a 
systematic taxonomy of possible factors, see Moors, 2016). Given this decompositional 
view of automaticity, the automaticity of the relational processing has to be considered 
with regard to all automaticity features separately. 
First, a process is called fast if it consumes little time or has a short duration (Moors, 
2016). In the size-judgment priming tasks, both the time between prime and target 
presentation and the presentation time of the primes were quite short in each of the four 
experiments. Further, the speed with which responses were made was comparable to 
that in other implicit measures. Relational prime processing can therefore be considered 
a fast-acting process. Second, a process is called efficient if it can operate without (or 
little) cognitive capacities (Moors, 2016). The response task implemented in the size-
judgment priming tasks can be considered cognitively more demanding than the 
response tasks typically used in sequential priming research (e.g., identification of target 
valence). It can thus be argued that the RPE emerged under conditions of reduced 
cognitive capacity, implying that the relational processing of the primes driving the RPE 
operates efficiently. Third, if a process is not affected by either the goal to initiate that 
process or the goal to counteract it, the process occurs in an uncontrolled fashion (Moors, 
2016). It seems unlikely that participants possessed the (conscious) goal to intentionally 
process the size relation between primes and reference object. Participants were asked 
to respond on the basis of the targets, and processing primes in the same way was neither 
informative nor beneficial for the task at hand. However, it is obvious that participants 
had the goal to process target stimuli with regard to their size relative to the reference 
objects. As this specific processing goal was crucial for the relational processing of the 
prime stimuli, the processing of primes can be considered unintentional but goal-
dependent. Last, unconsciousness of a process denotes the fact to be unaware of the 
stimulus input, the process itself, or how the process affects behavior (Moors, 2016). The 
question whether conscious awareness of the stimulus input is necessary for the RPE to 
occur was answered inconclusively in Experiment 4. Although prime stimuli were masked 
and presented only briefly, they were on average still perceived by most participants, as 
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indicated by prime visibility analyses. Accordingly, the cumulative evidence allows to 
conclude that relational processing can take place under at least three automaticity 
conditions (see Moors, 2016; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
On the basis of this discussion of the nature of relational processing and the 
automaticity conditions under which it can operate, it can be concluded that relational 
stimulus processing is an automatic propositional process. The observation of relational 
priming effects in four experiments implies that propositional knowledge can be 
constructed under conditions of automaticity. The first research goal was achieved. 
Research line 2: The indirect assessment of beliefs 
The second goal of my dissertational research was to develop and empirically validate 
an implicit measure of beliefs. As indicated by the findings of Chapter 2, automatic 
behavior can be guided by propositional processes. This finding led to the idea that the 
processing of propositional statements might be accompanied by automatic 
endorsement or rejection (i.e., the evaluation of the truth value) of the statement. If so, 
an indirect measurement procedure is imaginable that capitalizes on this process to 
indirectly assess beliefs (i.e., propositions that are believed to be true). The second part 
of this dissertation (i.e., Chapters 3 to 5) was devoted to the development and empirical 
validation of such an implicit measure. 
The psychological construct of body dissatisfaction played an important role in this 
endeavor, as its measurement was expected to profit from the indirect measurement of 
beliefs. Body dissatisfaction can be seen as the negative attitude towards one’s own body 
resulting from a (perceived) discrepancy between one’s actual physical appearance (i.e., 
the actual body image) and internalized ideals about one’s physical appearance (i.e., the 
ideal body image; e.g., Cash & Szymanski, 1995; Higgins, 1989; Strauman, Vookles, 
Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991; Williamson, Gleaves, Watkins, & Schlundt, 1993). 
Both constructs, actual and ideal body image, are very dissimilar with respect to how the 
concepts self and body size are related. Beliefs about the actual body image are defined 
by a descriptive relation between the self and body size (e.g., “I am thin”), whereas beliefs 
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about the ideal body image are defined in terms of desirability (e.g., “I want to be 
thinner”).  
In Chapter 3,  both beliefs were assessed independently with two versions of the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) to test 
whether body dissatisfaction is dependent on implicit beliefs concerning the actual and 
ideal body image. It was hypothesized that participants high and low in body 
dissatisfaction would differ both in their self-reported degree of body dissatisfaction and 
their implicit beliefs concerning these two types of body image. The implicit belief to be 
thin was expected to be stronger in participants low in body dissatisfaction as compared 
to participants high in body dissatisfaction. The implicit desire to be thin was in contrast 
expected to be stronger in participants who exhibit a high degree of body dissatisfaction 
as compared to participants low in body dissatisfaction. Both predictions were supported 
by the data of the two IRAP measures. Moreover, the pattern of correlations between 
each of the two IRAP measures and a number of other explicitly assessed variables was 
different. Based on these findings, it was concluded that both IRAP measures reflected 
different underlying constructs, i.e., beliefs about actual and ideal body image, 
respectively.  
Next, I engaged in the development and validation of the Relational Responding Task 
(RRT). The RRT is a reaction time task that was designed to capitalize on the fact that 
propositional statements, when processed, are automatically endorsed or rejected (i.e., 
evaluated as true or false) on the basis of their (subjective) truth value. If a person, for 
instance, is presented with the propositional statement “a banana is larger than a car”, 
that person is expected to automatically reject this proposition (i.e., evaluate it as false) 
based on the knowledge that the opposite is true (i.e., that a banana is smaller than a 
car). Respondents in an RRT are presented with propositional statements and are asked 
to respond as if they believe a certain type of proposition to be true (e.g., that pieces of 
fruit are smaller than vehicles) or false (e.g., that vehicles are smaller than pieces of fruit). 
Performance in these two task-conditions should reflect beliefs about the size of pieces 
of fruit in relation to vehicles. Specifically, it should be easier to categorize propositions 
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as true and false in a manner that is in line with one’s personal beliefs than it is to respond 
in a manner that is inconsistent with one’s personal beliefs.1 
In Chapter 4, such a finding (i.e., better performance in the categorization of 
statements as true and false when performed in line with one’s own beliefs) was 
obtained in the context of racist beliefs. Specifically, participants were asked to 
categorize statements about the intelligence of Flemish people relative to immigrants 
(e.g., “Flemish people are smarter than immigrants”) as true or false in accordance with 
the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants in one block of trials, 
but in accordance with the contrary belief (i.e., that immigrants are more intelligent than 
Flemish people) in a second block of trials. The difference in the performance between 
the two types of trials was indeed found to be informative about the participant’s racist 
belief, as the difference in performance between blocks correlated with ratings of the 
extent to which participants explicitly endorsed the belief that Flemish people are more 
intelligent than immigrants and with questionnaire measures of subtle and blatant 
racism. 
To further strengthen the argument that propositions can be automatically endorsed 
or rejected when processed, in Chapter 5, the assessment of body dissatisfaction was 
revisited. Beliefs about actual and ideal body image of young female adults were assessed 
separately with two RRTs. Reassuringly, RRT effects indicated that both beliefs did not 
only differ from each other, but also contributed significantly and uniquely to the 
prediction of the explicitly assessed level of body dissatisfaction of participants. The 
dissociation of two beliefs that differed only with respect to their relational information 
was a crucial step in the validation process of the RRT, as it demonstrated that the RRT is 
capable of capturing differences between beliefs that vary only in their relational 
component. 
To summarize, in the second part of my dissertation, experimental evidence was 
presented that the subjective truth value of propositional statements can be activated 
under conditions of automaticity. This conclusion is based on the findings obtained with 
                                                 
1 The example with statements about the size of pieces of fruit and vehicles was taken from an unpublished 
pilot study of the RRT. A short summary of the results can be found in Appendix A (Experiment 7). 
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two implicit measures, the IRAP and the RRT. Both measurement procedures capitalize 
on the fact that people are generally faster in categorizing statements as true and false 
in accordance with their own beliefs as compared to in contrast to their own beliefs. In 
each of these studies the score of the implicit measure correlated with explicit criterion 
variables of the to-be-measured belief.  
To define the endorsement of propositional knowledge as an automatic propositional 
process, two points need to be discussed, namely why the endorsement of propositions 
can be considered to be propositional in nature, and under what conditions of 
automaticity it can operate. According to dual-process models, the endorsement of 
propositional knowledge is based on propositional processing. Whether a proposition is 
endorsed or not depends on the consistency of the proposition with other propositional 
knowledge (i.e., it is based on the principle of preserving consistency between elements 
within the propositional system; e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
For instance, the statement “I want to be thinner” is endorsed if it corresponds with a 
person’s beliefs about his or her ideal body image. It is rejected if it is in contrast to that 
belief. Crucially, reasoning processes that involve the comparison of propositional 
knowledge are propositional in nature. In dual-process models, such processes are 
assumed to occur only slowly and to require cognitive resources (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 
2004). Single-process propositional accounts, in contrast, propose that propositional 
processing can also occur automatically. To argue that the endorsement of propositions 
can occur automatically, the automaticity of the process has to be considered with regard 
to the separate automaticity features (e.g., speed, efficiency, uncontrollability, 
consciousness; Moors, 2016). Note that as my research focused mainly on the RRT, the 
discussion of the automaticity of the endorsement of propositions will focus on the 
automaticity conditions realized in this task. Further, future research will be proposed 
regarding those conditions of automaticity for which the research presented in Chapters 
4 and 5 is not sufficient for a conclusive answer. 
First, consider the automaticity feature of speed. Reaction times to statements in the 
RRT were undoubtedly longer than reaction times in other implicit measures. However, 
it is not claimed that the statements themselves were processed under conditions of 
automatically. The process of interest is the processing of the relation of the statements 
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to their truth values. The relevant question therefore is whether this process operates 
fast. Considering that participants had to process the complete statements before being 
able to judging them as true or false in accordance with the response rule, responses can 
be considered to be relatively fast. For this conclusion, also consider the inducer trials in 
the RRT. On these trials participants categorized single items as synonyms of true and 
false, a task that is more comparable to that of other implicit measures. As the speed on 
those trials was comparable to that in other implicit measures, it can be argued that 
participants always responded as fast as possible. With regard to the target statements, 
this means participants responded as soon as the stimuli were completely processed and 
understood. Consequentially, it can be assumed that the endorsement of statements in 
line with the personal belief occurred fast, once stimuli themselves were processed with 
regard to their meaning. However, to substantiate the claim that the endorsement of 
target statements in an RRT occurs in a fast manner, it might be reasonable to 
experimentally assess the speed with which statements were processed (in terms of 
being understood). To do so, one could conduct an experiment in which response 
latencies to statements in an RRT are compared to response latencies to the same 
statements in a task in which participants do not have to endorse the statements. 
Participants in such a task could in contrast be asked to simply indicate the point in time 
at which they finished processing the meaning of the statements. Comparing response 
times between these two tasks would allow for an inference about the average time it 
takes participants to endorse or reject a statement in line with the response rule, once 
they have processed it. As the endorsement of the statements in line with the personal 
beliefs (i.e., the process in question) can only start once a statement is understood, such 
an experiment would allow narrowing down the time window within which the personal 
endorsement of statements operates. 
Second, if a process is not affected by a manipulation of cognitive load, it is considered 
automatic in terms of efficiency (e.g., De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 
2009). A first step in investigating this issue for the RRT could be to manipulate the 
working memory load of participants that perform an RRT. Participants could, for 
instance, be asked to recite a series of digits (Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000) on a 
subset of RRT trials. The finding that such a manipulation of the cognitive load does not 
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decrease the magnitude of the RRT effects as compared to the control trials (i.e., trials 
without the additional digit-reciting task) would indicate that the endorsement of 
statements is automatic in terms of being efficient. Note, that it can be expected that 
overall reaction times will increase if participants are asked to perform a second task. 
This is, because the processing and understanding of the target statements in itself is 
more demanding than the processing of single stimuli. However, as argued above, of 
crucial interest is not the processing of the target statements, but their endorsement in 
line with personal beliefs. Therefore, of crucial interest is whether or not the 
endorsement of a statement, once it is processed, is unaffected by cognitive load. Also 
note that it is possible that RRT effects increase given cognitive load. This is explainable 
due to the impact of cognitive load on the responding on incongruent trials (i.e., when 
the response rule is incongruent to the personal belief). It is likely that responding on 
such trials is influenced by cognitive load, in that it increases the task difficulty. This, 
however, also does not directly concern the process in question. Therefore, if RRT effects 
do not decrease in size given cognitive load, the endorsement of statements can be 
regarded as being automatic in the sense that they are independent on the availability of 
processing resources. 
Third, when considering uncontrollability, the influence of two types of goals has to 
be considered, the goal to engage in the process, and the goal to stop, alter, or avoid the 
processing. With respect to the latter, studies on faking implicit measures are most 
informative (e.g., Degner, 2009; Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Teige-Mocigemba & 
Klauer, 2013). In such studies it is tested whether implicit measures are affected by the 
participants’ knowledge about how the tasks work. Similar to the study of McKenna, 
Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes (2007), who investigated faking IRAP effects, 
participants in a RRT faking study could be instructed to either cheat on the RRT, or, more 
specifically, to respond slower on congruent than on incongruent test blocks. If RRT 
effects are unaffected by such faking instructions, their occurrence can be considered 
independent of the goal to stop, alter, or avoid the personal endorsement of the 
statements. Interestingly, McKenna et al. (2007) found that IRAP effects were unaffected 
by faking instructions. Specifically, they asked three groups of participants to complete 
an IRAP task two times. After the first completion, each group of participants was 
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instructed differently. One group was instructed to fake by responding slower on 
congruent test blocks. A second group was simply told to cheat on the task, without 
providing any information on how to cheat. The control group was not given any 
instructions. Crucially, no differences in the outcome were found between groups, 
indicating that participants were unable to cheat. However, whether the same is true for 
the RRT has to be tested empirically. Also, consider the second type of goal mentioned 
above, namely to engage in the personal endorsement of the stimuli of the RRT. Crucially, 
participants are not asked to express their personal beliefs. They are, however, asked to 
act as if they endorse a certain belief in one block of trials, and to act as if they do not 
endorse that belief in a second block of trials. Consequentially, in one of the two task-
conditions, personal belief and instructed belief coincide. It is therefore hard to exclude 
the possibility that participants recode the task and simply respond in accordance with 
their personal belief on those trials on which instructed and personal beliefs coincide. It 
is furthermore imaginable that participants actively responded in contrast to their 
personal belief on trials on which their personal belief differed from the instructed task 
rule. Hence, at present, it is difficult to make strong claims about whether or not the 
endorsement of propositions is automatic in the sense of being valid in the absence of 
the intention to express the belief. Future work could examine this issue by determining 
the strategies that participants use while completing an RRT. Also, to investigate whether 
the goal to endorse statements is necessary for the occurrence of RRT effects, one could 
deploy a task in which participants are not required to endorse the statements in any 
way as part of the task rules. Consider, for instance, a task in which participants are 
presented with grammatically correct and incorrect statements that are either believed 
to be true or false. The words ‘true’ or ‘false’ are presented above and below the 
statements (e.g., Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014). Participants are asked to 
indicate whether or not the statement is grammatically correct. Imagine that the 
categorization of personally endorsed statements is faster when these are flanked by the 
word true as compared to when they are flanked by the word false, and vice versa for 
personally rejected statements. The finding of such a systematic impact of the irrelevant 
flanker would be explainable by the conceptual overlap of the endorsement/rejection of 
the statement and the meaning of the flanker. The finding would therefore indicate that 
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participants automatically endorse or reject the statements while processing them, even 
if they an endorsement of statements (in any way) is not demanded by the task.  
Last, being unconscious of a process comprises of being unaware of the input (i.e., 
the statements), the output (i.e., the personal belief), or the process itself (i.e., the 
automatic endorsement of the personal belief and its influence on target 
categorizations). It seems obvious that participants are aware of the experimental 
stimuli, as they are both task-relevant and clearly visible. Moreover, oral feedback of 
participants who completed the studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that 
participants can also be aware of the to-be-measured belief (i.e., racist beliefs and body 
image). Also, multiple students stated that responding in one condition was harder than 
in the other condition, based on their personal beliefs. However, a systematic 
investigation of these assumptions could shed more light on this issue.  
On the basis of the above discussion of the nature of the endorsement of 
propositional statements and the conditions under which it can operate, it can be 
concluded that the endorsement of propositions is a propositional process which 
operates automatically at least with regard to one feature of automaticity. The 
observation of meaningful RRT effects in the presented experiments implies that 
propositions can be endorsed in a fast and, potentially, unintentional manner.2 The 
findings substantiated the claim that the RRT can be used as tools to capture beliefs at 
the implicit level. As pointed out, more research is necessary to strengthen this claim with 
regard to other features of automaticity. 
Conclusion 
As discussed in detail above, the observations of automatic relational processing and 
automatic endorsement of propositions have to be regarded as instances of automatic 
propositional processing. The findings presented in this dissertation are difficult to 
reconcile with the central assumption of dual-process models of cognition that all 
                                                 
2 Note, however, that this does not mean that the automatic endorsement of propositional knowledge is 
restricted to occur under this set of automaticity features. This will be discussed in detail in a subsequent 
section of this Chapter. 
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automatic processing must rely on associative processes (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006). 
In light of the presented findings, the idea of two distinct modes of processing that are 
strictly separated along the lines of automaticity has to be discarded in favor of the idea 
that propositional processes can occur under conditions of automaticity. Nevertheless, it 
seems intuitively plausible that the presence or absence of different automaticity 
conditions can impact the degree of complexity of propositional processing. This idea is 
elaborated upon in the next section. The chapter will be concluded with a discussion of 
theoretical and practical implications and open questions of automatic propositional 
processing. 
IMPLICATIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
On the complexity of automatic propositional processing 
The assumption of dual-process models of cognition that automatic stimulus 
processing must be driven by associative processes limited the scope of automatic 
processing dramatically. As soon as a process was seen to be capable of occurring 
automatically, it had to be explained in associative terms (e.g., the processing of the 
valence of a stimulus as the automatic spread of activation from the stimulus concept to 
a valence node, see Fazio, 2001). The findings presented in this dissertation show, 
however, that this structural restriction is no longer tenable. As argued above, it seems 
sensible to consider the complexity of propositional processing to be determined by the 
automaticity conditions under which it operates. This assumption will be discussed with 
regard to the two types of automatic propositional processing investigated in this 
dissertation, i.e., automatic relational processing and automatic endorsement of 
propositions. 
Automatic relational processing in the sequential priming task can be seen as an 
automatic construction of propositional knowledge about two concepts (i.e., the prime 
object and the reference object) and their relation (i.e., bigger or smaller) in the way that 
is consistent with the belief about how these concepts are related (e.g., the prime object 
‘bike’ is smaller than the reference object ‘car’). Does the finding of relational priming 
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effects in Chapter 2 allow for the conclusion that all types of comparative judgments 
regarding features of a prime stimulus and a reference stimulus can occur under the 
conditions of automaticity determined by the priming task? To answer this question, 
consider a number of priming studies conducted during the course of my PhD research 
that did not yield publishable results (see Appendix A, Experiments 4 to 6). The relational 
priming effects obtained in the size-judgment priming tasks of Chapter 2 allowed for 
inferences about the participants’ beliefs about the relative size of physical objects. 
Experiments 4 to 6 of Appendix A were conducted to see whether it is possible to also 
assess psychologically more relevant beliefs in this way. In Experiment 5, I focused on 
beliefs about how people saw themselves (actual-self) and how they desired to be (ideal-
self). Prime and target set comprised of adjectives of personality attributes (e.g., 
responsible, selfish, lazy, funny). In one task, participants were asked to categorize 
targets as being self-descriptive or not (i.e., actual-self priming task). In the second task, 
participants were asked to categorize targets as being desirable or not (ideal-self priming 
task). Prime stimuli were expected to influence target categorization based on their self-
descriptiveness and desirability in the two tasks, respectively. Within the actual-self 
priming task, prime adjectives that were descriptive of the participant were expected to 
facilitate responses towards self-descriptive target adjectives as compared to non-
descriptive target adjectives. Non-descriptive prime adjectives in contrast were expected 
to facilitate responses towards non-descriptive target adjectives as compared to self-
descriptive target adjectives. Desirable and non-desirable prime stimuli were expected 
to affect the judgments in the ideal-self priming task in the same way. Crucially, for each 
individual participant, the prime set was chosen to contain adjectives that were 
descriptive but undesired (e.g., lazy) or desired but not descriptive (e.g., funny). Similar 
to the medium-sized objects that were used as primes in the experiments of Chapter 2, 
these adjectives were expected to influence target categorization differently between 
tasks. For example, imagine a person that rated the attribute ‘responsible’ as highly 
descriptive and desirable, ‘selfish’ as both non-descriptive and undesirable, and ‘lazy’ as 
descriptive but undesirable. When categorizing targets on the basis of self-
descriptiveness, the prime ‘lazy’ was expected to facilitate responses towards the 
descriptive target adjective ‘responsible’ as compared to non-descriptive target adjective 
‘selfish’. In contrast, when targets were categorized on the basis of desirability, the same 
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prime ‘lazy’ was expected to facilitate the categorization of the undesired target adjective 
‘selfish’ as compared to the desired target adjective ‘responsible’. Priming effects would 
therefore be indicative of the participants’ beliefs regarding their actual and ideal self. 
However, no such priming effects were observed in Experiment 5, or in the similar 
Experiments 4 and 6. 
The absence of priming effects in these experiments indicates that processing prime 
stimuli in accordance with actual- and ideal-self beliefs did not result in the construction 
of propositional knowledge. However, given the same conditions of automaticity, the 
processing of prime stimuli in accordance with beliefs about their relative size resulted in 
the construction of propositional knowledge. It therefore has to be argued that whether 
stimuli are relationally processed is dependent on the type of comparative judgment and 
the task-relevant features of a prime stimulus and a reference stimulus. This intuitively 
makes sense if one considers the two types of judgments that were focused upon. The 
size of physical objects is factual independent of the context, whereas judgments about 
the descriptiveness or desirability of a personality attribute are clearly context-
dependent. For instance, whether someone considers him or herself as lazy depends on 
the knowledge that is used to make that judgment. Even the most lazy person can think 
of instances in which the opposite is true (i.e., in which he/she is not lazy; e.g., with 
respect to regular physical activity). The ease of a judgment relies on the knowledge that 
is called upon. If that knowledge is ambiguous, the judgment should be harder as 
compared to when it is unambiguous (e.g., judgments of size). 
The findings in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that the RRT, in contrast to the sequential 
priming task, allows for the automatic processing of stimuli with regard to personal, 
potentially ambiguous, beliefs. One could argue that this is due to the fact that processing 
in the RRT and the priming task differ with regard to the degree of processing 
automaticity. As discussed above, propositional processing in the priming task operates 
under at least three features of automaticity, whereas propositional processing in the 
RRT can be considered automatic only with respect to speed and, potentially, 
intentionality. Such reasoning would, however, disregard the fact that the automatic 
propositional processing differs between the two tasks. As indicated above, automatic 
processing in the priming tasks consists of the construction of propositional knowledge 
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in line with the personal belief. Automatic processing in the RRT is, in contrast, restricted 
to the evaluation of propositions as being true or false (i.e., endorsement or rejection of 
propositions). The discrepancy in the findings in the size-judgment task of Chapter 2 and 
the actual- and ideal-self judgment tasks of Appendix A therefore only indicates that the 
construction of propositional knowledge is not unconditionally possible given the set of 
automaticity features uphold by the specific priming task, but, as agued above, instead 
depends on the specific judgment and stimulus material. It cannot, however, be argued 
that an automatic endorsement of ambiguous propositional knowledge can only operate 
under the less stringent automaticity conditions uphold by the RRT. Rather, it has to be 
tested whether the automatic processing that occurs in the RRT can also operate given 
stricter conditions of automaticity. Specifically, it has to be tested whether the automatic 
endorsement of statements is also possible given the automaticity conditions of the 
priming paradigm. Imagine, for instance, a priming task, in which the stimuli “I want to 
be” or “I am” are presented as cue on trial offset. The cue is followed by personality 
attributes as prime and target words (e.g., lazy, funny). Participants are asked to 
categorize targets with regard to the cues as being true or false. Crucially, in such a task, 
one can assume that the stimulus compounds (i.e., cue and target, and cue and prime, 
respectively) can be processed as readily constructed propositions. Given the 
unintentional misapplication of the categorization task to be cue-prime-compound, an 
automatic endorsement or rejection of the statement is imaginable. If this is observed, 
that is, if target categorization is systematically influenced by the personal beliefs about 
the truthfulness of the proposition formed by prime and cue, it would suggest that the 
endorsement of propositions can also occur under the stricter set of automaticity 
conditions of the priming task. 
To summarize, the findings that automatic processes can be propositional in nature 
led to the question how the complexity of a propositional process should be best defined. 
With regard to the two processes investigated in this dissertation, it was argued that a 
critical assessment of the complexity of a process is possible only by reflecting the set of 
automaticity features under which that process can operate. These seem to be 
determined by the properties of the specific experimental procedure that is used to 
investigate the process (e.g., stimulus set, task, time-course). Crucially, knowing under 
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which automaticity features a process can or cannot operate is important when 
hypothesizing about its influence on behavior. Implicit measures are regarded as 
laboratory equivalents of automatic stimulus processing in real life. Predictions about 
real-life behavior with implicit measures therefore heavily rely on knowing of the 
automaticity conditions under which specific processes occur in a specific real-life setting 
to be capable of deploying an implicit measure that fits these automaticity conditions. 
Propositional vs. associative implicit measures 
Traditional associative implicit measures, like the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the evaluative priming task (Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995) were designed to capture the extent to which certain concepts 
are related in memory (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). They can be used to 
capture the extent to which a certain class of stimuli (e.g., blacks) is related with a positive 
or negative valence. Crucially, however, associative implicit measures do not generally 
restrict the way in which stimuli are related to one another. Propositional implicit 
measures, like the RRT and the IRAP, in contrast restrict stimulus processing. 
Consequentially, these measures always probe specific cognitions rather than an 
unspecific relatedness. This is of importance, as in many cases the precise way in which 
concepts are processed is of crucial interest. 
Consider, for instance, the findings of De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, and De Houwer 
(2006). They observed that a group of depressed patients and a non-depressed control 
group did not differ in their scores of implicit self-esteem as measured with a standard 
self-esteem IAT. However, explicit measures clearly indicated that depressed patients 
possessed a significantly lower level of self-esteem as compared to the non-depressed 
control group. Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, and De Raedt (2013; 
see also Remue, Hughes, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2014) provided a lucid explanation for 
this puzzling finding by arguing that depressed people differ from non-depressed people 
in the way in which they automatically process information. Using two IRAPs, they 
showed that dysphoric students had lower scores on an IRAP designed to capture the 
belief “I am good” than on an IRAP designed to capture the belief “I want to be good” 
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whereas non-dysphoric students showed the reversed pattern. Remue et al. (2013) 
argued that the positive scores of the self-esteem IAT might reflect different types of 
processing of the stimuli for the two groups of participants. They proposed that positive 
scores of the self-esteem IAT might reflect processing of the attitude stimuli in line with 
their positive actual self-esteem for non-dysphoric students, whereas the same positive 
score reflected stimulus processing in line with a positive ideal self-esteem for dysphoric 
participants.  
The work by Remue et al. (2013) underscore the benefits of using implicit measures 
that are sensitive to how concepts are related to another. This need for a higher 
specificity in implicit measures is also reflected in the development of multiple 
“propositionalized” variants of the IAT. In the personalized IAT (pIAT) of Olson and Fazio 
(2004; see also Dewitte & De Houwer, 2008), participants are asked to classify attribute 
stimuli as instances of the categories “I like” or “I dislike” instead of as instances of the 
categories “pleasant” or “unpleasant” used in the standard IAT of Greenwald et al. 
(1998). As argued by Olson and Fazio (2004) IAT scores reflected the participants’ 
personal rather than normative, societally shared evaluations. Yoshida, Peach, Zanna, 
and Spencer (2012), in contrast, used the attribute category labels “most people like” and 
“most people do not like” to focus stimulus processing to societally shared knowledge 
rather than personal evaluations. In each case, the reasoning behind the change in 
categories of the IAT was driven the assumption that specific knowledge (e.g., the 
personal rather than the societal evaluation of an out-group) is related to specific 
behavior (e.g., discriminative behavior against an out-group). Crucially, as these instances 
of the IAT require the processing of stimuli in a specific relation (e.g., with regard to 
personal beliefs), they can be seen as propositional implicit measures. 
To summarize, implicit measures are used by psychologists who are interested in 
measuring cognitions (e.g., attitudes, beliefs) to understand, control, and predict human 
behavior. The more stringently an implicit measure restricts stimulus processing to 
specific relational information, the more precise the measurement outcome should 
reflect a specific cognition. The prediction of automatic behavior, being based on specific 
cognitions, should therefore be predicted best with propositional implicit measures that 
restrict stimulus processing accordingly. If, for instance, racist behavior is mainly guided 
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by personal beliefs about an out-group, the implicit measurement procedure that 
assesses these specific beliefs should best predict automatic racist behavior. If stimulus 
processing is not restricted, the interpretation of implicit measures is prone to 
unwarranted assumptions about how participants process the experimental stimuli. As 
these assumptions could be wrong, such implicit measures should in general be less 
predictive of behavior than propositional implicit measures that restrict stimulus 
processing to mirror stimulus processing in real life. 
Further benefits and potential restrictions of propositional implicit measures 
Since their introduction two decades ago, implicit measures have gained enormous 
popularity as a means to indirectly assess cognitions and predict behavior. As argued by 
Fazio and Olson (2003), implicit measures are suited to predict behavior particularly in 
situations in which people are not motivated or capable of controlling the impact of their 
cognitions on behavior. Implicit measures have therefore been used intensively in clinical 
addiction research (e.g., Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Teachman, Cody, & Clerkin, 2010; Wiers, 
Houben, Roefs, De Jong, Peter, & Etchison, 2010; Wiers, Van Woerden, Smulders, & De 
Jong, 2002), and research on racial stereotypes and racist behavior (e.g., Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 
2001). In such instances, implicit and explicit measures can be expected to diverge, as 
explicit measures are likely to be influenced by the motivation to correct responses to 
match social acceptance (e.g., Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Greenwald & Nosek, 2008; Petty, 
Fazio, & Briñol, 2008). Accordingly, the use of implicit measures should be most beneficial 
in such instances. When people, in contrast, are willing and capable of reporting their 
beliefs, implicit and explicit measures converge. The finding that both automatic and non-
automatic processing relies on the same propositional representations implies that under 
these circumstances, propositional implicit measures should highly correlate with explicit 
measures of the same belief. This allows to test the accuracy of implicit measures. 
Consider, for instance, the assessment of actual and ideal body image with the RRT in 
Chapter 5. It was found the RRT scores of actual and ideal body image, but also the 
aggregated scores of the explicit ratings of the RRT statements, were valid indicators of 
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the degree to which participants were satisfied with their body. Such a finding was 
expected, as students in the anonymous setting of an experiment were expected to 
report their true beliefs in the explicit ratings. In other words, the fact that implicit and 
explicit measures predicted body dissatisfaction speaks for the accuracy of the RRTs. 
However, as argued in Chapters 3 and 5, there are good reasons to suspect that in applied 
research contexts, implicit and explicit measures of body image converge. Patients that 
suffer from eating disorder might for instance be inclined to fake on explicit measures of 
ideal and actual body image because of therapeutic consequences like compulsory 
admission. In such settings, explicit measures should consequentially be less informative 
than implicit ones that focus on the same beliefs. 
A remaining question with regard to the versatility of the RRT is whether it can also 
be used to measure multiple beliefs at once. Questionnaires allow assessing multiple 
facets of a belief, and even qualitatively different beliefs. Each item of a questionnaire is 
rated independently on the level of agreement with that statements or question. The 
RRTs presented in Chapters 4 and 5, in contrast, assessed only one specific belief each. 
However, it is easily imaginable to adjust the RRT to assess multiple facets of a belief or 
even qualitatively different beliefs. For that, target statements have to be used that 
reflect these different beliefs, and the response rules have to be adjusted to apply to all 
beliefs under consideration. Consider, for instance, the assessment of alcohol-related 
expectancies, i.e., beliefs that alcohol consumption will serve a certain function or result 
in a specific desirable consequence. The Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire (AEQ; Brown, 
Christiansen, & Goldman, 1987) focuses on multiple such expectancies at once (e.g., 
general positive or negative affect, relaxation and tension reduction, cognitive and motor 
impairment, sexual enhancement; for a more comprehensive list of factors, see Brown 
et al., 1987, Chart 1). Sample items of the factor sexual enhancement are, for instance, 
“alcohol makes sexual experiences easier and more enjoyable” and “I often feel sexier 
after I've had a few drinks”. Sample items of the factor relaxation and tension reduction 
are, for instance, “alcohol decreases muscular tension” “alcohol makes me worry less“. 
Crucially, these items, or abbreviated versions of them, could be used as target 
statements in an alcohol-expectancy RRT that addresses multiple different types of 
alcohol-related expectancies. Crucially, the overarching response rules would have to be 
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adapted to apply to all types of expectancies that are considered within the RRT (e.g., 
“respond as if you believe that alcohol has positive effects”). Separate RRT scores for 
each type of target statement (e.g., beliefs about sexual enhancement) can be calculated 
by using only the subset of trials on which statements regarding that belief were 
presented. The main restriction of the RRT in assessing multiple beliefs therefore seems 
to be the phrasing of response rules so that they apply to all beliefs under consideration. 
This should become increasingly difficult with the number of different beliefs included in 
one RRT. 
To summarize, it was argued that based on the finding that propositions, rather than 
associations, underlie automatic processing, implicit measurement procedures should be 
capable of assessing the same beliefs as explicit measures. This, however, is only possible 
if stimulus processing in implicit measurement procedures is restricted. Otherwise, 
uncertainty remains about what specific belief was accessed. If a person lacks motivation 
or introspection, explicit measures become unreliable, whereas propositional implicit 
measures are expected to remain credible indicators of beliefs. Further, propositional 
implicit measurement procedures like the RRT are theoretically capable of assessing 
multiple beliefs within one task, as long as the response rules are phrased in a way that 
they are applicable to all beliefs under consideration. 
FINAL CONCLUSION 
The research presented and discussed in my dissertation provides supporting 
evidence for the assumption that, in line with single-process propositional accounts of 
cognition,  human behavior is guided by propositional processes (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; 
Mitchell et al., 2009). Conversely, the reported findings seems difficult to reconcile (at 
least in a parsimonious manner) with classic dual-process models of cognition (for an 
overview, see De Houwer, 2014). In any event, the present studies clearly show that 
automatic stimulus processing can be much more complex than previously assumed.  
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ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
OVERVIEW 
Research that was conducted during the course of my PhD that did not yield 
publishable results was not included in the main body of this thesis. However, in order 
for this dissertation to be a comprehensive reflection of my work, these experiments 
are briefly summarized in the following sections. Experiments 1 and 2 constitute the 
first two instances in which task-misapplication was investigated, the mechanism by 
which automatic (relational) stimulus processing is thought to take place in the 
sequential priming paradigm (cp. Chapter 2). Experiment 3 constitutes an unsuccessful 
attempt to replicate the observation of relational priming effects of Chapter 2 with 
different task and stimulus material. Experiments 4 to 6 are three priming experiments 
that focused on the implicit measurement of self-relevant beliefs. Experiment 7 
constitutes a successful proof of principle experiment of the Relational Responding Task 
preceding the experiments presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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TASK MISAPPLICATION 
In Chapter 2 the mechanism of task misapplication (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Van 
Opstal, Gevers, Osman, & Verguts, 2010) was investigated as a means by which priming 
effects can be explained as resulting from the automatic construction of propositional 
knowledge about the prime stimuli rather than the activation of knowledge associated 
to the prime stimuli. The mechanism of task misapplication essentially constitutes of 
the  unintended misapplication of the target task to the primes, resulting in the 
processing of the primes in line with the target task. 
Experiment 1 
In a first priming experiment, stimuli were words that differed on two semantic 
features, namely their evaluative tone (i.e., being either positive or negative) and their 
liveliness (i.e., denoting either a person or an object). The stimulus material (e.g., friend, 
thief, present, gun) was taken from the study of Spruyt, De Houwer, and Hermans 
(2009). Prime and target stimuli were presented in blue or orange color on different 
trials of the experiment. Seventy-two participants were asked to respond to the targets 
on the basis of their liveliness when they were presented in blue. When targets where 
presented in orange, participants were asked to respond to the targets on the basis of 
their evaluative valence. The color of the prime of each trial either matched or 
mismatched the color of the target. 
Based on the assumption that participants would automatically misapply the target 
task to the primes, a semantic priming effect was expected on trials on which prime and 
target were both presented in blue. Similarly, an evaluative priming effect was expected 
on trials on which prime and target were both presented in orange. In contrast, on trials 
of a color mismatch between prime and target no priming effects were expected to 
arise due to the absence of a pattern between the responses indicated by primes and 
targets (i.e., as primes should be processed on the basis of their liveliness when targets 
had to be categorized on the basis of their evaluative tone, or vice versa). However, 
neither a semantic priming effect was found on trials on which stimuli were presented 
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in blue, F < 1, nor a evaluative priming effect on trials on which stimuli were presented 
in orange, F < 1. 
Experiment 2 
One possible explanation for the absence of priming effects in Experiment 1 was 
that participants did not process primes in accordance with any task, as the target task 
was indicated by the color of the target, and thus known to the participant only after 
the presentation of the prime. Consequentially, task misapplication at the point of 
prime presentation was unlikely. Moreover, response latencies to the targets were 
rather long (i.e., about 1000 ms), possibly indicating that participants only at the time of 
the target presentation chose which task to apply. To increase the likelihood of a 
misapplication of the target task to the primes, in this study the point in time at which 
participants were informed about the relevant task on each trial was antedated to the 
trial onset. Using the same stimulus material as in the previous experiment, 37 
participants were asked to categorize targets on either their feature of evaluative tone 
or liveliness depending on a cue that was presented on trial onset. However, no priming 
effects were obtained with this setup either. Neither a significant semantic priming 
effect was found on trials on which stimuli were presented in blue, F < 1, nor was a 
significant evaluative priming effect found on trials on which stimuli were presented in 
orange, F < 1. 
RELATIVE EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS 
Experiment 3 
Analogous to the size-judgment priming task, participants in this experiment ( N = 
46 ) were asked to categorize words (i.e., names of animals; taken from Moors et al., 
2013) as positive or negative in relation to one of two reference animals presented on 
trial onset. Stimuli were chosen based on rating norms as belonging to one of the three 
groups ‘positive’ ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’). The two reference animals were slightly 
positive (but to a lesser extent than the stimuli of the positive group; i.e., a swan), and 
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slightly negative (but to a lesser extent than the stimuli of the negative group; i.e., a 
mosquito). On trials on which targets were compared to the slightly negative reference 
object mosquito, primes of the neutral stimulus group were expected to facilitate the 
categorization of positive targets as compared to negative targets. When targets were 
compared to the slightly positive reference object swan, neutral primes were expected 
to facilitate the categorization of negative targets as compared to positive targets. 
However, on critical trials (i.e., when primes belonged to the group of neutrally 
valenced animals), the crucial interaction indicating a relational priming effect was not 
significant, F < 1.  
ASSESSING IMPLICIT BELIEFS WITH THE PRIMING TASK 
In Chapter 3 I presented results obtained with two Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedures (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Specifically, it was demonstrated that 
beliefs about actual and ideal body image can be assessed. Crucially, beliefs reflecting 
both constructs differed in how the inherent concepts self and body size were related to 
each other. The actual body image can be represented by beliefs that relate self and 
body size descriptively (e.g., I am thin). Beliefs reflecting the ideal body image, in 
contrasts, are characterized by a relation of desirability (e.g., I want to be thin). In 
following three experiments the descriptive and desirability relation were assessed 
using the sequential priming paradigm. 
Experiment 4 
In a first experiment, 34 participants were asked to categorize target words as being 
self-descriptive (response options: ‘am’ and ‘am not’) or desirable for them (response 
options: ‘want to be’ and ‘don’t want to be’) in two successive priming tasks. Primes 
were adjectives (e.g., responsible, reliable, intelligent, heartless, stupid, selfish, lazy, 
funny) and chosen individually based on explicit ratings of descriptiveness and 
desirability prior to the priming task. Targets in the descriptive priming task were five 
words that were descriptive (i.e., student, Belgian, female, young) and non-descriptive 
(i.e., lawyer, Dutch, male, old) of the participant, respectively. Accordingly, targets in 
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the desirability priming task were five words that were desirable (i.e., psychologist, rich, 
healthy, respected) or undesirable (i.e., Soldier, dead, sick, lonely) for the participant.  
Different patterns of priming effects were expected in the two priming tasks. 
Crucially, primes that differed in their descriptiveness and desirability should facilitate 
agreeing responses (i.e., ‘am’ or ‘want to be’) as compared to denying responses (i.e., 
‘am not’ or ‘don’t want to be’) in one task, and vice versa in the other task. For instance, 
the self-descriptive but undesirable adjective ‘lazy’ was expected to facilitate the 
categorization of descriptive target words (e.g., female) relative to non-descriptive 
target words (e.g., male) in the descriptive priming task, and to facilitate the 
categorization of undesirable target words (e.g., sick) relative to desirable target words 
(e.g., rich) in the desirable priming task. Such a finding would have indicated that 
primes can be processed in accordance with the (misapplied) target categorization task. 
However, no significant priming effects were found within the tasks, F < 1, for the 
interaction of the descriptiveness of primes and targets in the descriptive priming task, 
and F(1, 27) = 1.45, p = .238, ηρ2 = .05, for the desirability of primes and targets in the 
desirability priming task. 
Experiment 5 
This experiment was conducted to exclude the possibility that the absence of 
priming effects was due to the fact that prime and target set of in the previous 
experiment differed too strongly to allow for a misapplication of the task. Therefore, in 
this experiment both the prime and the target set exclusively contained attitude 
adjectives (e.g., responsible, reliable, intelligent, heartless, stupid, selfish, lazy, funny). 
These were again chosen individually for each participant based on prior explicit ratings 
of their descriptiveness and desirability.  Identical to the previous experiment, 
participants ( N = 43 ) were asked to categorize target words as being self-descriptive 
(response options: ‘am’ and ‘am not’) or desirable (response options: ‘want to be’ and 
‘don’t want to be’) in the two consecutive priming tasks. However, again no significant 
priming effects were found. Neither the interaction of prime and target descriptiveness 
in the descriptive priming task, nor the interaction of prime and target desirability in the 
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desirability priming task yielded significant results, F < 1, and F(1, 41) = 3.34, p = .075, 
ηρ2 = .08, respectively. Moreover, explicit ratings of the descriptiveness and desirability 
of the primes taken after the priming task did not correspond well with the ratings of 
the stimuli taken prior to the priming task. This finding suggested that participants were 
unable to consistently rate adjectives as descriptive and desirable.  
Experiment 6 
Thus, in our third attempt, I restrained from manipulating the stimulus material in 
order to receive stimuli that differed in their relation of descriptiveness and desirability. 
Instead I relied on groups of people that possessed specific but differing beliefs about 
related constructs, namely beliefs about actual and ideal body image. After the 
successful dissociation of these beliefs with the IRAP (Chapter 3), I aimed at capturing 
them with two priming tasks focusing on the descriptive and desirable relation between 
self and body size. 
In two priming tasks, prime words were exemplars of the two categories thin and 
overweight. Target words of the actual body image priming task were descriptive and 
non-descriptive of the participants (i.e., ‘student’, ‘female’, ‘young’, ‘lawyer’, ‘male’, 
‘old’). Targets of the ideal body image priming task descriptive of the participants 
desired or undesired future selves (i.e., ‘successful’, ‘rich’, ‘psychologist’, ‘sick’, ‘poor’, 
‘soldier’).  Sixty-three body satisfied and body dissatisfied participants were asked to 
categorize targets as being descriptive or desirable of their selves in two priming tasks. 
Prime words in both tasks were expected to influence responses towards the target 
stimuli depending on the participants’ implicit beliefs about their actual and ideal body 
image. Specifically, for participants that believed to be thin (i.e., that possessed a thin 
actual body image) I expected primes of the category thin to facilitate the 
categorization of descriptive target words relative to non-descriptive target words. For 
participants that believed not to be thin (i.e., that possessed an overweight actual body 
image) I expected primes of the category overweight to facilitate the categorization of 
descriptive target words relative to non-descriptive target words. Moreover, for these 
participants I expected a reversed pattern in the ideal body image priming task. 
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Specifically, for participants that desired to be thin (i.e., possessing a thin ideal body 
image) I expected primes of the category thin to facilitate the categorization of desired 
target words relative to the categorization of undesired target words. 
A significant overall priming effect of 8 ms was found in the desirability priming task, 
F(1, 60) = 4.74, p = .033, ηρ2 = .07, indicating faster responses to desirable target words 
when preceded by primes of the category thin as compared to primes of the category 
overweight, and faster responses to non-desirable target words when preceded by 
primes of the category overweight as compared to primes of the category thin. This 
interaction, however, did not differ significantly between participants with high and low 
body dissatisfaction, F(1, 59) = 2.45, p = .123, ηρ2 = .04. No priming effects were found 
for the descriptive priming task, F < 1. 
Despite the fact that people high and low in body dissatisfaction differ in their 
believes about their actual and ideal body image (cp. Chapter 3), I was unable to 
capture these differences with the priming task. This led to the assumption that the 
priming task as an irrelevant feature task might have been not sensitive enough for the 
measurement of implicit beliefs about the self (cp. Discussion in Chapter 6).  
PROOF OF PRINCIPLE OF THE RELATIONAL RESPONDING TASK 
Experiment 7 
Prior to the successful demonstration of the Relational Responding Task (RRT) in 
Chapter 4, a proof of principle experiment of the RRT with 65 participants was 
conducted, using statements that contained a relation of size (i.e., smaller than, larger 
than) and were either objectively true or false (e.g., ‘an apple is smaller than a boat’, ‘a 
banana is larger than a car’). Scores of the RRT were expected to indicate an implicit 
belief of objectively true statements and a disbelief of objectively false statements. 
Furthermore, it was tested whether scores of the RRT were independent of the order of 
consistent blocks (i.e., responding in line with the objective truth of statements) and 
inconsistent  blocks (i.e., responding in contrast to the the objective truth of 
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statements). Reassuringly, no effects of order was found, all F < 1. Most crucially, the 
average RRT score of 0.25 was sign. larger than zero, t(64) = 4.41, p < .001, indicating 
faster responses to the statements in line with the rule that stated objective truth (i.e., 
“respond as if you believe that fruits are smaller than vehicles”). 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
Het onderzoek dat in deze dissertatie wordt voorgesteld is gebaseerd op de 
assumptie dat propositionele processen automatisch gedrag (kunnen) aansturen, een 
hypothese die centraal staat binnen zgn. propositionele één-proces modellen van 
cognitie (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Deze 
modellen contrasteren sterk met (de meer gangbare) twee-proces modellen van 
cognitie die vooropstellen dat automatisch gedrag wordt aangestuurd door associatieve 
processen (bv., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Twee-proces 
modellen veronderstellen twee manieren van informatieverwerking die respectievelijk 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor automatisch en niet-automatisch gedrag. Automatisch 
gedrag zou aangestuurd worden door associatieve processen, i.e.., de automatische 
activatie van associaties tussen concepten binnen een associatief netwerk. Niet-
automatisch gedrag, daarentegen, wordt verondersteld te worden aangestuurd door 
propositionele processen. De complexiteit van informatie in het propositioneel systeem 
verschilt van de informatie opgeslagen in het associatieve systeem. In tegenstelling tot 
associaties omvatten proposities gekwalificeerde relaties tussen concepten die 
gekenmerkt worden door een (subjectief of objectief) waarheidsgehalte. In Hoofdstuk 2 
onderzoek ik het idee dat propositionele representaties (i.e., informationele eenheden 
die informatie bevatten over hoe concepten gerelateerd zijn; zie De Houwer, 2009, 
2014) kunnen ontstaan onder automaticiteitscondities. In vier sequentiële 
primingstudies (bv., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) werden deelnemers 
gevraagd om de fysieke grootte van een reeks targetobjecten te beoordelen, relatief 
ten opzichte van een eerder klein (i.e., een voetbal) of eerder groot (i.e., een auto) 
referentieobject. De set van cruciale primes bestond uit objecten die groter waren dan 
de kleine referentieobjecten maar kleiner dan de grote referentieobjecten (bv., een 
fiets). Resultaten toonden aan dat de impact van deze cruciale primes op de snelheid 
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waarmee een target kon gecategoriseerd worden afhankelijk was van de grootte van 
het referentieobject. Deze interactie, ook wel het relationeel primingeffect genoemd, 
toont aan dat deelnemers de grootte van de primes verwerkten in relatie tot de grootte 
van het referentieobject. Aangezien dit effect tot stand kwam onder 
automaticiteitscondities bieden deze studies bovendien steun voor de idee dat 
propositionele informatieverwerking kan plaatsvinden onder automaticiteitscondities. 
Een tweede onderzoekslijn was gebaseerd op de hypothese dat de verwerking van 
propositionele informatie hand in hand gaat met de automatische evaluatie van deze 
informatie als waar of vals. Indien deze hypothese juist is, dan zou het in principe 
mogelijk moeten zijn om een indirecte meetprocedure te ontwikkelen die toelaat om 
indirecte overtuigingen (‘beliefs’) te capteren (i.e., proposities die spontaan 
geëvalueerd worden als waar door een bepaald individu). Het psychologisch construct 
van lichaamsontevredenheid heeft een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij het testen van deze 
assumptie. Lichaamsontevredenheid kan gezien worden als een negatieve attitude ten 
opzichte van het eigen lichaam die ontstaat wanneer men een discrepantie ervaart 
tussen het eigenlijke fysieke voorkomen (d.i., het actuele lichaamsbeeld) en 
geïnternaliseerde idealen over fysieke aantrekkelijkheid (d.i., het ideale lichaamsbeeld, 
b.v., Cash, 1989). Beide constructen, het actuele en het ideale lichaamsbeeld, zijn zeer 
gelijkend met uitzondering van de manier waarop de concepten zelf en lichaamsgrootte 
gerelateerd zijn. Proposities over het actuele lichaamsbeeld worden gedefinieerd door 
een beschrijvende relatie tussen het zelf en lichaamsgrootte (bv., ik ben dun). 
Proposities over het ideale lichaamsbeeld worden gedefinieerd in termen van 
wenselijkheid (bv. Ik wil dunner zijn). In Hoofdstuk 3 werden impliciete overtuigingen 
over actueel en ideaal lichaamsbeeld gecapteerd met twee versies van de zgn. Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). In Hoofdstuk 4 
beschrijf ik de ontwikkeling en validatie van de zgn. Relational Responding Task (RRT). 
De RRT is een reactietijdtaak die werd ontworpen op basis van de premisse dat 
propositionele informatie, indien verwerkt, automatisch wordt geëvalueerd als waar of 
vals op een manier die in overeenstemming is met iemands persoonlijke overtuiging. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 werd de RRT getest in de context van racistische overtuigingen. 
Deelnemers werden, in de twee verschillende condities van de RRT, gevraagd om te 
reageren op verschillende statements (bv. “Vlaamse personen zijn intelligenter dan 
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immigranten”) alsof ze geloofden dat een bepaald type propositie juist was (bv. dat 
Vlaamse personen intelligenter zijn dan immigranten) of fout was (bv. dat Vlaamse 
personen dommer zijn dan immigranten). Het verschil in reactietijd tussen de twee 
condities (i.e., het RRT effect) bleek te correleren de mate waarin deelnemers expliciet 
te kennen gaven dat Vlaamse mensen volgens hen intelligenter zijn dan immigranten 
evenals met vragenlijsten die subtiel en openlijk racisme capteerden. Na deze eerste 
toepassing van de RRT werd in deze nieuwe procedure ingezet om 
lichaamsontevredenheid te meten (Hoofdstuk 5). Impliciete overtuigingen omtrent 
actueel en ideaal lichaamsbeeld werden afzonderlijk gemeten met behulp van twee 
RRT’s. De RRT-effecten toonden aan dat beide overtuigingen van elkaar verschilden en 
elk een significante en unieke bijdrage leverden aan de voorspelling van 
lichaamsontevredenheid. Samengevat, in hoofdstukken 3 tot 5 werd bijkomende 
evidentie verworven voor de hypothese dat het subjectieve waarheidsgehalte van 
propositionele stellingen kan worden geactiveerd onder automaticiteitscondities. Deze 
conclusie is moeilijk te verenigen met de centrale assumptie van twee-proces modellen 
van cognitie dat automatische prikkelverwerking per definitie gebaseerd is op 
associatieve processen (bv., Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Anderzijds zijn onze 
bevindingen wel perfect te integreren propositionele één-proces modellen van cognitie. 
Dit neemt echter niet weg dat de mate waarin propositionele kennis onder 
automaticiteitscondities kan verwerkt worden allicht aan een aantal randvoorwaarden 
is gebonden. In de algemene discussie stel ik daarom voor om mentale processen niet 
langer te beschrijven in functie van de inhoud ervan (bv., propositionele kennis vs. 
associatieve kennis) maar in functie van de automaticiteitscondities waaronder deze 
processen kunnen opereren. Hierbij voer ik tevens aan dat de kans dat een bepaald 
proces kan optreden onder automaticiteitscondities allicht afneemt naarmate de 
complexiteit ervan toeneemt. In het licht van dit raamwerk worden de RRT-effecten 
kritisch besproken. Een discussie over de praktische bruikbaarheid van (propositionele) 
impliciete maten sluit de dissertatie af.   
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- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Heider, N., 
Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2015). On the Relationship between Body 
Dissatisfaction and Implicit Beliefs about Actual and Ideal Body Image. 
Manuscript Submitted for Publication. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:  
All datasets reported in the abovementioned publication 
All datasets reported in Chapter 3 of the doctoral dissertation of Niclas 
Heider 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
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        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [X] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
        PDF is stored in subfolder "06EthicalProtocol" 
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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Chapter 4 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: RRT study on racism / internal liplab code: 
MNH_2014_racial_RRT 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 23.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: De Houwer, 
J., Heider, N., Spruyt, A., Roets, A., & Hughes, S. (2015). The Relational 
Responding Task: Toward a New Implicit Measure of Beliefs. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 6, 319. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:  
All datasets reported in the abovementioned publication 
All datasets reported in Chapter 4 of the doctoral dissertation of Niclas 
Heider 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
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        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name: Maarten DeSchryver 
   - address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
   - affiliation: Ugent 
   - e-mail: Maarten.DeSchryver@UGent.be 
    
v0.2 
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Chapter 5 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: RRT study on Body Dissatisfaction / internal liplab 
code: MNH_2014_BD_RRT 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 23.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Heider, N., 
Spruyt, & De Houwer, J.(2015). Body Dissatisfaction Revisited: 
The Importance of Beliefs concerning both Actual and Ideal Body Image. 
Manuscript Submitted for Publication.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:  
All datasets reported in the abovementioned publication 
All datasets reported in Chapter 5 of the doctoral dissertation of Niclas 
Heider 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
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* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [X] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
        PDF is stored in subfolder "06EthicalProtocol" 
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
    
v0.2 
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Appendix A 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: MNH_2011_Priming_Task_Misapplication_colored 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 1 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
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  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: Task Misapplication Study 2 / internal liplab code: 
MNH_2012_Prime_Task_Misapplication_cued 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 2 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: evaluative relational priming study / internal liplab 
code: MNH_2013_relative-evaluative-priming 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 3 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: MNH_2011_Priming_AMWANT_1 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 4 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: MNH_2012_Priming_AMWANT_2 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 5 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: relational priming study with body dissatisfied 
participants / internal liplab code: MNH_2013_Priming_BD 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 6 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study: relational priming study with body dissatisfied 
participants / internal liplab code: MNH_2014_RRT_size 
% Author: Niclas Heider 
% Date: 22.4.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Niclas Heider 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: niclas.heider@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt (PhD Promoter) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: adriaan.spruyt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
PhD Thesis of Niclas Heider 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Experiment 7 reported in Appendix A 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): Liblab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
        R-scripts can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. 
        merged raw data and working data can be found in subfolder 
"03Analysis/Results" 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. 
        R-script can be found in subfolder "03Analysis/Calculations" 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
        Scanned informed consents can be found in subfolder 
"01Background/informed consents" of each study 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. 
        Data is stored and organized in line with the guidelines of the Liplab 
(provided by Maarten DeSchryver) 
        a readme-file can be found on lowest folder level, specific files are 
in their respective folders 
  - [X] other files. 
        the computer program can be found in subfolder "01Background" 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [X] other: LipLab Share 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
  
v0.2 
 
 
 
 
 
